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ABSTRACT 
 
The goal of this dissertation is to identify the structure of perception as depicted by 
Hierocles in the !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#.. In order to do that, I will focus on Hierocles' arguments 
and examples concerning perception. I will start by considering the distinction between 
perception of oneself and perception of external things and all the nuances of the complex 
relationship between the two. Such analysis will unfold in such a way that we come to find a 
non-indifferent perception. Because of that, I will study the role of !"#$%&'() in the structure of 
perception. To be sure, this is a complex and intricate concept, but I will try to pick out the 
fundamental aspects and their relevance as regards the strucutre of perception. In the end, I will 
establish a link between the !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#. and the fragment from Stobaeus (6.671). Such 
connection will help to uncover the concentric structure of a non-indifferent perception. All this 
analysis will stick as much as possible to Hierocles' texts.  
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Resumo 
O objectivo desta dissertação é identificar a estrutura da percepção tal como ela é 
desenhada por Hiérocles nos <,(#= >1!(?$%&'(). Para alcançar este objectivo focar-me-ei na 
análise que o filósofo estóico leva a cabo em torno da percepção. O foco começa por incindir 
sobre a distinção entre percepção de si e percepção do exterior, com todas as suas subtilezas. 
Tal análise implicará então a consideração da importância da não-indiferença nessa estrutura de 
percepção. O objectivo é compreender como a percepção é sempre relacional e interessada. . 
Centrar-me-ei então na noção de !"#$%&'(), tentanto explorar a complexidade e multiplicidade 
do fenómeno em causa. Será também estabalecida a relção com o fragmento de Estobeu 
(6.671), que é, a par da obra <,(#= >1!(?$%&'(), a fonte mais importante do pensamento de 
Hiérocles. Através desta relação introduzir-se-á a estrutura circular e concêntrica de uma 
percepção relacional e interessada. Toda esta dissertação será levada a cabo focando-se 
principalmente nos textos do próprio Hiérocles.       
 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: *+,-'(), './*%',-'(), 0/1%2-3() 4*.1!5, 0/1%2-3() 16/ 7#18), 
!"#$%&'(), 9:µ;, non-indifferent differential diagnosis, self-centred map of functional non-
indifference.  
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Introduction 
The goal of this dissertation is to identify the structure of perception as outlined in 
Hierocles' !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#.. I hope to show that Hierocles' work offers an opportunity to 
study the complex nature of human (and also animal) perception. To be more precise: I hope to 
show that Hierocles' work offers an outstanding chance to study the all-embracing, 
multidimensional and self-centred structure of our interested and therefore evaluative 
perception.  
This is, of course, a lot of ground to cover. Besides being a lot, the ground is also rocky 
and difficult. A number of precautions are required. A bad choice might lead down a dangerous 
or blocked path. For this reason I will try to come up with a map of it. This being said, such a 
map will obviously focus on the roles not only of !"#$%#&', #()!*#$%#&' and +),*-%.&', but 
also of /012*3#&'. All these concepts play a pivotal role in Hierocles' text and accordingly in the 
following analysis, which will not only study each of them, but also and specially focus on how 
they relate to each other. A clear outline of the structure of perception — as identified by 
Hierocles — should arise from the links between these elements.  
In order to keep this dissertation within reasonable boundaries it will need to be an 
immanent analysis of the text. The problems will be dealt with as they appear in the text, not 
along the lines of a thorough study of (orthodox or unorthodox) general Stoic doctrine. 
Hierocles' !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#. is seen here as a possible key to the problematic structure of 
perception.  The goal will therefore be neither to compare Hierocles' view to that of Chrysippus 
or any other Stoic, nor to use Hierocles' work to directly improve our overall knowledge of 
stoic doctrine. I believe this will sound appalling to most scholars. Yet my concern is 
philosophical, not scholastic. Stoic doctrine is obviously important for understanding this 
author's perspective, and I will try not to neglect it. Nevertheless, this dissertation cannot focus 
on systematic links to the doctrines of /012*3#&' or !"#$%#&' (and accordingly 4!),!#*!). If 
however this exposition — being a master’s thesis — needs to be seen as as a scholastic 
project, let it be seen as a small, limited but precise contribution for others to use in whatever 
context it might help. 
Before proceeding to the analysis proper, I must add that, even within such a restricted 
framework, there is a considerable list of tasks I need to do. The first one is to correctly identify 
the problem at stake. The second is to properly detect what Hierocles says to answer this 
problem. The third is to support my interpretation and show it corresponds to what is in the 
text. The fourth is to understand how the Stoic author expresses himself and accordingly to 
understand how the way he expresses himself affects what he is saying. The fifth job is to 
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consider whether the answers Hierocles gives for the problems associated with the main 
question at stake solve such problems and also the main question, and why they resolve them or 
not. The sixth has to do with the things the Stoic philosopher does not say: are the answers 
incomplete? Does he present all the intricacies of the problem? What does he presuppose 
without explaining? What did he leave out? How important is that which is left out? This sixth 
task leads to the seventh, which concerns itself with the relationship between what is said and 
what is not said — it could be called the building of unfinished bridges: pointing out unsolved 
problems that can lead to new investigations, which may in turn complement or even alter the 
signification and significance of what Hierocles says.This seventh task will mostly be relegated 
to footnotes (and annexes). I will try to accurately perform all these assignments throughout 
this dissertation. 
 
Stating the Problem 
 
The driving question in this dissertation can be formulated in a very concise way: what is 
perception all about? 
I feel that presenting this thesis as one that fantasises about understanding what perception 
is all about entails a tremendous risk, for this could overload it with unrealistic expectations. As 
well documented by the philosophical tradition, such a concise query involves many problems. 
The enormous breadth of these issues cannot be entirely taken into account here. Instead, 
Hierocles' text will be used to highlight some of them. One therefore needs to grasp which 
elements of perception are at stake in this Stoic's explanation, and how he describes them. The 
goal is to use these elements and his description of them to better understand what perception is 
all about.  
Moreover, a comprehensive and detailed outline of the problems one would need to 
address in order to fully grasp and answer this driving question is also far beyond the scope of 
this work. There are indeed concerns Hierocles does not tackle and which would be important 
for understanding what perception is all about. For example, in his text one will find no answer 
to this: why and how is it that, when one perceives a men coming round a corner, one perceives 
him immediately as a man that already existed and was walking in the other street that leads to 
that corner, and not as a man that started existing right then and there? What is there in one's 
perception of that man that tells one he already existed before one perceived him? And how can 
one perceive that man as already existing, i.e. how does this (or these) element(s) constitute a 
perception in which the man is perceived as he is? One will not find these questions in 
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Hierocles' work. Therefore, despite their importance in a full comprehension of what perception 
is all about, they will not be considered in this dissertation. The well-known example of water 
boiling is another example regarding aspects of perception not found in Hierocles’ text, yet 
decisive for a full understanding of what perception is all about. Why is it that when one 
perceives water boiling in a pan, the boiling of the water is perceived as a consequence of the 
fire underneath it? What is there in the boiling of water that tells one that such boiling is caused 
by the fire? How is the element of perception "boiling" associated with the element "fire"? 
Although this is a very important question in the complex objective of understanding what 
perception is all about, it has nothing to do with Hierocles’ investigation. It cannot therefore be 
considered in this dissertation.  
But rather than enunciating the very long list of problems Hierocles does not deal with, it 
would perhaps be better to consider the ones he does. For these also contribute to the 
understanding of what perception is all about, and they can — and hopefully will — be studied 
here. This does not mean I will now list all the problems at stake in the Stoic's text. In its place, 
I would like to give a generical sketch of the fundamental issues at stake, and then let the 
course of the text show how Hierocles expresses them. 
The first thing to notice has to do with the structure of Hierocles' text. For he uses many 
examples that help to explain what he is trying to say, and in these examples he shows that 
there are a lot of elements that go unnoticed in one's perception, despite their decisive role in it. 
For example, he tries to show that, in perception of one's hand, the fact that the hand is one's 
own hand plays a pivotal role, even though this element is seldom realized. This structural 
organization indicates that normal perception tends to ignore its own constitution. Such an 
arrangement turns perception into a long equation, of which one only perceives the result; like a 
huge iceberg of which one only sees the very tip. In the end analysis, Hierocles' text even 
provides elements important for explaining how one deals with a result not knowing it is the 
result of an equation, i.e. ignoring what elements made such an equation possible. This first 
point, besides being an important one in the quest for discovering what perception is all about, 
is also the point that actually begs such a quest. In order for one to commence asking questions 
about the structure of perception, one needs to realize one does not know such a structure. But 
one tends to assume one clearly knows how such a structure works because one uses it 
everyday and it works just fine. And the fact that one is surprised to see how much information 
Hierocles extracts from his examples serves to show that there are elements one does not take 
into account as being part of the perception of things, although one would not perceive the way 
one does perceive if it were not for them. This shows a deficit or "astigmatism" in the way one 
! %!
tends to understand one's own perception. This is relevant to the understanding of what 
perception is all about, and it can be studied in Hierocles' !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#.. 
Numerous questions arise from this first point: how is it that there are hidden constitutive 
elements of perception? What are these elements? How do they relate to the manifest ones? 
Which are the manifest ones? Once again, a full answer to these questions is far beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. Nevertheless, they do help to distinguish between the two 
fundamental groups of questions at stake. One of them concerns the how; the other concerns the 
what. These two subordinate groups form the totality of the question "what is perception all 
about?", and they do because to realize how perception works one needs to know what are the 
pieces that make it work as it does, and also how these pieces relate to each other in order for 
perception to be what it is. To understand Hierocles' contribution to the knowledge of both 
these realms is this thesis' job. 
Bearing this in mind — and without now going into detail regarding what elements 
Hierocles identifies or the way he explains how they are connected — one can use examples to 
better understand what is at stake. Take for example my hand: I see my hand and it is just my 
hand. But what is it that I perceive when I perceive my hand? Because my hand is not just a 
hand, it is my hand, it is my hand at 24 years of age, it is my right hand and not my left hand, 
and so on. What is it that makes my hand different from other people’s hands? Is it just size? 
Complexion? Size and complexion? If I had an exactly similar twin would my hand be 
perceived as being the same as his? Is my hand severed from my body just the same as my 
hand still attached to it? And is my hand attached to my body the same whether it obeys my 
commands or not? The problem does not concern only hands; it has to do with everything I 
perceive: what is it that I perceive when I perceive a lion? Is the perception of a lion behind 
bars similar to the perception of that same lion without something between us? Are the bars the 
only thing that changes? What if I can perceive it behind bars without perceiving bars? What if 
I can perceive it through a completely translucid glass (just like one sees sharks in tanks)? Is 
perception of the lion the same whether it is captive or free? If not, what is it that makes the 
difference? How is it possible that the same object can be perceived in different ways? And if 
there is indeed a change, does that change happen as a result of a change in the perceived 
object, or is it possible that the very act of perceiving somehow changes the perceived object? 
In other words: are the elements that constitute perception provided by the perceived object? 
And is the way in which these elements relate to each other also provided by it? Or is it 
possible that perception itself shapes the perceived object?  How does one distinguish between 
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what is "generated" by perception itself and what is generated by the perceived object? What 
belongs to the former or the latter? 
Once again I would like to stress that this dissertation will not be able to answer all the 
questions formulated so far, and nor will it be able to consider all the other intricate questions 
these questions give rise to. The goal is restricted to pinpointing and explaining what 
contribution studying Hierocles provides to their answering. 
There is however one last point I would like to emphasize right now, for it helps to set the 
tone for the rest of this thesis. It has to do with this last batch of difficulties. I gave the example 
of a hand, and then said that such an example would apply to every object of perception. After 
that, I used another example, this time concerning the perception of a lion. Both of them tried to 
show that there are various elements in each perception, and that the changing of small 
elements may (and probably will) change the result of the whole equation. This analysis only 
considers each perception as an equation: perception of the lion would be one equation, and 
perception of the hand another. But one still needs to ask whether there is some kind of 
relationship between these "individual" equations, and, if there is, how it works. One might 
begin by asking: how is perception of one's own hand (and all the elements therein involved) 
related to perception of a lion (and all the elements therein involved)? Maybe it can be said 
that, when one perceives the lion, one perceives one's hands as a means of escaping by 
climbing. In this scenario, one is putting two different moments of perception within the 
perception of a situation, and describing the perception of that situation as an equation that 
includes different moments that are themselves also equations. But is perception of one's hand 
in the morning still related to the perception of the lion in the afternoon? I am sure this sounds 
like a crazy question, because here perception of one's hand happens in a different context to 
perception of the lion. Nonetheless one could ask: does perception of one's hand in the morning 
include or not the possibility of grabbing and pulling? I am not yet saying it does — though I 
am certainly hinting —, but if it does, does not that mean that perception of one's hand in the 
morning makes reference to the possibility of escaping the lion in the afternoon (by climbing, 
for example)? There is therefore a possible connection between apparently unrelated 
perceptions, for an isolated perception appears to bear an intrinsic reference to what one might 
term a "bigger picture". Such a bigger picture appears therefore to be an equation that contains 
other equations as its variables, which in turn can have other equations as variables, and so on. 
How such a thing can happen is a question of the utmost importance to the grasping of what 
perception is all about. The two capital questions one needs to ask concerning this are: ”How 
big is this picture?” and “How is it organized?” 
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Hierocles' text deals with these problems. And in doing so it helps in disputing the 
paradigms that support one's natural comprehension of perception. These paradigms can help in 
better understanding what was just said, and thus in realizing what perception is all about. 
But which paradigms are they? Or, in other words, how does one tend to apprehend how 
perception happens and what it contains? Perception is usually understood to be a passive 
apprehension of pre-disposed elements that appear already related to each other in an obvious 
way (colours, shapes, odours and textures). Such an apprehension is considered neutral as 
regards one's disposition, theories and convictions. Furthermore, each moment and object 
perceived tend to be understood in a fragmentary way, as if they had no relation to each other 
— just as if the one perceiving were collecting different and unrelated pieces. According to this 
perspective, perception of one's hand is the perception of an object shaped in a certain way (one 
squarish palm and five cylindrical fingers), that has a certain texture, a certain odour and a 
certain colour, that includes in these elements various subtleties like different colours (in the 
case of the nails or hair), and so on. These are, more or less extensively, the elements included 
in the perception of one's hand, and they appear as a given unity among themselves, but without 
any connection to one's feet (which are under the table one has one's hand upon and are 
therefore out of sight — and hopefully not noticed for their odour). Then one might take one’s 
feet from under the table and look at them, and the same process would take place. Then one 
raises one's eyes and sees a wall, and another entirely different and unconnected perception 
would take place. One might term this the Lego paradigm. It describes one's natural 
understanding of perception as a construction made from different and isolated blocks that get 
assembled and can then be disassembled again into simple and unrelated elements. However, as 
I tried to anticipate in the previous paragraph, there is another possible understanding of 
perception, one that Hierocles' text describes and which, instead of focusing on the small Lego 
parts, focuses on the ”Instructions Page”. It sees the bigger picture and it is from this bigger 
picture that it extracts the comprehension of the small parts — instead of seeing a brown 
rectangular piece, it sees the piece that serves as a door to the house. Mutatis mutandis, the 
form of perception Hierocles describes involves an all-inclusive perception, a total perception 
that extracts each and every element from a universal context (from a universal equation that 
contains multiple equations, which in turn include other equations and so on). In this case, it 
would be only because one was already dealing with a result that one would not know the 
complex maths behind this result. Since one is only interested in the result, one tends to forget 
the rest. 
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Now the second paradigm concerns precisely this interest one has in perception. One could 
call it the paradigm of the bystander — someone who is just watching the game. In fact, 
perception tends to be associated with a neutral and disinterested apprehension of factual data. 
Yes, one comes to interpret it afterwards, but perception itself is completely neutral and attains 
to what it perceives — perception does not tell the woman her husband is cheating on her, it 
just tells her he is naked and in contact with a naked woman, or rather it shows her shapes and 
colours and textures and odours that she interprets as being her husband and another woman 
naked in their bedroom (the one with those colours and shapes and so on), and then she 
interprets that as cheating. In the same fashion, perception only gives me five cylinders and a 
squarish palm, which I interpret as a hand. This is one's natural way of describing perception. 
But Hierocles' description points at an entirely different way; one that I venture to say destroys 
this bystander's paradigm. For he describes perception as a self-interested perception, one that, 
because it is interested, perceives everything in an interested fashion, in an immediately 
interested fashion. Therefore, it works as a continual diagnosis that actively interprets 
everything at every moment. According to this account, perception of the husband cheating is 
first and foremost perception of the husband cheating, and all the sensorial data exist and make 
sense only within this context. The data is transformed and shaped by the meaning of what is 
happening; indeed to such an extent that the same lamp the wife uses to read every night 
becomes a weapon for attacking the mistress (all the sensorial data relating to the lamp only 
make sense in this context). And perception of this episode would be completely different if the 
wife was completely surprised or if she came home because she was trying to catch her 
husband in flagranti, just as both of these alternatives depend on whether she is pregnant with 
his child or about to ask for a divorce anyway. 
Now this is where the two paradigms meet each other, just like their opposites. For a 
perception that works according to a Lego standard builds only from the data it has in front of 
it, and it cannot therefore connect the present moment to past happiness or a future divorce. On 
the contrary, a self-interested perception is a perception that interprets what it perceives as 
being closer to or further away from what interests the one perceiving — a perception that sees 
the husband (and not a male human) and the mistress as the ruining of its own life or as the 
perfect chance to ask for a divorce and keep half of his fortune.  
The !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#. places its author's name in the small list of those who explain 
perception as an interested and total phenomenon. Indeed, there are not many that can be 
included in such a catalogue, and those who do comply are often overlooked or even despised. 
For they claim that the normal way of understanding perception misses out exactly on what 
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perception is all about. Obviously, this does not fall well with the ones who follow the above-
mentioned paradigms. But instead of following this path, authors like Hierocles focus on an 
analysis that stresses the active, cohesive, diagnostic, interpretative and evaluative structure of 
a self-centred, all-inclusive and all-relating perception. To explain what this entails and how 
this can happen is to clarify what perception is all about. To perform such a task, even if I am 
limited by using only Hierocles' work, is my goal. 
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1)First Section — !"#$%#&' and #()!*#$%#&' 
 
1.a) Introduction 
 
Hierocles begins his !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#. by stating that the best starting point to this 5"#$% 
-'(#)*+,-#.1 is the discussion or dispute (-67/') concerning an animal’s 89:,/) /012;/). But if 
one wants to be picky, the very first thing that appears after the title is a cryptographic 
subheading, which reads "20 !0#$<)2,!& ,= >?/) @!(,/A". The meaning of this subheading is 
puzzling. Nevertheless, it puts !"#$%#&' in the spotlight from the very beginning. But then the 
opening of the text seems unrelated to this ciphered message. Indeed, the first paragraph tells 
one that the best introduction to the fundaments of ethics is a consideration of an animal's 
89:,/) /012;/), and then says it is not worse to commence further back and ponder the genesis 
of beings endowed with a soul (7B)2#&' ,:) Cµ.DE3)) and the first attributes of an animal (,F 
89:,! #(µG!*)/),! ,? >?3). Consequently, ignoring this very suspicious subheading, one can 
find four important points in the first paragraph: the first is ethics; the second is the 89:,/) 
/012;/); the third is the 7B)2#&' ,:) Cµ.DE3); and the fourth is ,F 89:,! #(µG!*)/),! ,? >?3. 
The first point comes as no surprise. The title of the work surely anticipates it, and it is also 
well know that Stoics such as Hierocles have a special concern for ethics. The second point is 
also to be expected from someone used to dealing in the Stoics. For /012*3#&' plays a decisive 
role in ethics, and the 89:,/) /012;/) is the result of the first moment of /012*3#&'. In fact, 
authors from this school often maintain that the discussion concerning the 89:,/) /012;/) is the 
best starting point for a study of ethics, since it involves the first moment of that which makes 
ethics possible. Accordingly, if one knows some of the Stoics' basic tenets, one would expect 
these two first points to appear at the beginning of this text.  But the third and fourth can be a 
bit of a surprise, as in a way Hierocles anticipates, when he says "+--F $: /H E2;9/) 
C)$(µ%$I)!& µJ--/) K)3$2) +9L<µ2)/'" (I 2-3). The appearance of two unexpected elements 
therefore raises some questions regarding their meaning and their connection to the purpose of 
an ethics-related text. The problem can be stated like this: why is it not worse to begin further !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1The title !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#. is difficult to decipher. In fact, it can be understood as indicating an elementary 
introduction of ethics, in the sense of an "introduction" to ethics, but it can also be understood as a fundamental 
explanation of ethics, in the sense of an explanation of the foundations of ethics. Obviously, these meaning do not 
exclude each other. There are indeed moments during which one feels that Hierocles is making a resume of important 
doctrinal ethical matters (pointing hence to the first option), but the care with which he explains some points is also 
worthy of a more detailed explanation of fundamental aspects of ethics. A clear-cut identification of the meaning of the 
title would be easier if the text were not partly lost. 
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back by considering the 7B)2#&' ,:) Cµ.DE3) and ,F 89:,! #(µG!*)/),! ,? >?3? Or, in other 
words: what are they and what do they have to do with ethics and the 89:,/) /012;/)? 
It is obvious that one should also ask what ethics involves and what after all the 89:,/) 
/012;/) is, but if one has had some contact with Stoics, one tends to let oneself be carried away 
by some anticipation of their meaning. They are nevertheless important questions that 
Hierocles’ text needs to answer. But in order to arrive at them, it might be wise to understand 
why one should begin even further back. 
In addition, if one were to be really picky about this first paragraph, it would not be out of 
place to ask what each of these four elements has to do with the subheading "20 !0#$<)2,!& ,= 
>?/) @!(,/A". In fact, the explanation of the third and fourth point will contribute to this. 
The 7B)2#&' ,:) Cµ.DE3) is described as the process by which animals and humans come 
to have .(EM. What this word means is not yet clear. But if Hierocles introduces this word and 
this process here, it must be because they have something to do with the first and second points. 
As to an animal’s first attributes (,F 89:,! #(µG!*)/),! ,? >?3), they are said to be !"#$%#&' 
and N9µM (I 33-34). At first sight these two bear — at least to the untrained eye — no 
connection to ethics and the 89:,/) /012;/). Still, just like the 7B)2#&' ,:) Cµ.DE3), there 
must be a connection.  
Indeed there is, and now one has the necessary elements to establish it. The generation of 
beings endowed with .(EM — sc. animals and humans — is described as the process by which 
one acquires that which makes animals different from non-animals. And what makes animals 
different from non-animals is precisely what is at stake in the word .(EM. As I said, the 
meaning of such a word is hard to grasp from the description presented in I 6-38 — the part 
concerning the 7B)2#&' ,:) Cµ.DE3). It is however clear that a) .(EM is what distinguishes an 
animal from a non-animal and that b) those who have .(EM differ from those who do not have 
it as regards !"#$%#&' and N9µM. Accordingly, it becomes clear that the generation of animals 
and humans is the process by which they come to have both !"#$%#&' and N9µM, i.e. the things 
that make them different from beings without .(EM. This is clear when Hierocles says "... ,= 
>?/) ,/A µO >?/( P(/;) QE2& /#01(234, !0#$M#2& ,2 1!R N9µS" (I 33-34, my emphasis). He then 
says the latter will not be considered for now. The former, however, must be pondered upon, 
since it contributes to the knowledge of the 89:,/) /012;/) ("152*# 7F9 20' 7):#&) ,/A 89T,/( 
/012*/(", I 35-36, my emphasis). 
So the 7B)2#&' ,:) Cµ.DE3) is the process by which animals come to have their 89:,! 
#(µG!*)/),!. At least the latter contributes to the knowledge of the 89:,/) /012;/) — although 
we will see that in fact both contribute to it. Since the understanding of the 89:,/) /012;/) 
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contributes to the grasping of ethics, it is safe to say that directly or indirectly ,F 89:,! 
#(µG!*)/),! ,? >?3 contribute to the apprehension of ethics, and therefore so does the 7B)2#&' 
,:) Cµ.DE3), for it helps to explain ,F 89:,! #(µG!*)/),! ,? >?3. 
The reason why Hierocles decides to leave one of the 89:,! #(µG!*)/),! on hold can be 
analysed, and it will be, but just not now. Be it as it may, the introductory pages that explain 
Hierocles' personal will to go further back  —from I, 1 to I, 37 — end up presenting a structure 
that can be summed up as follows: The subject of the text is ethics, and this subject entails the 
study of the 89:,/) /012;/), which in its turn involves an investigation into animals’ .(EM, 
which in its turn includes an investigation into !"#$%#&' (and N9µM, which will be kept for 
later). The beginning of the text thus has three main concerns: 89:,/) /012;/), .(EO ,:) >?3) 
and !"#$%#&'. The order Hierocles follows is: first he deals with .(EO ,:) >?3), second he 
handles !"#$%#&' and after that he looks at the 89:,/) /012;/). I will follow this same order. 
My analysis will start with an investigation of the Stoic's description of the .(EO ,:) >?3) — 
as it appears in the 7B)2#&' ,:) Cµ.DE3) — and from this it will extract elements that already 
point to !"#$%#&'. The investigation will thus lead to the consideration of !"#$%#&'. All of this 
will take place in the first section. The 89:,/) /012;/) and its connection to the other subjects 
will be saved for the second. This connection will lead to N9µM and help to explain the complex 
structure that begins to be outlined in these first pages. 
So let us zoom in on the first subject — the .(EO ,:) >?3) 
 
1.b) +,)-#&' ./) 0µ1234) and !"#$%#&' 
 
Before getting straight to the point, I would like to stress that I wish to explain neither the 
physical or natural aspects of Hierocles' analysis nor what the Stoics mean by generation. My 
goal is to understand !"#$%#&'. The explanation of the 7B)2#&' ,:) Cµ.DE3) is only a means to 
this end. 2 
Hierocles' description of the process by which animals and humans acquire that which 
makes them animals or humans (i.e. the description of the process by which animals and 
humans acquire .(EM) goes like this: 1) a seed drops into a healthy womb at the right time; 2) 
as soon as 1) happens, the seed starts its proper activities, by which the embryo is formed with 
the matter the seed draws from the body that holds it; 3) from 1) on the seed turned into embryo 
is 4D#&', a kind of 8)2Aµ! transformed by the seed's presence and beginning its proper !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 To better understand this process, please confront SVF: 2.806; 2.787; 2.805; 2.756-757. Besides this confront also 
Long, "Soul and Body in Stoicism", 34-57, esp. 43-44. 
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activities; 4) with the progression of the aforementioned activities the embryo gets closer to the 
moment of birth — and there is a relationship between this progression in time and the 
progressive transformation of a 4D#&', that is closer to a dense 8)2Aµ!, into a "thinner" 8)2Aµ!, 
that is closer to .(EM; 5) once it leaves the uterus and comes into contact with the 829&BE/), this 
4D#&' turns immediately into .(EM (µ2,!G<--2& 20' .(EM), i.e., the embryo gets transformed 
immediately into an animal. 
However obscure and imprecise this outline may be, it serves Hierocles' purpose by 
making the moment of contact with the 829&BE/) the immediate moment in which an animal 
becomes an animal and begins to have something that can be described as !"#$%#&'. In fact, to 
conclude the argument Hierocles says ",!D,U PV 8J) ,= C182#=) W#,B9!' *6"7,. C#,R >?/)" 
(my emphasis). Since he also says that animals differ from non-animals with regards to 
!"#$%#&' and N9µM, I owe it to logic to conclude that *6"7,. C182#=) W#,B9!' the animal has 
both perception and impulse — the animal is an animal as soon as it has them, and it has them 
immediately when it gets out of the womb. So, as far as perception is concerned, it can be said 
that it begins at the same time as animal life itself begins — (and this will be further proved 
later on) — and that this moment happens at the same time contact with something external 
begins.  
This makes the moment of birth the decisive moment in the description outlined above. For 
it is the moment at which an embryo stops being an embryo and becomes an animal. 
Accordingly it is the instant at which 4D#&' becomes .(EM. Although there is a gradual process 
leading to the transformation into .(EM, since all the time before birth an embryo remains 
4D#&' ("P&!µB)2& 4D#&'" I, 14), the distinction is clear-cut. For however gradual the 
development of an embryo may be, all the time it is an embryo it is still 4D#&' and not .(EM. 
Animal life as such begins only when an animal acquires .(EM and accordingly !"#$%#&' and 
N9µM; and it only acquires them when in contact with the 829&BE/). In fact, one tends to assume 
animal life begins at the moment of conception, for this is when the processes eventually 
leading to the forming of the .(EM begin. But Hierocles clearly states that during all this time 
the embryo remains 4D#&'. So the focus is on the differential moment, or, in other words, on the 
moment that creates a split between two completely different states, between two completely 
different ways of being. Before birth there is a way of being that is also attributed to plants, 
which is 4D#&', and it contains absolutely nothing of what makes animal life what it is: 
!"#$%#&' and N9µM. For all this period, during which the embryo remains 4D#&', it remains a 
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kind of life that is toto coelo different from animal life. Indeed this applies to such an extent 
that the word "life" has completely different meanings if applied to 4D#&' or to .(EM.3 
In order for this explanation to be completely clear, one would have to go into a detailed 
analysis of what one might term the scala naturae.4 Such an incursion is beyond the range of 
this thesis. Nevertheless, an outline of what is at stake in this is mandatory, for it will have an 
impact at various decisive moments in this dissertation. The scala naturae can therefore be 
explained as being a scale that ranks different forms or categories of life, establishing a) a kind 
of rupture between each of them and b) a continuous progression from one to another. Both 
aspects can be described by what Aristotle terms C42LI'5. The classical example distinguishes 
between no life at all — a state attributed to things such as rocks and inanimate objects —, a 
kind of life with no anima, i.e. the life of those things which do not have .(EM and accordingly 
do not perceive or experience impulses (have neither !"#$%#&' nor N9µM) — plants fall within 
this category —, a life capable of perceiving what surrounds it and capable of acting 
accordingly to its impulses, i.e. the life of the Qµ.(E! such as animals, and finally a life of 
those who besides perceiving and experiencing impulses are in such a condition as to 
understand what they perceive, to think about it and control their impulses accordingly. The 
first stage can be termed esse, the second vivere, the third percipere and the fourth 
intelligere.6At stake in this scala naturae is not only the existence of different levels of being, 
but also their relationship to each other. Indeed, the scale mirrors the normal way of 
categorizing forms of being, which is done by comparing them with one another. For example, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 It is important to notice that we tend to associate the beginning of life with the moment of conception, or at least with a 
moment that happens while the animal is still within the womb. Still, Hierocles emphasizes that animal (and human) life 
as such only begin at birth. This is a very important aspect, for, as we will see, it highlights the role of the 829&BE/).  %!The expression scala naturae is normally used to denote a scale that depicts the evolution of different forms of life. 
This scale portrays evolution from the simplest to the more complex forms of life, and has as fundamental characteristics 
the ones I will describe in the following pages.  Now, what I want to make clear is that the use of the expression scala 
naturae tends to be a narrow one, since it only considers a limited part of a vaster scale. In fact, its usual use tends to 
restrict it to just a few levels, all of them encompassed within animal life. On the contrary, my use of this expression has 
a broader scope. Instead of focusing on the realm of animal life, the scale includes esse, vivere and intelligere and 
incorporates animal life (i.e. percipere) into a more complex structure. And the point I want to make is that this more 
complex and multi-layered structure is always presupposed in the more restricted use of the scala naturae, whether one 
is aware of this or not. To be more precise, I could say that the usual uses of the scala naturae consider only a segment 
of what is in reality a vaster scale. This smaller segment — which corresponds to the stricter sense of scala naturae — 
presupposes a vaster scale — which corresponds to the broader sense of scala naturae — and is always included in 
it.This vaster scale works like a "categorical panorama" which encompasses everything one perceives, whereas the 
stricter sense correspond merely to a "region" located in this global picture. The broader sense of scala naturae refers to 
a total scale that leaves nothing outside it: everything one perceives is located and is organized within this scale (i.e. each 
thing is located on one level which is defined by its relative position to the other levels). And upon closer inspection it is 
easy to grasp that the stricter sense of scala naturae already presupposes that all the forms of living inside it have a 
position relative to what is simpler than them (esse and vivere) and to what is more complex than them (intelligere). In 
the end, what we are dealing with is always a panorama in the true sense of the word: an all-embracing range that 
categorizes and organizes each and every mode-of-being within a scale. Every segment of this scale only makes sense 
within the whole framework, whether one is aware of it or not 
5De anima 414b28-415a3. 
6Other arrangements can be made, but for now one can work with these four. 
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one tends to see things that belong to esse as things, objects with no life at all, and one's 
comprehension of vivere is based on things with a form of "organic" life. Rocks are "existing 
things", things with a material support one can see and touch, but with no life at all, whereas 
plants are also touchable and existing things, but completely transformed by a form of 
"organic" life. So one takes the basic foundation contained in esse, to wit the physical existence 
of some kind of material, and gives it vital functions, producing something completely different 
from a mere esse, something toto coelo distinct from what is involved in a purely material and 
dead existence — i.e. generating a form of vivere.  
One of the most important features of this scale consists in the integration of the previous 
form of life. In other words, vivere incorporates esse and transforms it by adding something 
extra, which in this instance is "organic" life. The scale thus implies both a continuation and a 
rupture between different levels. A continuation because of the integration of the previous state 
in the next one. A rupture because the latter does not just add different characteristics to the 
former: it adds new characteristics that transform the ones inherited from the previous level. 
Perhaps an example from geometry will help: the relationship between the different stages in 
the scale can be compared to the relationship between a triangle and a square. By adding one 
more side to a triangle one changes everything about it. In fact, it ceases to be a triangle 
because a triangle is defined by having three sides, whereas this polygon has four. By adding 
one more side, the polygon becomes a square, which is obviously completely different from a 
triangle. This is what I call a rupture: by adding something, one can completely transform the 
previous state of a geometric shape, to a point where the essence of the new shape is 
completely different from what it was before. But at the same time, a square does integrate 
three sides in it, although it completely changes their structure. Furthermore, if one looks at a 
square and traces a diagonal line, one can still find the triangle there as a part of the square. So 
in a square it is still possible to trace back to the previous state from which it originated. This is 
what I mean by continuation: the square integrats what was prior to it, even though it 
transforms it. There could not be a square without four sides, and in four sides there need to be 
three, even if they are arranged in a different way.  The same thing happens with esse and 
vivere: vivere possesses the physical existence that defines esse, but it has this in a completely 
different way. In fact, one can see physical existence in plants, just as one sees it in rocks, but 
such a physical existence is completely transformed by the "organic" life the plant has, to a 
point that what defines this same physical existence is no longer it being physically existent, 
but it being an organic and living physical existence. Physical existence in plants can be traced 
back to esse; it includes what defines esse, but at the same time it changes what defined esse in 
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such a way that the same concept of "physical existence" is completely different if applied to 
plants or rocks. 
The transformation at stake thus involves a rupture and, at the same time, a continuation of 
the previous level. The same thing applies to the relationship between vivere and percipere. 
Plants, for instance, are characterized by having a material support and organic life, which 
makes them different from things that only have material support, like rocks, but they are also 
characterized by lacking perception and impulse, which animals have. The fact that animals 
add perception and impulse to a material existence and organic life transforms their existence. 
Just as before, the introduction of perception and impulse integrates the basic foundation of 
esse and the basic foundation of vivere and transforms them, giving rise to something that is 
completely different from a mere esse and a mere vivere and yet integrating them and being 
continuous with them — percipere. This description is very incomplete and "full of holes", so 
to speak. Yet it serves to stress the paradoxical relationship of continuum and rupture between 
an embryo and an animal: there is a continuum because an animal has a physical existence and 
some kind of organic life, just like an embryo. Such a continuum is actually present in 
Hierocles' efforts to mediate the 4D#&'' transformation into .(EM by a series of continual 
processes rendering an embryo ready for birth (I 11-19). But there is also a rupture because the 
moment of birth transforms these things into a form of life toto coelo different by adding .(EM 
and accordingly !"#$%#&' and N9µM.7 And Hierocles’ text focuses on this moment of rupture: on 
the moment at which an embryo, which is 4D#&' and therefore a form of life that falls within 
the realm of vivere (like a plant, for example), gets transformed into a being endowed with 
.(EM and therefore into a completely different form of life, which falls within the realm of 
percipere (it becomes an animal). 
There is an important note here regarding Hierocles’ analysis of the transition between esse 
and percipere. It has to do with the afore-mentioned fact that Hierocles places the beginning of 
animal life at birth and not conception. When drawing a scale like this, the split between vivere 
and percipere, or, in Hierocles' words, between 4D#&' and .(EM, tends to be ascribed to the 
moment of conception. In such cases, therefore, the beginning of animal life and of vivere 
happens before an animal is born. I will not consider why Stoic writings reject this model. 
However, the fact that they do, and more specifically the fact that Hierocles does, creates a 
variation in the classical scale, which puts the moment of birth in the spotlight. It is important 
to stress the importance of the moment of birth in this analysis, for it helps to define the lower !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7Hierocels says at I 23-26 that there is a predisposition for this transformation. However, this does not help to explain 
why is it that there is such a predisposition, which would be the interesting point.  
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limit of the scope in which Hierocles works. This moment is decisive because it is the moment 
of rupture that transforms physical existence and "organic" life into a psychical life, into animal 
life. Since we are dealing with perception, and since Hierocles is also about to focus on 
perception — as he keeps on doing throughout almost all of the surviving text —, birth 
becomes the moment at which the point of interest in this investigation comes into play, to wit, 
!"#$%#&'. All of the subsequent analysis carried out by the Stoic occurs has as its scope the 
period of time that goes from this moment of birth onwards. 
When defining birth as being his analysis' lower limit, Hierocles also identifies the key 
player in the change that happens at that moment: the 829&BE/). As already said, the 829&BE/) 
plays a decisive role here, since the encounter with it is the moment at which an animal 
acquires .(EM, which transforms its physical existence and organic life by giving it perception 
and impulses. The 829&BE/) is the trigger of all the changes that happen at birth. X"#$%#&' 
begins when in contact with the 829&BE/). Y9µM begins when in contact with the 829&BE/). 
Animal life begins when in contact with the 829&BE/). By using the 829&BE/) as the decisive 
element in an animal's birth, Hierocles gives it one of the leading roles in his play.  
But this is not all. In fact, this explanation of the 7B)2#&' ,:) Cµ.DE3) turns out to be 
much more than just a description of how animals come to have their 89:,! #(µG!*)/),!. As 
the presentation of the scale helps to demonstrate, the structure involving rupture and 
continuation between the different levels entails strong links among !"#$%#&', N9µM and animal 
life. X"#$%#&' and N9µM cannot be reduced to merely additional and superfluous elements of 
life, neither can life be regarded as a simple support that enables !"#$%#&' and N9µM or as 
something upon which they "rest". Indeed, the meaning of the word "life" changes dramatically 
when considered as being a perceptive and impulsive life. At stake is something that Hierocles 
never explicitly states, but pervades all of his analysis, to wit, the understanding of perception 
as being something intrinsic to life, embedded in it, shaped by it, and therefore transmuted by 
its characteristics and functions. Perception is shaped and moulded by the kind of life animals 
and humans have. But, at the same time, perception is a constitutive part of animal and human 
life and therefore shapes and transforms it.  At the same time, and although it may be harder to 
grasp at the beginning, the same happens between perception and impulse, and also between 
impulse and life. The N9µM at stake is completely embedded in life and shaped by it, just like 
life is shaped by impulse. Likewise, the fact that both !"#$%#&' and N9µM define — and are 
defined by — life already points to a deep relationship between !"#$%#&' and N9µM: the 
!"#$%#&' at stake is shaped by impulse, just like impulse is shaped by perception. The text 
creates from the very start a highly complex trio in which each element influences and is 
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influenced by the other two. Understanding how these elements relate to each other is the key 
to grasping what perception is all about. 
It is important now to return to the scale and consider intelligere. Despite Hierocles never 
dealing with what corresponds to this form of being — at least in the surviving text —, this is 
the step that allows one to define the upper limit to Hierocles' analysis. It is therefore in 
considering intelligere that one can finally circumscribe the ground upon which the surviving 
work is built. 
Maybe this time one can start by noting that for Stoics, such as Hierocles, children up to 
the age of seven are comparable to animals, because they are yet to obtain -67/'. This means 
that their state is still that of percipere. Their transformation into man only begins when they 
start developing -67/'. It is to this moment that the transformation of percipere into intelligere 
corresponds. Indeed, the transformation of percipere into intelligere comes from the 
transformation of the .(EM into a .(EO -/7&1M. What happens when children begin to develop 
-67/' is a transformation of the .(EM, not in a way that it ceases to possess !"#$%#&' and N9µM, 
but in a way that transforms the same !"#$%#&' and the same N9µM. Just as outlined above, 
-67/' integrates !"#$%#&' and N9µM — and organic life and material existence — in a new and 
transformed form of life. This new form of life is that termed intelligere, which adds -67/' to 
the previous ones and transforms them, so as to give both !"#$%#&' and N9µM a logical shape.8 
This is normally seen as the culminating point of this scala naturae.9 Regarding the question at 
stake, it is also the point that constitutes the upper limit to Hierocles' analysis. All the examples 
used by the Stoic philosopher and all the theses that these examples support occur between the 
moment of birth and the moment at which -67/' appears.  
There is an important remark to make about this delimitation of scope. It has to do with the 
idea of a fundamental unity/communion between animal and human perception. This idea is 
presupposed in the scale and in the 7B)2#&' ,:) Cµ.DE3), and without realising this from the 
start it would be hard to understand what this first explanation has to do with human perception 
— and, for that matter, it would also be hard to understand what any of the numerous animal 
examples used by Hierocles contribute to the understanding of human perception. The idea of 
this community or union can be explained by the continuum from esse all the way to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8In fact, at stake here is the fundamental stoic claim that all adult human perception and impulse entails as their decisive 
elements thesis, i.e. that they have the form of a knowledge (be it pretence knowledge or actual knowledge) 
9It is also the anchor point for the whole scale, since the scale can only be built by someone who is in a state of 
intelligere. Furthermore, the scale is built mirroring how those who are in this state organize the various forms of being 
— it mirrors how intelligere organizes the world. Now this means that the scale is built upon the presupposition that the 
state of intelligere is capable of properly grasping and explaining the previous states. This entails obvious problems that 
I cannot address for now, but which are connected to most, if not all, of the valid and valuable objections made to 
Hierocles' description of perception. This point is further devolped in annex 2. 
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intelligere. For it means that there is a continuum between a young child's perception and adult 
perception, and that there is therefore a kind of continuum between an animal's perception and 
an adult's perception, for the latter integrates the state in which both animals and children are 
situated. This is why studying the structure of perception — even if prior to its transformation 
by -67/' — does help to understand what kind of perceptive strucure we have as adult humans. 
And the remainder of Hierocles' !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#. focuses precisely on the gap between birth 
— the transformation of vivere into percipere — and the moment percipere gets transformed 
into intelligere; i.e. it focuses on percipere and therefore on !"#$%#&' and N9µM. Thus, in order 
for any of the Stoic’s analysis to be transposable to adult perception — as he clearly intends it 
to be — a fundamental unity between animal and human perception has to be presupposed.10 
Using a scale such as this entails enormous problems. Since they are connected to all 
Hierocles' weaknesses and strengths, I hope to demonstrate them in the end of this thesis.11 For 
now I would just like to anticipate that, although Hierocles presupposes a scale like this one, 
he, at the same time provides important elements that lead to its destruction. 
To comprehend how Hierocles depicts this connection between !"#$%#&', N9µM and life 
will be a long task, one that, in the end, will provide us with the structure of perception outlined 
by this Stoic philosopher. 
 
1.c) The beginning of the connection between 5).*6%1&' 7!(.89 and 5).*6%1&' ./) 
0:.;'. 
 
The picture of the 7B)2#&' ,:) Cµ.DE3) outlined above suggests that !"#$%#&' plays a 
decisive role in animals being what they are. Now, in this portrayal, the 829&BE/) appears as a 
major player in the relationship between the new-born child and !"#$%#&'. And at the same 
time this picture also suggests that !"#$%#&' has mostly to do with what is external. Indeed, 
!"#$%#&' is said to begin at the moment contact with the 829&BE/) takes place, giving the 
829&BE/) the role of a trigger of !"#$%#&'. This implies that the perception that begins as soon 
as an animal is born ("2H$Z' [µ! ,? 72)C#$!&") is perception of what is external or 
surrounding. Furthermore, this is surely what one usually deems perception useful for: to 
perceive things, external things, to perceive what surrounds one at any given time. And one 
interprets Hierocles' words like that correctly, because he is indeed saying that as soon as an 
animal is born it perceives its 829&BE/). So one expects the next step to be the consideration of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Although this pressuposition entails serious problems, as exposed in annex 2. 
11 Unfortunately, this can only be done in annex 2. Please confront it. 
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perception of external things. But instead of following the obvious trail left by the explanation 
of the 7B)2#&' ,:) Cµ.DE3), Hierocles turns to an analysis of +),*-%.&' @!(,/A, that is, of 
perception of oneself. He does come back to +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6', confirming that it certainly 
begins at birth, but only in V, 54. But why does he pass on to perception of oneself instead of 
finishing what is suggested by the  direction of the text? 
In a way, this drastic change in direction is anticipated by the curious statement that opens 
the text ("20 !0#$<)2,!& ,= >?/) @!(,/A"). But by the time Hierocles says, apparently out of the 
blue, "OH1 +7)/%,B/) \,& ,= >?/) 2H$Z' [µ! ,? 72)C#$!& !0#$<)2,!& @!(,/A" (I 39-40), one 
has long forgotten this strange statement A focus on !"#$%#&' is not surprising, since Hierocles 
has already said that the process of generation described above is the one by which animals and 
humans acquire .(EM, and accordingly !"#$%#&' and N9µM. Given that he also said he would 
leave N9µM for later, the explanation of !"#$%#&' is indeed the natural way to proceed. 
However, it is very surprising that the focus on !"#$%#&' begins with a turn towards ",= >?/) 
[...] !0#$<)2,!& @!(,/A", i.e. towards a discussion of !0#$<)2,!& @!(,/A, +),*-%.&' @!(,/A and 
the like. I say it is a turn because it seems to create and follow a sub-path within the 
consideration of !"#$%#&'. In doing so, Hierocles subdivides !"#$%#&' into perception of 
external things and perception of oneself. One was expecting a focus on !"#$%#&', and indeed 
on !"#$%#&' of external things; that would not seem a turn at all, precisely because one thinks 
08-"9-#. is the same as perception of external things. In short, by going into the study of 
!"#$%#&', Hierocles does follow the expected and logical path, but by focusing on !0#$<)2,!& 
@!(,/A he embarks upon an unexpected path within this. Such a turn comes as a shock for three 
main reasons: the first is that one was not expecting !"#$%#&' to appear divided into perception 
of oneself and perception of external things; the other is that one has no distinct idea of what 
Hierocles means when saying that ",= >?/) [...] !0#$<)2,!& @!(,/A"; the third is that one 
realises that there is an implicit connection between perception of oneself and perception of 
external things (indeed the former appears where one was expecting to see the latter), but the 
connection between them is still rather enigmatic. 
I think it is hard to believe Hierocles tries on purpose to lead his reader in one direction just 
to sweep the rug from under their feet.12 Whether on purpose or not, this is the effect produced 
by the text. Be it as it may, this turn is much more than a rhetorical device to catch the reader 
off guard. It may indeed have that effect, but the surprise has a deeper meaning. What is it? !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Such drastic change does not seem to be an intentional rhetoric device. To understand if it is or not, it would help if 
one knew the purpose of Hierocles' text. As it was said above, this is a very difficult task. Regardless of these questions, 
the effect of this drastic change remains the same. 
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The answer to this question might begin by explaining that this appearing "out of the blue" 
gives perception of oneself an immediate prominence. Even if Hierocles did not plan this 
surprise ahead, for the unsuspecting reader the result is still shock all the same. Indeed, the 
sudden arrival of an unexpected element forces one to give it some attention, in order not to 
miss what is being said. But precisely because of this, the surprise factor also raises questions 
concerning what one assumes to be at stake. When one is expecting X to emerge in the 
sequence of a text, but then sees Y, it makes one wonder not only about what Y means, but also 
about the meaning of X, and also about the meaning of all that seemed to be at stake in a text 
one was expecting to lead to X but then leads to Y.  So this turn into !0#$<)2,!& @!(,/A plays, 
intentionally or not, with the reader’s expectation and pre-assumed theses concerning 
perception, and more specifically perception of external things and the role it has in animal life. 
In Hierocles' particular case, this surprising change of direction forces a reader not only to ask 
what is meant by ",= >?/) [...] !0#$<)2,!& @!(,/A", but also after all what the perception of 
external things suggested previously is, and also what this perception, that can be both of 
external things and of oneself, is.  In fact, this turn demands a myriad of questions: What is 
perception of oneself? What kind of relationship is there between perception of oneself and 
perception of external things? Does the unexpected prominence of perception of oneself 
influence the meaning of what Hierocles has in mind when he talks about perception of 
external things? If yes, what is after all at stake in perception of external things? And what kind 
of perception is this that, on the one hand, can be both of external things and of oneself and 
that, on the other hand, is of such a nature that +),*-%.&' @!(,/A plays some kind of pivotal 
role? In the end, even if the Stoic philosopher did not build up one path just to surprise the 
reader by going the other way, he still raises all these questions. This means that an apparently 
simple path leads to what begins to sound like a complex labyrinth. 
The only possible explanation for Hierocles' change in direction is the possibility of it 
having something to do with what seemed to be the normal course of the text. In other words, 
the fact that he starts talking about perception of oneself when everything seemed to point to 
perception of external things necessarily means the Stoic is identifying a deep relationship 
between them. In fact, this change of course means that in order for one to understand 
+),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6' one must first grasp +),*-%.&' @!(,/A. Thus, by giving prominence to 
+),*-%.&' @!(,/A when one was expecting to see +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6', Hierocles is also 
establishing some kind of asymmetrical relationship between these two. He is performatively 
saying that the key to grasp +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6' lies in the comprehension of +),*-%.&' 
@!(,/A. Although the reason for this asymmetry is still far from recognizable, this is what the 
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text suggests. And in doing so the text presents +),*-%.&' @!(,/A as the fundamental player in 
the whole equation of perception. Indeed, if I am right, being one of the two branches of 
!"#$%#&', and also the key to understanding the other branch (+),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6'), +),*-%.&' 
@!(,/A appears as the piece that cracks the whole puzzle. 
So the surprise at stake in this turn involves much more than the order of the text's 
elements — it changes their meaning. As we shall see, this means that perception of external 
things will not be exactly what one expected it to be. 
Now, after saying that one must not ignore the fact that an animal perceives itself as soon 
as it is born, Hierocles claims that for the sake of those who are slower13 at grasping, it is 
necessary to say something to recall this ("1!R P2; µV) ])21! ,:) G9!P(,B93) -2E$I)!* ,&)! 
89=' W86µ)%#&) ,/D,/(" I 39-40). This means that there are some who do not believe animals 
perceive themselves as soon as they are born. Hierocles then uses the following analysis of 
perception of oneself to prove them wrong. But yet another argument ("],29/' -67/'") 
intrudes: there are others so slow and dumb that they do not even believe animals perceive 
themselves at all. These are the ones who "P/1/A#& 7F9 ,O) !"#$%#&) W8= ,I' 4D#23' !H,? [,? 
>^_] P2P6#$!& 89=' ,O) ,:) C1,=' +),*-%.&), /H1B,& PV 1!R 89=' ,O) @!(,/A." (I 44-46) This 
means that the consideration of +),*-%.&' @!(,/A needs to refute two groups of slow people: 
those who believe animals (and human infants) do perceive themselves, but not immediately at 
birth, and those who completely deny animals’ perception of themselves, acknowledging only 
their perception (or apprehension) of external things.14 
It is important to stress that one is dealing with two different claims. One of them does not 
deny perception of oneself, but does deny that it begins with birth. This view has to explain 
why perception of oneself does not begin with birth and also how and when does one acquire it. 
Reversely, to dispute such a claim, one would have to either deny perception of oneself 
altogether  —which is what the second group of "slow ones" does — or show that perception of 
oneself begins at birth — which is what Hierocles is trying to do. The second group of people 
denies perception of oneself at all times of animal and human life. This group believes !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Hierocles uses the comparative here ("G9!P(,B93)"), but further ahead he only uses "G9!P2;'". In both cases Hierocles 
is clearly insulting his opponents, saying they are dumb, slow in comprehension, or even stupid. Please confront note 12 
below to understand more about these opponents 
14Various researchers have wondered about these two groups of people. Cf. Inwood, „Hierocles: Theory and Argument 
in the Second Century A.D.“, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2 (1984), pp.. 151-184, esp.. 157f., 167ff., 178, G. 
Badalamenti, „Ierocle Stoico e il concetto di !"#$%!&'!()“, Annali del Dipartamento di filosofia (Università di Firenze) 
3 (1987), pp. 53-97, esp.. 61ff., 65ff., 72ff., G. Bastianini/A. A. Long, op. laud., 390and following., A. A. Long, 
„Hierocles on oikeiôsis and Self-Perception“, in: K. J. Boudouris (Hrsg.), Hellenistic Philosophy, Bd. I, Athens 1993, 
pp. 93-104, esp.. 95f. (=A. A. Long, Stoic Studies, Berkeley/LA/London 1996, pp. 250-263, esp. 254f— Ramelli, Ilaria 
(ed.), Hierocles the Stoic: Elements of Ethics, Fragments and Excerpts, Society of Biblical Literature, Atlanta, 2009, pp. 
40-41. 
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perception is provided only for the apprehension of external things (+),*-%.&' ,:) C1,='), and 
not for apprehension of oneself (+),*-%.&' @!(,/A). So this view has to prove that perception of 
oneself does not and ultimately cannot happen in animals and humans. To fight such a claim 
one needs to argue that perception of oneself does happen (at least once). The two possible 
arguments against this view emerge personified by the other group of slow people, who believe 
perception of oneself does take place but not at birth, and by Hierocles, who claims perception 
of oneself does take place and from the very beginning of life. So the reference to the two 
groups of slow people can be regarded both as a way to isolate the two tasks at hand: to prove 
that a) animals and humans have something that can be called perception of oneself and that b) 
such a thing exists from the very beginning of life. 
There are two reasonable questions to ask right now: why on earth does Hierocles bring 
these objections to the table? And why does he use specifically these two? 
The majority of the studies about the !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#.tends tends to focus more on the 
scholarly and historical aspect of this attack on these two groups, rather than using them to 
explain Hierocles' point. Such an interpretation takes this reference to slow ones as an attack on 
other schools, in which case each of the questions is directed towards a certain school. Such an 
analysis easily becomes a game of who said what, much like an intellectual form of gossiping. 
There is however an obvious point in favour of such an analysis: if one understands who 
Hierocles is fighting with, it might help to grasp the theses he is trying to refute, and 
consequently it might help in understanding what Hierocles is trying to prove.  Nevertheless, if 
one takes this allusion to the two groups of slow ones to be a mere quarrel between schools, 
one misses out on what this reference is all about. 
In fact, if one forgets the disputes between schools and the historical aspects of this 
passage, one becomes aware of the fact that the label "slow" applies to whoever fits the role 
described. "Slower ones" and "slow and stupid ones" are not only the ones intentionally 
attacked by this comment, but also all of those who do not believe an animal perceives itself as 
soon as it is born. So I think that this insult concerns not only those who explicitly deny 
perception of oneself — from birth onwards or altogether — but also those who do not realize 
that animals perceive themselves from birth and how this happens. In other words, this insult 
applies to all of those who are caught off-guard by the so-called turn towards +),*-%.&' @!(,/A 
and by the way this turn explains perception of oneself in the lines that follow. After a few 
years reading philosophy, one gets used to being insulted. But the meaning of the affront is 
more important than the experience of being offended. In this case, it means Hierocles is 
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accusing whoever fits this role of missing out on not only one’s perception of oneself, but also 
on all the above-mentioned connections —, i.e. of missing out on what perception is all about.  
Now this way of reading the attack on the two groups of slow ones opens up a new 
dimension to the problem. Indeed, this way of putting the problem reveals a certain tendency 
towards slowness or stupidity as regards the problem of perception. One tends to expect a 
different drection in the text than +),*-%.&' @!(,/A because, as previously stated, one tends to 
associate !"#$%#&' mainly with +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6', to a point where the latter is seen as if it 
were the former. In other words, one tends to be surprised by this change in direction because 
one tends to be stupid. So by trying to refute the two groups of slow people, Hierocles is first 
and foremost attacking a normal way of describing perception, one that his reader probably 
embraces without even noticing — (and not necessarily, or at least not only, attacking some 
more detailed view supported by research). This common way of describing !"#$%#&' is the one 
that identifies +),*-%.&' @!(,/A as a non-decisive element of perception. For some, it is 
supervening (or non-decisive) to the point of not existing. For others, it is supervening because 
it is added to an already existing and perfectly functional +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6'. In short, this 
common way of describing +),*-%.&' @!(,/A presupposes that it does not determine the 
composition of +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6' and that, if it takes places, it is as a different and 
independent branch of perception. This means that it would be possible both to get the core of 
!"#$%#&' without grasping +),*-%.&' @!(,/A — one would just be missing a specific and non-
fundamental part of it — and to grasp +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6' without grasping +),*-%.&' @!(,/A. 
And this is precisely what Hierocles is fighting against. 
Another possible way of answering these questions — sc. "why does Hierocles bring these 
objections to the table?",  and "why does he use specifically these two?" — consists in saying 
Hierocles uses them as a rhetorical device to construct his subsequent argument. Just like the 
previous option, this way of interpreting Hierocles' reference to the G9!PD,29/& has a strength, 
to wit, the fact by that, by identifying whom he needs to refute, he also explains what he needs 
to say. This can therefore be presented as a clever way of antecipating what he is about to say, 
dividing it into two important points. Yet, describing this passage as a merely rhetorical one 
misses the questions just asked. For saying that Hierocles plans on using these two objections 
to explain perception (and more specifically +),*-%.&' @!(,/A) does not explain why they are 
important for explaining it. 
Now both of these answers contain valid points, and partly answer the questions at stake. 
But there is a more reasonable and obvious answer to these questions, and it is very simple: 
Hierocles introduces these two objections because he thinks them to be important for him in 
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explaining !"#$%#&'. In fact, Hierocles wants to explain !"#$%#&', and it is in this context that 
he says that +),*-%.&' @!(,/A is a pivotal player in such an explanation. But then there are 
some who do not even believe animals have such a thing. Accordingly Hierocles needs to prove 
them wrong if he intends to prove perception happens the way he says it does. This part is quite 
clear. But a question remains: why is +),*-%.&' @!(,/A so important for the understanding of 
!"#$%#&'? How can it be so important? Besides this, the insistence on the fact that this 
+),*-%.&' @!(,/A begins at birth also seems rather strange. However, there is only one reason 
why Hierocles might emphasize this point so much, and it is not so strange: he must think that, 
in order to understand !"#$%#&', it is fundamental for one to comprehend that +),*-%.&' @!(,/A 
begins at birth. Now why is this so important? How can it be so important? 
Before answering these questions, I would like to stress that these last three options are not 
mutually exclusive. For Hierocles is probably doing all three at the same time, i.e. showing that 
these questions are important for understanding perception, and, in doing so, attacking those 
who do not think the same way and explaining how he is going to proceed in order to refute 
them and explain what perception is all about. Nevertheless, these three options do not carry 
the same weight. Clearly the third is the fundamental one, and the other two only make sense as 
a way of clarifying what is at stake in the third. In fact, the fundamental things to remember 
from this allusion to the two groups of slow ones are the questions: why is +),*-%.&' @!(,/A so 
important for the understanding of !"#$%#&'? And why is it so important that it begins at birth? 
The problem of whom Hierocles is refuting by saying what he is saying is an important one, but 
only because it helps to clarify why +),*-%.&' @!(,/A is so important for the understanding of 
!"#$%#&' and why it is so important that it begins at birth. The same can be said about the 
rhetorical use of these objections, for knowing how the subsequent pages will be organized is 
only useful if it helps in grasping what is at stake in the problem under analysis. Knowing that 
the text will deal with the fact that animals and humans have +),*-%.&' @!(,/A and from the 
beginning of their lives only serves to show that these things are important for grasping what 
!"#$%#&' is all about, and it therefore actually only serves to highlight the already formulated 
questions: why is +),*-%.&' @!(,/A so important for the understanding of !"#$%#&'? And why 
is it so important that it begins at birth?  
As one can easily grasp, these questions regarding both the importance of +),*-%.&' 
@!(,/A and the fact that it begins at birth are connected to the non-supervening character of 
+),*-%.&' @!(,/A. Hierocles is clearly trying to show that there is no moment of !"#$%#&' in 
which +),*-%.&' @!(,/A does not play a decisive role. He later explicitly states that it is 
important to prove that +),*-%.&' @!(,/A begins at birth and is continuous from that moment 
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onwards. At stake is the impossibility of explaining any moment of perception without 
+),*-%.&' @!(,/A. Being apparently granted that +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6' begins at birth, 
Hierocles’ efforts to prove that +),*-%.&' @!(,/A begins at birth and is continuous from there 
onwards can only be seen as a means to introduce the necessity of this thesis, to wit, there can 
be no +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6' without it being accompanied and influenced by +),*-%.&' @!(,/A. 
Now this means that all these inquiries can be assembled into one decisive question: why is 
+),*-%.&' @!(,/A always and necessarily a decisive element in the explanation of !"#$%#&'? 
Linking this with what was previously said, one can begin to grasp that this analysis of 
perception of oneself divides itself into two moments, which not only explain perception of 
oneself, but in doing so also pave the way to a new comprehension of the perception of external 
things and perception in general.  
Now this sets out Hierocles' list of tasks. They are pretty clear, but let us review them. He 
wants to explain perception, i.e. both animal and infant perception, viz. perception as such, 
even when it is already in the framework of logos. To explain it he will have to investigate 
+),*-%.&' @!(,/A, and after that +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6'. But before passing on to +),*-%.&' ,:) 
C1,6' he needs to prove that there is such a thing as might be termed +),*-%.&' @!(,/A and that 
such a thing begins at birth, i.e. as soon as animal and human life begins. To do this he will try 
to prove that a) animals do have +),*-%.&' @!(,/A and b) they have it from the beginning of 
life. This seems to be what the analysis of !"#$%#&' in the !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#. consist in, at least 
before N9µM comes explicitly into play. 
But what is this strange phenomenon that Hierocles alludes to with expressions like ",= 
>?/) [...] !0#$<)2,!& @!(,/A" and +),*-%.&' @!(,/A? In fact, Hierocles does not say what it is. 
And contrary to +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,=', the meaning of which seems obvious at first glance, it is 
hard not to wonder about what it stands for. To a certain degree it looks like Hierocles assumes 
his reader will obviouly know what he is pointing to when using +),*-%.&' @!(,/A. In fact, 
Hierocles goes on to prove such a thing exists without first explaining what he is proving. In 
this sense, he presupposes the meaning of +),*-%.&' @!(,/A in order to prove it, leaving to his 
reader the job of understanding what he is presupposing. Indeed, if one looks closely at the 
refutation of the previously mentioned objections, one will not find a single sentence defining 
+),*-%.&' @!(,/A. One is then left fishing for its meaning in the examples Hierocles uses to 
prove it. It is precisely because the meaning of +),*-%.&' @!(,/A is not so obvious that it is so 
important to consider the examples the stoic philospher uses to prove it. Indeed, one can in 
these examples find elements explaining what Hierocles presuposes +),*-%.&' @!(,/A to be. 
But, as was said, these examples furnish other elements that explain much more than this. They 
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end up giving an account of +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,=' and !"#$%#&' in general, an account that 
diverges from one's pre-assumed conceptions.  
Now this sets out my list of tasks. My job consists in a) explaining how Hierocles executes 
his tasks, b) considering whether he accomplishes what he set out to do or not, c) explaining if 
and why he does or does not achieve it, d) understanding what he presupposes +),*-%.&' 
@!(,/A to be, e) explaining why this +),*-%.&' @!(,/A has some kind of prominence. 
Accordingly, this leaves me also with the task of f) uncovering what +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,=' and 
!"#$%#&' turn out to be. It is easy to grasp that my fundamental tasks are d), e) and f), for 
without accomplishing them I cannot accomplish the previous ones. More importantly, without 
doing them properly I would miss the main goal of this thesis — I would miss out on what 
Hierocles identifies as the key to understanding what perception is all about. 
The fact that Hierocles presupposes the meaning of +),*-%.&' @!(,/A, and that he leaves 
his reader with the task of extracting its meaning from the examples, gives those examples a 
different level of importance. And there is an important guideline that helps in understanding 
the importance of Hierocles' examples. This guideline applies to all the examples just 
mentioned and to all others appearing throughout his text. This guideline is related to the fact 
that Hierocles distinguishes between arguments (-67/&) and "facts themselves" or "things that 
actually happen" ("!H,F ,F 7&)6µ2)!" VI 54, ",F #(µG!*)/),!" IV 5415). The opposition 
between them is not always explicitly mentioned, but a criterion to identify it is not hard to 
find. Whenever the Stoic uses empirical examples, he is referring to something that can be 
described as "!H,F ,F 7&)6µ2)!" or ",F #(µG!*)/),!". Almost all of the examples used by him 
are empirical ones, and they are focused on animal and human behaviour. Hierocles uses them 
to prove the successive arguments he presents. The text tends to repeat this structure: he 
presents a thesis or argument (-67/') and then uses " !H,F ,F 7&)6µ2)! " or " ,F #(µG!*)/),!" 
to support it. However, just as happens with the meaning of +),*-%.&' @!(,/A, in most 
instances the arguments are rather obscure, and one needs to look at the examples to understand 
what he is arguing.  
An argument has already been provided: Hierocles says one must not be unware that an 
animal perceives itself as soon as it is born. But he does not say a single word as to what 
perception of oneself might be. It is only when one looks at the examples used to prove 
perception of oneself that one begins to grasp what it signifies. So several times the meaning of 
the -67/' only comes to the surface in the analysis of the facts used to substantiate it. As I have !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15Here Hierocles uses #(µG!*)/),! in a different sense than in the 7B)2#&' ,:) Cµ.DE3).  
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already tried to show, it is hard to track whether this is an intentional rhetorical strategy or if 
the author just assumes the reader knows what the former is talking about. Nevertheless, this 
does put a lot of stress on the hermeneutical analysis of the examples. And it also serves to re-
introduce the above-mentioned correction of one's presupposed conceptions concerning what is 
at stake in Hierocles’ arguments. In fact, when he uses them, one tends to presuppose he is 
going to explain them in a certain way, precisely because one tends to assume one knows what 
the arguments are about. And this happens very easily, inclusively because Hierocles does not 
bother to explain his arguments with care: he just puts them on the table and then goes on to the 
examples that are supposed to prove them. But, when one is faced with an analysis of empirical 
facts that brings up various elements that one did not anticipate, the complexion and 
complexity of the argument at stake become evident. And this forces a re-assessment of one's 
presupposed thesis concerning Hierocles' argument, a re-assessment that re-opens — or, to be 
fair, that opens for the first time — what is at stake. At this point one is forced to look more 
closely at what is being said and to carefully study and interpret the "facts themselves" in order 
to grasp how and why Hierocles uses them to prove the argument he is trying to demonstrate. It 
is therefore in the examples that one can find the heart of what the arguments are about. 
 
1.d)<!(.; and non-7!(.;: the binomial, total and intricately inter-related field of 
!"#$%#&'. 
 
The afore-mentioned allusion to the G9!PD,29/& defines what Hierocles needs to prove in 
order to explain what he terms !"#$%#&' @!(,/A: a) animals and humans have something that 
can be called !"#$%#&' @!(,/A and b) such a thing exists continuously from the very beginning 
of life. 
But before going into the arguments and examples used by Hierocles to prove his two 
points about perception of oneself, it is important to take into consideration some of Hierocles' 
terminology. I will focus on two decisive connections: the one between !"#$%#&' and +),*-%.&' 
and the one between !"#$%#&' and #()!*#$%#&'. Both of these considerations will be limited to 
the use of these words in the !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#.. It is true that a thorough study of the meanings 
of these words would have to include not only a careful analysis of their use in the !"#$% 
&'(#)*+,-#., but also an analysis of their use in other texts. Nevertheless, such a task would go 
far beyond the scope of this analysis. I will therefore only briefly consider how Hierocles uses 
each of them, so that one can more clearly follow his examples and his assertions. 
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Let us first consider the connection between !"#$%#&' and +),*-%.&'. The relationship 
between them appears for the first time in the above mentioned passage of I 44-46, where 
Hierocles says that slow ones "P/1/A#& 7F9 ,O) !"#$%#&) W8= ,I' 4D#23' !H,? [,? >^_] 
P2P6#$!& 89=' ,O) ,:) C1,=' +),*-%.&), /H1B,& PV 1!R 89=' ,O) @!(,/A." Here it seems that the 
relationship between !"#$%#&' and +),*-%.&' is one in which the former contains the latter. 
Indeed, this passage hints that there is !"#$%#&' and then two branches of it called +),*-%.&' 
@!(,/A and +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6'. And in fact that is what Hierocles is saying. But what does 
this mean as regards the semantic fields of !"#$%#&' and +),*-%.&'? Does it mean +),*-%.&' is 
a subdivision of !"#$%#&'? Or is +),*-%.&' the proper activity of the PD)!µ&' described as 
!"#$%#&'? And if it is true that, as suggested, +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6' and +),*-%.&' @!(,/A fill the 
whole field of 08-"9-#., does this mean !"#$%#&' and +),*-%.&' are simply synonyms? Indeed, 
if the whole of !"#$%#&' consists in +),*-%.&' @!(,/A and +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6', then !"#$%#&' 
and +),*-%.&' tend to be synonyms. This is in fact what the text suggests, but in order to 
confirm it one will needs to look at other passages.  
A list of all the passages that contain !"#$%#&' and !0#$<)/µ!&, +),*-%.&' and 
+),&-!µG<)3, and the number of times both terms appear connected to each other would take 
too long and turn this analysis into something it does not need to be, to wit, a philological 
analysis. Nevertheless, a few of them could render the basic tone of the connection and 
accordingly ensure a fair interpretation of Hierocles' text. For example, some lines below the 
passage that divides !"#$%#&' into +),*-%.&' @!(,/A and +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6', Hierocles uses 
",:) µ29:) @!(,:) !0#$<)2#$!&"(I 49) instead of " ,:) µ29:) @!(,:) +),&-!µG<)2#$!&". If 
they had different meanings and Hierocles was using them in a strict sense, this exchange 
would not be possible. If this were the case, Hierocles — in order to keep !"#$%#&' referring to 
the global phenomenon of perception and +),*-%.&' referring to both different sub-fields of 
perception — would have to use ",:) µ29:) @!(,:) +),&-!µG<)2#$!&". But he does not do so, 
and this reinforces the hypothesis that he uses them as synonyms. A few lines below, in I 38-
39, Hierocles says ",= >?/) 2H$Z' [µ! ,? 72)B#(!& !0#$<)2,!& @!(,/A"; then in I 48-49 he uses 
",:) µ29:) @!(,:) !0#$<)2,!& ,F >?!". All these uses focus only on what Hierocles describes 
as +),*-%.&' @!(,/A, but instead of using +),&-!µG<)/µ!& they use !0#$<)/µ!&. Another 
passage that also points to a synonymical use of these terms is I 51 - I 54. Here Hierocles 
begins the paragraph by saying ",F >?! 89:,/) µV) µ29:) ,:) 0P*3) !0#$<)2,!&" (I 51-52) and 
immediately after this, in the sentence he uses to prove this, he says ",!D,U PV 1!R ,F µV) 8,%)F 
,I' ,:) 8,29D73) 89=' ,= `8,!#$!& 8!9!#12(I' 1+8&,%P2&6,%,/' +),&-!µG<)2,!&" (I 53-54). 
Further ahead in the text, in the first subheading in chapter III, one finds "20 !0#$<)2,!& ,F >?! 
! #*!
,:) C) @,B9/&' P()+µ23)", and in the second he writes "20 P&%)21:' !0#$<)2,!& @!(,/A ,= 
>?/)". Here in each subheading he uses one of the branches of !"#$%#&' — as divided in the 
passage in I 38-39 —, but resorts to !0#$<)/µ!& instead of +),&-!µG<)/µ!&. And just a few 
lines below he repeats what he said in the first subheading but this time using +),*-%.&': "...,F 
>?! 1!R ,:) C) @,B9/&' +#$2)2&:) 1!R P()<µ23) +),&-%.&) QE2&..."(III 20-22). To crown all 
these examples, I would just like to stress two more, in which Hierocles uses !"#$%#&' and 
+),*-%.&' in the same sentence. The first is VI 2: "1!$6-/( 7F9 /H #(),2-2;,!& ,:) C1,=' ,&)/' 
+),*-%.&' P*E! ,I' @!(,:) !0#$M#23'". The second is VI 20-22, where Hierocles is trying to 
explain that !0#$M#&' is a PD)!µ&' +9E&1M and therefore "PI-/) [C#,&] \,& K9E/&,' a) +4' @!(,I' 
1!R 89R) b @,B9/( ,&)=' +),&-!µG<)2,!&, @!(,I' !0#$<)/&,/." 
I believe this few examples show Hierocles uses !"#$%#&' and !0#$<)/µ!& in a similar way 
to how he uses +),*-%.&' and +),&-!µG<)/µ!&. In fact, they strongly suggest that Hierocles 
uses both !"#$%#&'/!0#$<)2#$!& @!(,/A and +),*-%.&' /+),&-!µG<)2#$!& @!(,/A in the same 
way, in line with what happens with !"#$%#&'/!0#$<)2#$!& ,:) C1,6' and +),*-%.&' 
/+),&-!µG<)2#$!& ,:) C1,6'. To sum up, I believe it is safe to say that, regarding the purpose 
of this thesis, and despite minor differences in emphasis that one would have to consider in a 
more careful analysis, both !"#$%#&' and +),*-%.&' are used to denote the same semantic field 
and can therefore be roughly considered synonyms. 
The connection between !"#$%#&' and #()!*#$%#&' is a bit more difficult to grasp. The 
main reason for this is easily understood: #()!*#$%#&' is !"#$%#&' with the added prefix #()-, 
and this added prefix must change something; otherwise it would not be there. However, an 
added prefix may end up being absorbed in the meaning of the word it is added to, as both 
ancient and modern languages abundantly show. 
As stated above, it is impossible here to carefully analyse and compare every use of both 
these terms. There are few uses of #()!*#$%#&' and #()!&#$<)/µ!& — in fact only 8 —, but the 
meaning of each one of them is rather complex, and to now go into an explanation of each and 
every one would make this study deviate from its purpose. So to summarize, while at the same 
time providing the elements one needs to proceed, I will for now focus on a more general 
survey. All in all, there are three main aspects in a possible interpretation of #()!*#$%#&' that 
deserve to be highlighted. 
The first possible way of interpreting the #() is to take it to mean "co-", in which case 
#()!*#$%#&' consists in a co-perception of multiple elements. This would in fact lead to a 
seemingly easy distinction between !"#$%#&' and #()!*#$%#&', with !"#$%#&' being used when 
there is one object of perception and #()!*#$%#&' when there is more than one object. For 
! $+!
example, in I 39 Hierocles uses ",= >?/) 2H$Z' [µ! ,? 72)B#$!& !0#$<)2,!& @!(,/A", just as he 
uses !0#$<)/µ!& in II 2-3, this time combined with a use of #()!*#$%#&' regarding two objects 
of perception: "P&= 89T,% 8*#,&' ,/A !0#$<)2#$!& ,= >?/) [8!) @!(,/A c ,:) µ29:) $0: ,:) 
Q973), W829 d) CP6$% ,F µB9%, #()!*#$%#&'"(my emphasis).So the "co-" in #()!*#$%#&' and 
#()!&#$<)/µ!& is related to two explicitly stated objects of perception, as in the above quoted 
passage II 2-3 and also the one passage II 18-20, where Hierocles says: "1!R µO) ,*)! '* +#$2)I 
,:) C) e(,/;' $0: ,*)! f3µ!-B! 1!R P(#8!$I #()!&#$<)2,!& ,F >?!" (my emphasis).  
However, this is a very limited and selective choice of examples, for there are others where 
#()!*#$%#&' and #()!&#$<)/µ!& only deal with one explicit object of perception, such as: 
"E2-:)% PV #()!&#$<)/µB)% ,&)=' C8&$B#23' ,O) E24!-O) 1!R ,/Z' 86P!' ,? g#,9!1TP2& µB92& 
@!(,I' W8/#,B--2&"( II 23-25, please note that #()!&#$<)/µB)% is only explicitly related to 
,&)=' C8&$B#23'), "N86,2 1&)PD)/( #()!*#$/&,/" (II 26-27) and also "1!R PI,! 1!R !H,/A ,/A 
86#/) C1,2*)2,!& P&<#,%µ! #()!&#$<)2,!&" (II 37-38). 
So the one criterion that apparently separates !"#$%#&' and #()!*#$%#&' does not seem to 
work. But this does not mean that one cannot interpret #()!*#$%#&' as a co-perception, for even 
in these examples, in which #()!*#$%#&' is only explicitly related to one object, the 
#()!*#$%#&' of this object still involves a co-perception of other elements. 
This brings us to a second aspect in this possible interpretation of #()!*#$%#&'. It has to do 
with the complexity and simultaneity of what Hierocles points to when using #()!*#$%#&' and 
#()!&#$<)/µ!&. Indeed, in this possible interpretation of these terms, one is dealing not with a 
simple co-perception of different objects, but instead with a complex co-perception of different 
elements in the perception of the same objects, and also with a complex co-perception of 
different objects that are themselves perceived as a complex co-perception of different 
elements. 
Now this meaning of the #()- in #()!*#$%#&' is particularly evident in the first and third 
examples Hierocles uses (I 50-II 3 and II 19-III 19). In fact, instead of portraying a perception 
that has the form of a mosaic, that simply adds individual pieces to other pieces — which is the 
normal perception interpretation paradigm—, Hierocles uses #()!*#$%#&' in a way that the 
perception of X is always and already defined by being also the perception of Y and Z, and Y 
and Z play a pivotal role in the perception of X.  
If one considered a bird's perception of its wings using the normal perception paradigm, 
one would tend to think that the bird perceives two distinct wings, the left and the right, and 
that each of these wings is a different object from the other, just as they are different from each 
of its feet and its head and beak. Using this model for interpreting perception, the bird's 
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perception of itself is a kind of collage or mosaic (or lego, to use the metaphor I used in the 
beginning) of all these different elements.  In fact, there is a co-perception of different elements 
that assembles these elements into one bigger object that embraces A and B and C and D. This 
assembling just adds each piece to the others to form a bigger picture. And if one were to go 
into finer detail and focus on one of these elements, like the left foot, one would find the same 
model on a microscopic level: the left foot would have three fingers and a kind of palm and 
perhaps some membranes in between the fingers. And if one were to go into a finger the same 
thing would happen: there would be a nail and two parts with a joint in between. By increasing 
the graduation of the microscope, this analysis could go on indefinitely, yet always following 
the same model of co-perception as a collage or mosaic or lego (i.e. a collage of collages, a 
mosaic of mosaic, a lego of legos). 
However, this mosaic or collage model is not what one finds in Hierocles’ use of 
#()!*#$%#&'. In fact, if one considers the first example — let us leave the third for later — one 
sees that the introduction of 8!9!#12(M and its connection to E92*! and Q97! point to 
something completely different from this model of perception. For the word 8!9!#12(M brings 
to the table something like "being prepared for", "being equipped for", "being arranged for", 
"having the power to", "having the means to", "having the way or means for providing". So the 
fact that an animal's perception of its parts is a perception of its parts and of the E92*! for which 
they have them ("$0: \,& QE2& )3# 89=' h) E92*!)"I 54-55, my emphasis) signifies that an 
animal's perception of its own parts is already and at the same time a perception of its 
"disposition" or "arrangement" or "aptitude" for the associated E92*! — it means each part is 
also seen as a means or a tool or something that is able to fulfil some task or function or 
necessity, i.e., some E92*!.16 Hierocles’ point is that birds perceive that they have wings and at 
the same time that they have wings for flying, just like humans perceive that they have eyes and 
at the same time that they have eyes for seeing, and land animals perceive that they have legs 
and at the same time that they have them for walking. To put it even better: birds perceive their 
wings as means to fly, and this implies a perception that is at the same time perception of 
having those parts and of their E92*!. So !"#$%#&' is here described as an originally complex 
perception. In this case, perception of one's parts is already perception of the functions for 
which those parts are useful. Note that these two elements are not two different perceptions, but 
two moments of the same perception, for the perception of one's parts is already and at the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 For a better understanding of the meaning of E92*! in Hierocles' text, cf. Carvalho, Mário Jorge, Wahrnehmung und 
Selbstreferenz - Der Selbstreferentielle Charakter der Wahrnehmung nach Hierokles, in Edmundo Balsemão Pires, 
Burkhard Nonnenmacher and Stefan Büttner-von Stülpnagel (ed.), Relations of the Self, Coimbra University Press, 
Coimbra, 2010,pp. 109-139, esp. 116-117, note 17. 
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same time a perception of the E92;!& of those parts. This shows that perception of the bird's 
wings is not a perception of the sum of elements A and B — having wings and having ability to 
fly —, but a perception in which B influences the meaning of A and vice versa, in such a way 
that A without B would be perceived in a completely different way than it is.  
But this is not all, because this possible interpretation of #()!*#$%#&' can still be combined 
with the collage (or mosaic or lego) model. In fact, one could say that a bird's perception of its 
wings is connected with its ability to fly, in such a way that perception of these wings without 
the ability to fly would be completely different, but still claim that this has nothing to do with a 
bird's perception of its feet. Certainly a bird’s perception of its feet is connected with walking, 
and thus has the same intrinsically complex structure as a bird's perception of its wings, but 
between feet and wings there would still be a relationship that fits into the collage model, for 
the bird's perception of its wings and their ability to fly is merely assembled with the bird's 
perception of its feet and their ability to walk. In other words, one could still divide the animal's 
perception of its different parts and respective functions into isolated unities, into islands, so to 
speak. In that sense, perception of oneself would take the form of an archipelago, even if each 
island encompassed multiple elements that relate to each other in the way we just described as 
not corresponding to a mosaic or lego. 
Now the use of #()!*#$%#&' in the third example is very good at illustrating another 
possible way of interpreting an animal's co-perception of its different parts. Indeed, when 
Hierocles talks about an animal's co-perception of its strengths and weaknesses, perception of 
strengths is connected to perception of the weaknesses in such a way that perception of the 
former influences perception of the latter and vice-versa. A bull's perception of its horns as a 
strength when it comes to fighting other animals is determined by the fact that they are able to 
protect the weaknesses such an attack might prejudice. So in a bull’s case it is possible to 
interpret co-perception of its horns and legs as something that exceeds a perception of its horns 
and their E92*! (which in this instance is defence) coupled with a perception of its legs and their 
E92*! (which can be to walk). Instead, a bull's perception of its horns incorporates as a decisive 
element the fact that they are stronger than its legs and therefore able to protect them, while 
perception of its legs incorporates as a decisive element the fact that they are weaker than the 
horns and accordingly should be placed behind them in the event of a fight. In this case, we are 
dealing with an even more complex co-perception, for the bull's perception of each of its parts 
and its respective function is connected to other parts and their function in such a way that they 
create a complex network of inter-defining elements. This interpretation being true, a bull's 
perception of its legs is defined by their connection to its horns, just as perception of its horns 
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contains as a decisive element perception of its legs. So this would mean that a bull's perception 
of its legs (!) is a complex one, since it involves at least the perception that it has them (a), that 
it has them for walking (b), and that they are easily damaged in an attack (c), amongst others, 
which just like these inter-define each other, to such an extent that a) is defined in connection 
with b) and c) and would be completely different without them, and vice-versa. At the same 
time, a bull's perception of its horns (G) is a complex perception because it involves at least the 
perception that it has them, that it has them for attacking, that it has them for defence, and that 
these horns are resistant to attacks, amongst others. Now what is at stake in this interpretation 
of  #()!*#$%#&' is the possibility of a bull's perception of its legs (!) being connected to a 
perception of its horns (G), because perception of ! involves perception of !-c, which makes 
reference to perception of G (and more specifically because the horns are perceives as capable 
of defending its own legs). This means that peception of ! is always perceived as having a 
decisive connection to G, to such an extent that, if a bull lost its horns, perception of its legs 
would change.  
But this is still not all. Indeed, this possible interpretation of the meaning of  #()!*#$%#&' 
strongly suggests that all the elements involved in !"#$%#&' @!(,/A are intrinsically related to 
one another and defined by this relational dimension, but could still leave the collage or mosaic 
model intact for +),0-%.&' ,:) C1,6'. However, in a way that is now easy to follow, one can 
already see that, within this possible interpretation of #()!*#$%#&', external things are co-
perceived in relation to an animal's own x92;!&. For example, a bull's perception of the ground 
is intrinsically defined by its possibility of walking over it, just like a bird’s perception of a cliff 
is perceived immediately as something it can fly over — whereas a bull's perception of that 
same cliff is intrinsically determined by the possibility of its falling off it. At the same time, a 
bull's perception of a cliff like this is related to its perception of firm ground, precisely because 
the cliff is perceived as not being something it can walk upon, i.e. as not being firm ground. So 
perception of external objects also has the form of a complex network of interelated elements 
that play a pivotal role in perception of one another. At the same time, given that an animal’s 
perception of external elements is related to those elements and to perception of its own E92;!&, 
it is also defined in connection to the animal's perception of its parts, just as the animal's parts 
are connected to their E92;!& and therefore to perception of external things.17 As I hope to show 
further ahead, if this meaning of #()!*#$%#&' proves to be a proper way of describing 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17This explanation is still rather incomplete, for one needs to clarify the role of possibility and of activity and passivity in 
this analysis. This will be done in the consideration of the examples. 
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perception, the paradigm of perception as a collage of different and isolated elements gets 
entirely eradicated from the whole realm of !"#$%#&'. 
Regarding the connection between !"#$%#&' and #()!*#$%#&', these examples still do not 
help in finding a criterion to distinguish them. In fact, all the examples show perception of 
anything to be complex, i.e. to entail multiple elements. So the problem in distinguishing 
between them is not that one finds #()!*#$%#&' used with single objects, but rather that 
!"#$%#&' applies to multiple elements of the same object and multiple other objects that 
determine the one object !"#$%#&' is specifically concerned with — the problem consists in 
!"#$%#&' always and already being a co-!"#$%#&' of multiple elements. The first example is a 
good one to show this: Hierocles uses !"#$%#&' and !0#$<)/µ!& during the majority of the first 
example, and then uses +),&-!µG<)2,!& when talking about perception of the animal's parts and 
of their E92;!&. However, this argument's conclusion captures the same phenomenon using 
#()!*#$%#&': "P&= 89T,% 8*#,&' ,/A !0#$<)2#$!& ,= >?/) [8!) @!(,/A c ,:) µ29:) 1!R ,:) 
Q973), W8V9 d) CP6$% ,F µB9%, #()!*#$%#&'."(I, 2-3). Thus, because this use of #()!*#$%#&' 
points to the same phenomenon that Hierocles described using !"#$%#&' and !0#$<)/µ!&, a 
criterion for distinguishing between !"#$%#&' and #()!*#$%#&' continues to elude us. 
Now, despite the translation of #()- as "co-" being very good at underlining the 
simultaneity and complexity involved in the term #()!*#$%#&', it is insufficiently clear 
regarding this terms' essential connection to @!(,6. Which brings us to the third element of this 
possible interpretation of #()!*#$%#&'. By using this word in the examples used to prove 
!"#$%#&' @!(,/A — (7 out of 8 uses are within this context18), Hierocles seems to ascribe a 
fundamental connection with the realm of @!(,6 to #()!*#$%#&' . 
It is important to note that this third element is nothing but a special case of the previous 
one. What this means is very simple: the apparent association between #()!*#$%#&' and @!(,6 
gives the latter a central role in the complex network described above. That @!(,6 plays a 
pivotal role in perception of one's own parts can be easily grasped, for all of one's parts are 
defined by being one's own (@!(,/A) parts. So in the complex network of elements that define 
my feet, the fact that they are mine makes them different from all other feet that are not mine. 
But it is also possible to see how it can play a pivotal role in perception of external things. 
Indeed, because perception of my feet is entangled with and defined by perception of their 
ability to walk and to run and to kick, and therefore by perception of their ability to run on the 
ground and to swim in the water or to surf on a board, perception of running and kicking and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18And the only one that is not used in these four examples (in VII 47)is still connected to !"#$%#&' @!(,/A, as one will 
see later on. 
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swimming and surfing is also always perceived in relation to my feet. This means that 
perception of running and kicking and swimming is connected to @!(,6. All, these things are 
constantly perceived as things I am doing or at least that I could do, or things I cannot do but 
wish I could, or things I cannot do and that I am not interested in doing. Accordingly 
perception of the ground and of the water and of a surfboard are also defined in connection to 
@!(,6. A surfboard is perceived as something completely different depending on whether one 
surfs or not (which actually explains why my girlfriend is incapable of understanding how I can 
spend so much money on surfboards). Furthermore, perception of a surfboard is different if that 
surfboard is mine or not, to such an extent that perception of the same surfboard is completely 
different if that surfboard is mine or not (a fact that has been emptying my wallet for a long 
time). Likewise, the ground is perceived as something completely different if it is perceived as 
something I can walk upon or not (if it is mined, or if I were paralytic, for example). So all 
these possibilities — of walking and swimming and surfing — are perceived in a completely 
different fashion if they are my possibilities: my perception of my feet's possibility of surfing is 
different from my perception of someone else's possibility of surfing.  
The most important aspect to draw from this portrayal is the fact that, according to this 
possible interpretation of #()!*#$%#&'' meaning, all the elements that one perceives are defined 
by being or not @!(,6, which means that even those who are not @!(,6 are defined precisely by 
not being @!(,6. As the fourth argument used to prove !"#$%#&' @!(,/A shows (III 20 to III 54), 
perception of something external is always entangled with a complex co-perception of oneself. 
I will not go into the explanation of this example for now, but I would still like to stress that an 
animal's perception of strengths and weaknesses in other animals is a perception of what might 
harm itself, what cannot harm itself, what it can harm in others and what it cannot harm in 
others. This serves to show —albeit in a brief and not very clear fashion — that @!(,6 is a 
constant, necessary and pivotal element in the complex structure just portrayed.19 
But, once again, this is not specific to #()!*#$%#&', for Hierocles' point is precisely that in 
the complex structure described above every !"#$%#&' includes the element @!(,6, even if it is 
perception of something external. Does this mean they are synonyms? Are they quasi 
synonyms that emphasize different aspects of the same thing? On the one hand, there are 
elements in the text that point to the fact that Hierocles could have used !"#$%#&' instead of 
#()!*#$%#&' and vice-versa (like II 23, II 27 and II 38). On the other hand, there are uses of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19To consider a work focused on the meaning of #()!*#$%#&', cf. — Badalamenti, Guido, "Ierocle Stoico e il concetto di 
#()!*#$%#&'", Annali del Dipartamento di Filosofia 3 (1987), 53-97.  
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#()!*#$%#&' that could not have been replaced by the use of !"#$%#&', because such a change 
would not entirely cover and emphasize the entire phenomenon at stake — as for example II 
18-20 —"1!R µO) ,*)! '* +#$2)I ,:) C) e(,/;' $0: ,*)! f3µ!-B! 1!R P(#8!$I #()!&#$<)2,!& 
,F >?!" — or more importantly VII 47-48 — "N9µM, 1!R ,/A 89=' #3,M9&/) @!(,/A 
#()!*#$%#&' C#,R) c -2-27µB)% /012*3#&'". 
To what conclusion does this lead? For now, to none. In order for one to understand the 
examples Hierocles uses, one needs to keep in mind that the phenomena described by !"#$%#&' 
and #()!*#$%#&' are not entirely different —or, as I hope to show, they are not different at all 
—, but at the same time it is important to keep an eye out for the important prefix #()- in some 
passages (or at least to bear in mind it plays a key role). Nevertheless, a full comprehension of 
what is at stake here can only be achieved after the consideration of the examples. For this 
reason, I will save the final and decisive words regarding this relationship for later. 
These considerations do not intend to reconstitute how Hierocles used #()!*#$%#&' "wie es 
eigentlich gewesen". As I said, this is not a philological analysis. As I also said, my goal is to 
explain what perception is all about, focusing for this purpose on Hierocles' description of it. 
This means that the reason why this possible interpretation of #()!*#$%#&' is considered here is 
to arrive at Hierocles’ account of perception, not to discuss the various nuances of the term 
itself. And from this possible interpretation of #()!*#$%#&', no matter what its meaning "wie es 
eigentlich gewesen", there are two aspects that stand out. The first is the portrayal of !"#$%#&' 
as a complex network that involves and must involve several elements at the same time, 
elements that not only co-exist, but also co-relate. The second consists in the pivotal role the 
@!(,6 plays in this complex network, for every element of the latter is always and already 
defined by its relation to @!(,6. In sum, these considerations show that Hierocles' analysis 
points to the fact that every !"#$%#&' is already and always #()!*#$%#&', in the sense that it is 
intrinsically complex and always has @!(,6 as a decisive element in relation to which the other 
elements are defined. 
Having made this introductory points, let us return to the arguments used by Hierocles to 
prove that a) animals and humans have something that can be called perception of oneself and 
b) this exists continuously from the beginning of life. The study of these arguments will lead to 
a clearer comprehension of what perception is all about. 
To prove a), Hierocles uses four arguments (-67/&), which are supported by four groups of 
examples corresponding to the above-mentioned group of "facts themselves" or "things that 
actually happen" ("!H,F ,F 7&)6µ2)!", ",F #(µG!*)/),!"):  
! $(!
- 1) animals perceive their own parts (,F >?! !0#$<)2,!& ,:) ;0<'=4 µ29:)). This is 
covered from I 50 to II 3. 
- 2) animals perceive what they are equipped with for their (own) defence ([,F >?!] /(PV 
,:) 89=' Kµ()!) 8!9!#12(!#$B),3) +(,/;' +)!&#$M,3' P&<12&,!&). This is covered from II 4 
to II 18. 
- 3) animals co-perceive their (own) strengths and weaknesses (,F >?! 
-<40#-">4*'0#1!R,*)! ,2 +#$2)I ,:) C) !W,/;' 1!R ,*)! f3µ!-B! 1!R P(#8!$I). This is covered 
from II 19 to III 19. 
- 4) animals perceive the strengths and weaknesses in other animals (",F >?! ,:) C) 
@,B9/&' +#$2)2&:) 1!R P()<µ23) +),*-%.&) QE2&, 1!R ,*)! µV) !H,/;' V8*G/(-!, 89=' ,*)! PV 
!H,/R' +)/E!R 1!R /i/) #DµG!#&' +P&<-(,/'"). This is covered from III 20 to III 54. 
To prove b) he uses two more arguments (-67/&). 
- 1) the relationship between body and soul is constituted in such a way that perception 
happens from the very first moment of life, being continuous and uninterrupted — this 
argument is subdivided into four points and then proved empirically. This is covered from III 
57 to V 35. 
- 2) There is no better point in time for the beginning of !"#$%#&' than the first,. This is 
covered from V 39 to V 53.20 
The six of them are related in a way I hope to demonstrate at the end of this dissertation. 
Bearing this in mind, b.1) andb.2) will be discussed later in this section. For now, let us focus 
on the first four arguments and on Hierocles' attempt to prove !"#$%#&' @!(,/A (or +),*-%.&' 
@!(,/A), for this will clarify better what Hierocles means by " +),*-%.&' @!(,/A", and 
hopefully also what he means by +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6'. 
 
1.d.1) The first argument. 
 
Now the first argument (a.1) to prove !"#$%#&' @!(,/A can be considered from the 
following perspective: if Hierocles can establish perception of one's own (@!(,/A) parts, then it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 In these arguments, Hierocles uses the key words mentioned previously as follows: 
a.1 — !0#$<)/µ!& in I 52 and II 2, +),&-!µG<)/µ!& in I 54 and #()!*#$%#&' in II 3. 
a.2  — "+)!&#$M,3'" in II 4. 
a.3 — #()!&#$<)/µ!& in II 20, II 24,  II 27 and II 37. 
a.4 — !0#$<)/µ!& in III (the headline), III 49, he uses +),*-%.&' II 21 and "+),&-%8,&1:'" in III 51. 
b.1 — !"#$%#&' in IV 27, !0#$%,&1M in IV 24 and IV 43, +),*-%.&' in IV 51, !0#$<)/µ!& in IV 53, V 23, 
V 35, and #()!&#$<)/µ!& in IV 59. 
b.2 — !0#$<)/µ!& in V 39, V 41, V 49, !0#$%,&1M in V 49, and +),*-%.&' in V 47. 
! $)!
seems hard to dispute !"#$%#&' @!(,/A. If one perceives one' own parts and given that these 
parts one's own (@!(,/A), one has some kind of perception of oneself, i.e. one has some kind of 
!"#$%#&' @!(,/A.  
From this perspective, the argument can be accused of falling into a petitio principii. In 
fact, it takes a concept and then builds the argument upon it in order to prove it: in order to 
prove that there is something that can be termed !"#$%#&' @!(,/A, Hierocles says that one has 
perception of one's own parts, while assuming that perception of one's parts is !"#$%#&' @!(,/A. 
This is the equivalent of trying to prove that animals have !"#$%#&' @!(,/A by saying that they 
have !"#$%#&' @!(,/A. 
But other than leading to this justifiable accusation, reading Hierocles' argument under this 
light also proves to be rather barren. In fact, it leaves one with a completely ciphered notion of 
@!(,6 and accordingly of !"#$%#&' @!(,/A. Seen from this perspective, the argument presents a 
formal description of @!(,6, but provides no data making it possible to understand this formal 
picture: it just says that @!(,6 is the object of !"#$%#&' @!(,/A and that !"#$%#&' @!(,/A is the 
!"#$%#&' that has @!(,6 has an object. Of course this makes all the sense in the world, but it 
does not help to grasp what is at stake. It is true that this way of reading the argument does say 
that the animal's own (@!(,/A) parts are @!(,6. But how far does that guide one in the 
understanding of what is @!(,6? Does that mean @!(,6 is the sum of the animal's parts? Is 
!"#$%#&' @!(,/A perception of one's parts? In fact, if one sticks to this way of reading the 
argument, there is not much information making it possible to answer these questions. 
Thankfully, there is another way of looking at it. 
This other way focuses on the examples and tries to extract the information from them 
necessary for understanding Hierocles' argument. Seen from this perspective, Hierocles text 
becomes very fruitful, in fact to a point where a very determined and clear notion of @!(,6 and 
!"#$%#&' @!(,/A can be found. 
Now, before moving on to the consideration of the examples, there is an important 
methodological remark to make.  
If one considers how Hierocles expects to establish that animals perceive their own parts 
with these examples, one realises he tries to do it by presenting a series of empirical examples, 
which at the same time presuppose and are said to prove both perception of one's parts and of 
their functions. It is important to stress Hierocles' perspective is one of a witness that watches 
animal behaviour, extracting or presupposing21 elements from what it witnesses animals doing. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21In order to comprehend the problems that this entails, confront annex 2.  
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In other words, Hierocles is observing animal behaviour and saying that, if they did not have 
what he calls !"#$%#&' @!(,/A, they would not behave the way they do.22 This presupposition 
amounts to something like this: animals perceive their own parts and that is why they behave 
the way they do; if they did not perceive their own parts they would not behave the way they 
do; now because they behave the way they do, they perceive their own parts. This witness 
standpoint consists in looking at animals' empirical behaviour and interpreting this behaviour as 
an expression of something, which is then taken as a conditio sine qua non for the behaviour to 
happen. One of the fundamental characteristics of this witness standpoint consists in it being an 
external witness. This witness is not an animal; it is just observing what animals do, and 
ultimately interpreting their behaviour according to what it sees from an outside perspective. 
I would like to stress that Hierocles does not present himself as a witness, let alone a 
witness with these characteristics. In fact, he never clearly states how he is going to proceed; he 
just goes on with his text leaving any methodological considerations for the reader. However, 
despite never explicitly saying how he will proceed, he does proceed somehow, and despite 
never explicitly saying what he is presupposing in his examples, he does presuppose 
something. For when analysing animal behaviour in order to prove that animals have !"#$%#&' 
@!(,/A, Hierocles' point is precisely that, if they did not have !"#$%#&' @!(,/A, they would not 
behave the way they do. So, despite never saying that !"#$%#&' @!(,/A is a conditio sine qua 
non for understanding animal behaviour, it is implicit in his analysis that, from his external 
standpoint, !"#$%#&' @!(,/A is indeed a conditio sine qua non for understanding animal 
behaviour. 
Having said this, let us then go to the other possible way of considering this first argument, 
the one that advances by probing the examples. One can actually start by a general and 
descriptive consideration of the argument and its examples.  
Hierocles first says that animals perceive their own parts ("µ29:) ,:) 0P*3) !0#$<)2,!&" I 
52). He then claims that, on the one hand, winged creatures perceive (+),&-!µG<)2,!&) the 
suitability (C8&,%P2&6,%') and readiness (8!9!#12(M) of their wings for flying and, on the other 
hand, land animals perceive their parts — that they have them and for what E92*! they have 
them ("1!R \,& QE2& 1!R 89=' h) QE2& E92*!)" I 54-55). We ourselves perceive that we have eyes 
and ears and so on. Hierocles then says that when we want to see something we direct our eyes 
to a visible object, not our ears, and vice-versa; and when we want to walk we use our feet and 
legs and not our hands, just as we do not use our feet and legs to give or take something, but !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22As previously stated, this ends up a petitio principii. 
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our hands. From this Hierocles concludes that the co-perception (#()!*#$%#&') of the parts and 
the functions for which they were given is the first proof of the fact that every animal perceives 
itself ("P&= 89T,% 8*#,&' ,/A !0#$<)2#$!& ,= >?/) [8!) @!(,/A c ,:) µ29:) 1!R ,:) Q973), 
W8V9 d) CP6$% ,F µB9%, #()!*#$%#&'."(I, 2-3) 
As anticipated in the introduction about methodology above, the fundamental elements 
required to grasp this argument and its examples are in a way presupposed. To be more 
specific, all the way through the examples given in this first argument, Hierocles keeps on 
presupposing a specific meaning for ;0<'?, one that is essential for explaining the examples he 
gives, but one which he never cares to state. However, the examples given here gain a different 
interest if one uses them precisely to understand what the philosopher means by @!(,6 and 
accordingly !"#$%#&' @!(,/A. In fact, all these examples provide the key for unlocking what 
Hierocles is pointing at when using @!(,6, and accordingly what !"#$%#&' @!(,/A is all about 
—(even if they do not prove it definitively). 
In fact, Hierocles' examples end up revealing the meaning of ;0<'? to a point where this 
concept becomes rather clear, determined and precise. And this sets the pace for the other three 
arguments, which also help us to the grasp the fundamental problem at stake here — at least as 
regards the nature of this study —, i.e. to correctly identify what Hierocles means by !"#$%#&' 
@!(,/A.  
But while the concept of @!(,6 defined here by these examples is clear, it is also 
surprising. To tell the truth, the concept of ;0<'? that emerges from reading Hierocles here is 
rather unforeseen, to say the very least. And it is unforeseen beacause it goes against what one 
usually deems @!(,6 and !"#$%#&' @!(,/A to be. Let us start by considering the two things that 
one tends to imagine !"#$%#&' @!(,/A to be, so as to grasp how Hierocles diverges from them, 
presenting in the process what he takes @!(,6 to be. 
The first thing that may come to mind when thinking about !"#$%#&' @!(,/A is some kind 
of internal perception. Indeed, within the philosophical tradition, perception of oneself tends to 
be associated with perception of some internal sense viz. with some kind of perception of 
perception (or awareness of perception).23 However, as these examples clearly show, what 
Hierocles means by !"#$%#&' @!(,/A is far from this. In fact, his examples of !"#$%#&' @!(,/A 
include perception of bodily parts such as feet and hands, which, according to a conception of 
!"#$%#&' @!(,/A as perception of perception has to be considered perception of external things. 
So one can safely say, at least in a negative sense, that Hierocles diverges from this line. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23This problem will also crop up later regarding Hierocles use of !"#$%#&' !0#$M#23'. 
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The second intuitive understanding of !"#$%#&' @!(,/A is the one that takes @!(,6 to be a 
unitary and closed entity of some kind. Indeed, @!(,6 is usually seen as something closed 
within itself, which cannot be related to other things. That comprehension of @!(,6 is similar to 
the comprehension of other objects such as books or shoes or balls — it comprehends @!(,6 as 
something that begins and ends within specific limits and is entirely contained within these 
frontiers. For this reason, one tends to interpret !"#$%#&' @!(,/A as perception of a single 
object, just as described in the mosaic (or collage) model above. In this case, perception of 
oneself is perception of a particular and singular object that is not defined in relation to other 
objects, but only put "side by side" with them. However, the contrast between this image of 
@!(,6 and the one presented by Hierocles could hardly be greater. For his examples portray 
@!(,6 as a multiplicity, and additionally as a multiplicity of different contents, each with its 
own determination: hands, feet, horns and so on are all @!(,6, which means !"#$%#&' @!(,/A is 
!"#$%#&' of hands and feet and horns and so on. 
Having established what @!(,6 and !"#$%#&' @!(,/A are not, it is now important to begin a 
positive description of what they are. 
1) Contrary to expectations, Hierocles' first example depicts @!(,6 as a formal and plurally 
applicable concept, one that is related to different things, such as hands and feet, but also one 
that is defined in relation to the things it is connected to, while at the same time defining them. 
It is thus important to understand how one gets to such a comprehension of @!(,6. 
Looking at the example of the bird that perceives its wings, one understands that at least 
two wings are being described as @!(,6. But one does not need an incredible imagination to 
expand this to all the other parts of the bird, such as feet and head and beak and so on. Each of 
these parts is @!(,6, and this means that there are many different things that pertain to @!(,6. In 
the same fashion, a land animal perceives its legs as @!(,6, but also the rest of its parts. 
Although @!(,6 always has the same meaning, there are many different things that can be 
@!(,6. All of them are defined by being @!(,6, to such an extent that the same part in another 
bird is perceived in a completely different way. At the same time, the meaning of the word 
@!(,6 is defined by its connection to the different animal parts, and the first thing that one can 
grasp about @!(,6 is that it is something that can be said of a complex array of different 
elements. 
2) Now the multiplicity at stake is not an all-embracing plurality, but rather a limited 
number of elements that somehow belong together. In other words, the multiplicity at stake 
here does not cover the entire perceptive field. 
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It is important to notice that this description of @!(,6 does not depict a sum of different 
elements as a sum of dots, but rather a stain or a field that encompasses different elements. In 
fact, the examples portray an expansive movement by the @!(,6, a movement through which 
this @!(,6 spreads out and comes to involve multiple elements, incorporating them in a kind of 
same-coloured stain. However, this expansion stops at a certain point. For the bird's !"#$%#&' 
@!(,/A encompasses perception of its multiple parts, like its wings and feet and beak, but 
certainly not perception of the air in which it flies, nor of the ground on which it walks nor of 
the worms it catches with its beak. This does not mean that perception of the ground or of the 
worms is not defined by their relation to @!(,6, but it does mean that they are not @!(,6. And 
this is the second thing there is to understand about the meaning of @!(,6: although it is suited 
to describing an animal's own parts — and their functions, as we will see —, it is not suited to 
describing things that do not belong to that animal, even though the perception of them is 
defined in connection to it. So at the same time that this @!(,6 is plural, in the sense that there 
are many things that are @!(,6, Hierocles still defines these various @!(,6 components as 
something that can be contrasted with all the other things that are not @!(,6. 
It is here important to notice that Hierocles' description points to an internal subdivision of 
the aesthetical field into two main areas. I say it is internal because it tries to depict an animal's 
perspective from within, and not how Hierocles sees an animal's perceptive field from the 
outside (as a witness). Even though Hierocles is witnessing animal behaviour, he is trying to 
say that animals — from their perspective —perceive whatever they perceive subdivided into 
two sub-fields: the area of what is @!(,6 and the area of what is not @!(,6. This being true, it 
means everything I perceive is contained in one of those fields, or, in other words, it means that 
my perception is internally and intrinsically organized into two different categories, and 
everything I see belongs either to one or the other. 
These two first points pose at least two questions. The first is how do the many elements 
that are @!(,6 "belong together". The second is what is the criterion that combines these 
various moment of @!(,6 into one specific sub-field of @!(,6, separating them from what is 
not-@!(,6. 
3) This leads to the third point, namely, what can be termed the distributive and 
agglutinative properties of @!(,6. The distributive aspect has to do with the way @!(,6 spreads 
out through multiple elements. It is distributive because it is something that can be distributed 
by different elements, like wings and feet and head and beak. But at the same time as the @!(,6 
spreads through multiple elements, it aggregates all these elements as elements that are ;0<'(@. 
This description defines @!(,6 as an "equation" in the etymological sense of the word, i.e. as an 
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equality. For this example presents @!(,6 as equal to hands and feet and so on. My hand is 
@!(,6, my other hand is @!(,6, and both my feet are @!(,6, just as my arms and chest and so 
on. Being an equation viz. an equality, this relationship goes both ways, which means that 
@!(,6 is both my hands and feet and arms and chest and so on. So this also means that the 
@!(,6 spreads out through this equation, in such a way that, instead of being defined by a 
particular content, it is defined by being equal to many different things. And it is this same 
equation that allows one to single out what is not @!(,6, to wit, the things that are not equal to 
@!(,6. 
To use an example, one can say that this @!(,6 works more or less like a "stamp" or a 
"branding-iron". Stock keepers and breeders have one branding-iron that they apply to all their 
different animals, and once the animals have that same sign branded on their body, they 
become part of the herd. The "brand" or "stamp" @!(,6 is what serves as a criterion for 
distinguishing what "belongs" to the animal, making those things part of the single "herd", i.e. 
making them ;0<'(@. 
4) Now, to better understand the distributive and agglutinative properties of @!(,6, one 
needs to consider what can be termed its genitive aspect. 
If, when looking at the examples Hierocles gives, one asks what this @!(,6 is, one realises 
that it always appears as a determinative complement of the things that are @!(,6. In other 
words, @!(,6 is something that unifies a plurality of elements by making them related to one 
same formal concept. X"#$%#&' @!(,/A in a bird is described as perception of what is its own 
(@!(,/A), like for example its wings, which are perceived as wings ;0<'(@. In the case of a land 
animal, !"#$%#&' @!(,/A is described as !"#$%#&' of what is its own (@!(,/A), like for example 
its legs, in which case @!(,/A appears as something that determines perception of the legs. In 
the case of a human, !"#$%#&' @!(,/A is !"#$%#&' of his/her own (@!(,/A) legs and hands and 
eyes and ears. So, using a language that Hierocles never uses, but which I think helps in 
grasping the structure of what is at stake, one can briefly put things like this: the @!(,6 never 
appears by itself, isolated and closed within itself, it never appears as a perceptum per se, but 
instead always appears as a genitive of percepta — it always and already appears as ;0<'(@. 
Using this grammatical terminology again, one could put this another way: the @!(,6 never 
really appears in the accusative — i.e. never appears as @!(,6 —, but always and already in the 
genitive —as ;0<'(@. 
A good example for explaining what is at stake here is a map. When one looks at a map of 
the Iberian Peninsula, one sees that there are many regions within Portugal, but they are all 
regions of Portugal. The characteristic "of Portugal" is distributed through all the different parts 
! %%!
contained within the Portuguese boarders. By spreading itself into all those parts, it also 
"aggregates" them, hence forming the country we call Portugal. In this example, Portugal is not 
defined as the country with these specific frontiers, but instead as a formal instance, for it is 
described as the country that encompasses everything that is "of Portugal" — and the proof is 
the fact that, if Portugal were to conquer some land from Spain, that land would become "of 
Portugal" without changing the description of Portugal as "the country that encompasses 
everything that is "of Portugal"  (although it would change the shape and dimension of what is 
"of Portugal", it would not change what Portugal stands for). 
The same thing happens with @!(,6. Let us consider a little bird: it perceives its wings as 
wings ;0<'(@, but when it grows it still perceives its wings as wings ;0<'(@, even though the 
wings have changed. My hands are different from what they were fifteen years ago, but they 
are just as much my hands as they were then. This brings us back to the consideration of @!(,6 
as an equation. For the property that allows @!(,6 to apply to my hand at ten years hold and at 
twenty five years old is the same property that allows @!(,6 to be applied to my right hand and 
my left hand and my feet. And this so-called property is the equational or equalitive property, 
which includes both the distributive and agglutinative aspects of @!(,6. Despite the changes my 
hand has undergone during fifteen years, it is still perceived as being equal to @!(,6, and this 
means it is perceived as something located in the sub-field of what is @!(,/A (in the sub-field of 
!"#$%#&' @!(,/A). So @!(,6 can be formally described as everything that is ;0<'(@ (just as in 
the example where Portugal was described as the land that includes everything that is "of 
Portugal")24 
By now one can grasp that the @!(,6 perceived in the !"#$%#&' @!(,/A is a multiple and 
complex one, which is defined by the things that compose it while at the same time defining 
those things. Each bird is defined by having its wings and its feet and its beak, but its feet are 
defined by being its feet and not feet in general, just like its wings are its wings and not wings 
in general. The same happens with my hands and legs: my hand is not just a hand like any other 
one, it is my hand — and Hierocles' point is to show that perception of my hand is completely 
different from perception of a hand. My hands are defined by being mine (@!(,/A), just like my 
feet are defined by being mine (@!(,/A). At the same time, the @!(,6 that is the object of the 
!"#$%#&' @!(,/A at stake here is presented as that formal instance that has these hands and these 
legs, or, put better, the formal instance that is these hands and legs ( i.e. that is equal to these !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24This is a circular definition, but that does not necessarily mean it is a bad one. As is the one of Portugal as "the country 
that encompasses everything that is "of Portugal", just like the definition of a square and ultimately all formal 
definitions. 
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hands and legs). So @!(,6 determines both what I am and what is mine in a relational way. In 
this sense, I can say that this hand is mine (@!(,/A) and that I am the one who has this hand. 
These feet and legs and arms and chest are mine, and that makes me the one who has these legs 
and arms and chest. This starts to describe a relational @!(,6 that defines and at the same time 
is defined by whatever it stamps or brands as its own (@!(,/A).25 
To sum up what I have said so far, one can say that these examples portray @!(,6 as being 
a region of whatever is ;0<'(@, a region that contains multiple elements that are ;0<'(@, and a 
region through which the @!(,6 spreads itself while at the same time aggregating the elements 
it is related to. But, as the examples of the map also show, this region, albeit plural, is not total 
— it delimitates what is ;0<'(@ and at the same time outs it in opposition to what is not @!(,/A. 
When a bird perceives its wings as its wings, it perceives other bird's wings as not being its 
own, just as it perceives a land animal's legs as not being its own. So by delimitating what is 
;0<'(@, one is also delimitating what is not ;0<'(@. The difference between them comes from 
this so-called "genitive stamp" which is applied to multiple elements, aggregating them without 
stopping them from being multiple. This genitive "stamp" serves as the criterion that internally 
divides the perceptive field into two sub-fields, to wit, the field of @!(,6, embracing all 
perceptive objects that are ;0<'(@, and the fields of not-@!(,6, embracing all perceptive objects 
that are not ;0<'(@. 
5)But this is far from being all there is to say about the realm of @!(,6 in the first example. 
In fact, by saying that animals perceive their parts and the E92;!& for which they have those 
parts, Hierocles is describing perception of the animals' parts as being related to perception of 
their E92;!&. This comes about with the meaning of j!9!#12(M as described above. Hierocles 
says that a bird "+),&-!µG<)2,!&" its wings' 8!9!#12(M and C8&,%P2&6,%' to fly, and then says 
that a land animal +),&-!µG<)2,!& its own parts, $0: \,& QE2& $3# 89=' h) QE2& E92*!). By doing 
this Hierocles describes this +),&-!µG<)2#$!& as a complex one. It is true that it was already 
complex, because it already involved a plurality of elements that were defined in relation to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25It is important here to stress that these elements in the first example already point to a complex perception, as described 
in the analysis of #()!*#$%#&', and thus reinforce this interpretation. It is true that, so far, only a part of this complexity 
has emerged, and in a different order than expoundeed, but it has surfaced. For these examples show that a bird's 
perception of its wings is (A) related to and defined by these wings being its wings, and is therefore connected to 
perception @!(,/A (!). In this case, A) is perceived as being "of !", just like perception of its feet (B) and head (C) and 
beak (D). So this means that at the same time as A, B, C and D are defined by being "of !", ! is defined as being A and 
B and C and D. But this also forces one to recognize that perception of A is interlaced with perception of B and C and D. 
At the same time, by dividing the percepta into what is @!(,6 and what is not @!(,6, these examples already create a 
complex network between perception of what is @!(,6 and what is not @!(,6, because at least one of these groups is 
defined in relation to the other  — (already hinting here at the pivotal role @!(,6 has, and already requiring the 
introduction of the E92;!& that makes it possible to explain the connection between what is @!(,6 and what is not @!(,6).  
melhorar a coisa do alfabeto, para ficar mais claro 
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@!(,6. But now it gets even more complex. For this passage means that a bird's perception of 
its own wings is already a perception of their aptitude for flying. 
The first thing to note is that Hierocles' examples stress the parts' intrinsic connection to 
their E92;!&. A bird perceives its wings as ready to fly, a land animal perceives its legs as 
capable of walking, and we perceive our eyes as capable of seeing, our eyes as apt for hearing, 
our hands as fit for giving and taking and our feet as capable of walking. This means that an 
animal's perception of each of its parts is more complex than anticipated. In fact, its perception 
of each of its parts was described before as complex because it involved each part's specific 
determination (being a hand, for example) and perception of it being @!(,/A. Now perception 
of that part involves its specific determination, involves perception of it being @!(,/A, but also 
involves perception of that specific part's E92*!. So the most important thing to retain from this 
passage is that each part's determination is defined not only by the fact that it is @!(,/A, but 
also by that part's E92*!. In other words, perception of my hand is determined by being my 
hand, but also by being able to give and take. A bird's perception of its wings is determined by 
the fact that the wings are its own wings, but also by their being able to fly.  
Now these examples, willingly or not, create an even more complex realm of @!(,6, one in 
which possibility comes to play a major role. This might seem a bit farfetched, but it is in fact 
very easy to explain. If a bird perceives its wings as a means to fly, it perceives its wings as 
always being apt for flying, whether it is indeed flying or not. This aptitude is indeed entailed 
in the meaning of 8!9!#12(M and C8&,%P2&6,%', and it describes a bird's perception of its wings 
as being one that involves its ability to fly in anticipation. The same thing holds for a land 
animal and for humans. Indeed, it is this anticipative character of the E920!&'s perception that 
enables one to use the parts for their specific E92*!. If a bird did not anticipate the ability of its 
wings to fly, i.e. if it did not perceive its wings as being able to fly before using them to fly, it 
would not begin using them to fly. If perception of my hand did not include and anticipate its 
ability to give and take, I would not use it when it comes to give and take. If there were no 
anticipation of the ability of my hand to receive something, I would not extend it outwards 
when someone  extended a chocolate bar in my direction. So perception of my hand is a 
perception that it is my hand and that it is able to give and take whenever it comes to give and 
take. A bird's perception of its wings is a perception that those wings are its own wings and is a 
perception of the possibility of these wings flying. 
One must further note that the introduciton of possibility and anticipation pave the way for 
a connection between each part and multiple E92*!&. When talking about aptitude of a hand for 
giving and taking, one is talking about more than one E92*!. So my perception of my hand is 
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not only perception of my hand as my hand,but also perception of my hand's aptitude for 
multiple E92;!&. And if one thinks about it, its is not just for giving and taking: my hand is 
perceived as capable of giving and taking, but also of grabbing and punching and pushing and 
pulling and so on. In the same way, a bird's perception of its wings is not only a perception of 
its ability to fly, but also of its capacity to protect its children, just like a land animal's 
perception of its legs is not only a perception of its ability to walk, but also to run, and probably 
also to kick. And even though it is not performing all the E92;!& at the same time, it still 
perceives its parts as apt for each of those E92;!&. 
And now comes one of the most important aspects of this fifth point: when talking about a 
bird's perception of its wings' aptitude for flying, Hierocles ends up describing perception of its 
own wings' aptitude for flying as perception of the bird's own (@!(,/A) aptitude for flying. At 
stake here is the existence not only of parts @!(,/A, but also of many possible E92;!& ;0<'(@ 
related to each of the parts that are @!(,/A. 
Now this multiplies the already plural realm of what is ;0<'(@. Instead of just dealing with 
parts that are @!(,/A, one is also dealing with all the E92;!& and Q97! that are possibly related to 
each of the parts that are @!(,/A. When I am talking of my hand's possibility to grab, give, take, 
punch, push, pull and so on, I am in fact talking about my (;0<'(@) possibility to grab, give, 
take, punch, push, pull and so on.  
All this means that !"#$%#&' @!(,/A is an anticipative form of !"#$%#&', because the @!(,6 
described in these examples is not restricted to an immediate present, but rather expands 
towards multiple possible E92;!&. X"#$%#&' @!(,/A is already !"#$%#&' of all the possible E92;!& 
@!(,/A related to each of the parts that are @!(,/A. And this means the @!(,6 described by 
Hierocles is a @!(,6 that always perceives itself by anticipating itself in situations yet to be, i.e. 
the @!(,6 described by Hierocles is always a @!(,6 defined by its connection with a form of 
that same @!(,6 that is yet to be. A bird perceives its wings as able to fly right now but also in a 
while, which means it perceives itself as capable of flying right now or in a while. A bird's 
perception of itself includes and is defined by perception of its own aptitude for flying in a 
while. I perceive my hands as capable of grabbing something right now, but also whenever I 
want to grab something. And this means I perceive myself as able to grab this bottle of water — 
something I will do it after I finish this sentence —even though I am typing right now. This 
possibility defines the perception I have of myself, which would be radically different if I 
perceived myself as unable to grab this bottle after I finish this sentence.  
So instead of a realm composed of different parts ;0<'(@, one is dealing with a realm of 
different parts ;0<'(@, each of them associated with multiple possible E92;!& ;0<'(@. Once 
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again, this description defines the region of ;0<'(@, an increasingly larger one, but always 
defined by being the region of what it ;0<'(@, i.e. the region throughout which the @!(,6 
spreads itself while at the same time "stamping" all those elements — parts and their multiple 
and possible E92;!& —  and therefore "aggregating" them in "what is ;0<'(@". 
 
1.d.2) The second argument. 
 
Let us now consider the next argument used to prove !"#$%#&' @!(,/A (a.2). This is the 
argument that intends to prove animals perceive their equipment for defence: "P2(,B9! PV \,& 
/HPV ,:) 89=' Kµ()!) 8!9!#12(!#$B),3) !H,/;' +)!&#$M,3' P&<12&,!&." Once again, 
Hierocles uses 8!9!#12(M.This re-introduction of 8!9!#12(M raises some questions regarding 
the novelty of this second argument. In fact, it may seem less interesting one, and to some 
extent even superfluous. For apparently an animal's equipment for defence is included in its 
parts. Accordingly, equipment for defence is connected to at least one specific E92*! (namely 
protection), just like the rest of its parts. If this were so, this argument would not be a second 
argument, but a corollary of the first: since an animal perceives its parts and their functions in 
the complex way I have tried to show, it must perceive the parts it uses for defence as parts for 
its own defence. Just as a bull perceives its legs and their use for walking, it perceives its horns 
and their use for defending itself. So why does Hierocles clearly identify this as a second point 
("P2(,B9!" II 4)?  
On the one hand, it is hard to deny the connection to the first argument, since it is indeed 
linked with it. On the other hand, this second argument does bring new elements to the table, 
which not only complement the former argument, but also influence and change the complexity 
of what has already been stated.  
1) The first thing to notice it that, by referring to weapons for defence, Hierocles is talking 
about defence against something which is not @!(,/A. This is evident when he says "1!R 7F9 
,!A9/& µV) 20' µ<E%) 1!$&#,<µ2)/& ,!D9/&' ;'72(#. b 1!R ,&#&) @,29/72)B#& >?/&'..." (II 5, my 
emphasis). The use of " ;'72(#. " stresses that a bull's perception of its weapons for defence is 
connected to perception of something that is not ;0<'(@. In fact, this is the first time that 
+),*-%.&' @!(,/A appears in the text connected to something which is presented by the author 
as explicitly not @!(,/A. 
Although this is not entirely new, the focus on the frontier between what is @!(,/A and 
what is not @!(,/A was never explicitly considered in the previous argument and respective 
examples. In fact, the first argument focused on the internal structure of the +),*-%.&' @!(,/A 
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sub-field, while this second one seems to also focus on this sub-field's connection to what is not 
@!(,/A.  
I would like to mention that this second argument is still an argument used to prove 
+),*-%.&' @!(,/A. And it is important to stress that, precisely because this argument focuses on 
+),*-%.&' @!(,/A, by making reference to an animal's defensive E92*!, this +),*-%.&' @!(,/A is 
put in an intrinsic connection with what is not @!(,/A but interferes with what is. Hierocles is 
describing the animal's own E92;!& as a means to interact with what is not @!(,/A, but at the 
same time he is saying that things that are not @!(,/A are perceived as possibly interfering with 
what is @!(,/A. A bull’s horns are connected to their aptitude for defending itself agains 
attacks, which come from what is not @!(,/A. At the same time, its perception of an attack is 
determined by its possibily affecting itself and also by its perception of its horns as a means to 
defend against such an attack. 
To sum up, I would like to stress two things: a) an animal's perception of its parts is 
described as being a perception of parts that are apt for their various E92;!&, which are defined 
by their aptitude for interacting with what is not @!(,/A but interferes with what is @!(,/A; b) 
what is not @!(,/A is perceived in connection to what is @!(,/A and defined in connection to 
the parts and E92;!& with which it interferes. 
2) This means that the connection between @!(,6 and not @!(,6 is established via an 
animal's own E92;!&, and in this example more specifically via its defensive E92*!. When a bull 
is setting itself up (1!$&#,<µ2)/&)26 for battle, perception of its horns is connected to the E92;!& 
that relate its horns to the external threat and is therefore connected to the external threat — and 
that is why it puts its horns forward as a congenital weapon for battle ("1!$<829 \8-! #(µ4(J 
89=' ,O) +),*,!L&)" II 7-8). So a bull's perception of its horns is defined by their being its own 
horns, but also by their aptitude for defence against something that is not @!(,/A, and ths means 
that a bull's perception of its horns includes perception of something that is not @!(,/A as a 
decisive element. Accordingly, this means that a bull's perception of what is not @!(,/A is 
intrinsically connected and defined by its perception of its own horns and their E92;!&, since the 
external threat is perceived as something worth putting its horns forward for. 
The same holds for whatever weapon each animal has for its own defence. Each animal 
perceives its weapons for defence in connection with their E92;!& — which are the animal's own 
defensive E92;!& —and in connection with something that is not @!(,/A. Just as a bull's 
perception of itself and of things that are not @!(,/A involves all these three elements in a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26Cf. LSJ B 2 —  "to be set as guard"; LSJ II  — "set in order, array, of soldiers", II 3 "bring into a certain state". 
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relational way, the same holds for those animals that have hooves or spikes or teeth as weapons 
for defence, like the wild ass, the hedgehog, the lion or the snake.  
3) It is important to note that, depending on which weapon each animal has for its defence, 
its perception of an external threat will vary. If a bull perceives a lion jumping from a tree to 
grab its back, it perceives its horns as unable to defend that part, whereas if a hedgehog 
perceives some animal attacking it from the back it just puts out its spikes to defend itself. 
Hierocles does not put this point so explicitly, but by saying that a bull puts its horns in front of 
the rest of its body, he is indeed saying that each animal perceives its different parts in 
connection with something that is not @!(,/A and that something which is not @!(,/A in 
relationship with its own parts and E92;!&, hinting that different animals prepare themselves for 
battle according to their weapons for defence. A bull tries to put its horns forward, while a wild 
ass will try to turn its back on an agressor so that it can kick it. A bull thus perceives something 
as more dangerous if it comes from behind, whereas a wild ass will perceive it as more 
dangerous if coming from the front. This means that perception of what is not @!(,/A interferes 
with an animal’s perception of itself, for a bull perceives its horns as being unable to defend 
itself when it is not facing a threat, whereas it perceives them as apt for defence when facing it. 
All in all, the elements so far presented describe an animal's perception of its own parts as 
being related to their E92;!& and to perception of things that are not @!(,/A but interfere with it. 
The point is that, if one of these elements changes, perception of the other two will change 
accordingly.As we will see, the fourth example helps to clarify this relationship between 
+),*-%.&' @!(,/A and +),*-%.&' of what is not @!(,/A, for it describes variation in the latter. 
However, one can safely say that this connection is already at stake in this second argument. 
4) One can already advance here that these things which are not @!(,6 but interfere with it 
compose the field that Hierocles calls  ,F C1,6'. They are the ones that form the 829&BE/), 
which was very stressed in the 7B)2#&' ,:) Cµ.DE3). Hierocles never says something like "this 
belongs here and that belongs there", but he does point to percepta that are @!(,/A and 
percepta that are not @!(,/A. These percepta that are not @!(,/A are the ones that compose the 
realm of perception described in the !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#. as being +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6'. This is 
the realm of what is @,B9/'. So now one can start to name the two sub-fields of !"#$%#&' above 
described: one of them goes by the name +),*-%.&' @!(,/A, and the other by the name 
+),*-%.&',:) C1,6'. As I tried to show, Hierocles’ analysis entails that, despite the sharp 
contrast between these two fields, +),*-%.&' @!(,/A and +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6' are intrinsically 
connected to each other.  
! &"!
5) Another important aspect introduced by this second argument is the active and passive 
dimension that determine an animal's relational perception of its own parts and of ,F C1,6'. 
In fact, when talking about an animal's perception of its weapons for defence, Hierocles 
describes perception of itself — and accordingly of its own parts — as being capable of 
suffering an attack, hence underlining the passive dimension of the relationship between @!(,6 
and ,F C1,6'. But, at the same time, by making reference to the animal's defensive E92*!, 
Hierocles is also pointing to an active dimension, for a bull perceives its horns as able to 
actively defend the rest of its body against such an attack, and this is why it puts its horns in 
front of the rest of its body.  
So Hierocles is describing an even more complex structu.re of perception than advanced so 
far. To tell the truth, an animal’s perception of each of its parts is defined by its connection to 
its multiple possible E92;!&, and each and every one of these possible E92;!& is defined in 
connection to perception of C1,6', but in such a way that the animal's perception of its own 
parts and E92;!& is defined by being possibly passively affected by something external and by 
possibly actively affecting something external. In fact, a bull's perception of an attack is 
perception of something that will possibly harm it, for it does not perceive the attack only when 
under that attack, otherwise it would not put its horns forward to defend against the attack in 
the first place. At the same time, a bull's perception of its horns is a perception of their aptitude 
for — and therefore possiblity of — defending against such an attack before it actually 
happens, and this is why it puts its horns forward before the attack actually happens. 
6) But one needs to follow this path right to the end. First one has to recognize that 
perception of external things is connected to perception of oneself via an animal's perception of 
its own E92;!&. Second one also has to realize that an animal's perception of these E92;!& is 
perception of their possible use. Now because of both these things, one has to conclude that an 
animal's perception of external things that affect it  (passive dimension) and that it is able to 
affect  (active dimension) is actually a perception that includes the possible ways such external 
things have of affecing the animal and includes the possible ways the animal has of affecting 
such external things. 
This means that perception of an animal's own parts — and, in this particular instance, 
perception of its weapons for defence — is connected to and defined by that animal's 
perception of something external, which is a perception that includes all the possible ways that 
such an external thing has of interacting with such parts, whether passively or actively.  
7) Finally, this surprisingly long consideration of the second argument forces one to 
reconsider the examples given in the first example. In fact, after analysing this second 
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argument, the examples previously used to prove that an animal perceives its own parts gain a 
new depth. 
Let us start with examples that show how perception of one's own parts and their E92;!& 
already involved perception of B1,6' in an active way. It has been said that perception of my 
hand includes a perception of its aptitude for grabbing something; but now one can say that 
perception of my hand includes a perception of its aptitude for grabbing something, be it my 
own or not; eyes are perceived as capable of seeing my own body, but also what is not @!(,/A 
(the examples in fact highlight seeing what is not @!(,/A); wings are perceived as capable of 
flying in the air (which is not @!(,6); legs are perceived as capable of walking on land (which 
is not @!(,6); and so on. An animal's perception of each of these parts includes in it a 
perception of something that is C1,6', but C1,6' in such a way that the animal's own E92;!& are 
perceived as being possibly in connection with that C1,6'. In fact, a land animal's perception of 
its legs is perception of their being apt for walking on land and not on air. And while it 
perceives it has legs and that these legs' function is to walk on the ground, it also perceives the 
ground as something it can walk upon in order to carry on its own business and fulfil its other 
E92;!&, like getting water, escaping danger, and so on. 
Although Hierocles does not go into so much detail in this first example, this is indeed 
what his examples entail. Perception of oneself therefore appears depicted here as already 
having an eye towards the execution or carrying out of oneself. And this means having at the 
same time an eye out for @!(,6 and for what is not @!(,6 but interferes with it. 
But the examples used in this second argument display an even more complex structure, 
one that still affects what has been said previously. Perception of my hand involves perception 
of its multiple active E92;!&, such as its aptitude for pulling and pushing and punching in my 
defence, but, as these second examples entail, perception of my hands and my hands' E92;!& is 
at the same time perception of their passive E92;!&. Indeed, they are also perceived as 
something that can be pushed and pulled and torn and taken care of and so on. A bull, being a 
land animal, perceives it has legs and that these legs' function is to walk, but it also perceives 
them as easily affected by a predator, and this is why it puts them behind its horns when 
attacked. Once again, the possibility of my hand being pushed and pulled and torn and taken 
care of is my (;0<'(@) possibility of being pushed and pulled and torn and taken care of. In the 
same way, a bull perceives the possibility of its legs being bitten as its own possibility of being 
bitten. And even if one stops focusing on examples that include attack and defence, one can 
still grasp that a bull's perception of the ground on which it walks includes a perception of that 
ground's resistance to its own steps, which is perception of a way of being affected by the 
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exterior. This means that a bull's perception of the ground involves several possible passive and 
active elements, since it is a perception of something upon which it can walk or run or stand 
still, which includes both its active E92;!& and the passive E92;!& of being offered resistance to. 
8)As has been said, Hierocles is painting a bicoloured picture in which perception is 
internally divided into perception of things that are @!,/A and of things that are not @!,/A viz. 
C1,6'. This means that everything I perceive already possesses one of these colours. But now, 
by introducing the various possible passive and active E92;!& @!(,/A, the realm of @!,/A has 
expanded significantly. Neverthless, this area is still one that defines and separates what is 
;0<'(@ from what is not ;0<'(@, since another man's ability of pushing and punching is not my 
ability of pushing and punching, although it is connected to my possibility of being pushed and 
punched, as we will see in a while. 
So things that are @!(,/A seem to be connected to things that are not @!(,/A and vice-versa 
(even if both terms carry different weight in the relationship between them). Despite there 
being two different sub-fields, these subfields are intrinsically related to one another.  
In other words, an animal's perception of itself and accordingly of its own parts happens 
within a surrounding environment (829&BE/)) that is external (C1,6') but interacts with !"#$%#&' 
@!(,/A and helps to determine it. 
 
1.d.3) The third argument 
 
The following argument (a.3) is considerably longer than the previous ones (II 19 - III 19). 
It deals with the perception animals have of their own strengths and weaknesses. 
One must begin by noting Hierocles uses #()!&#$<)/µ!& very often in this argument, 
starting in the formulation of it:"1!R µO) ,*)! '* +#$2)I ,:) C) e(,/;' $0: ,*)! f3µ!-B! 1!R 
P(#8!$I #()!&#$<)2,!& ,F >?!." (II 19-20). Accordingly, this argument will prove itself a very 
important one in corroborating the possible interpretation of #()!*#$%#&' introduced above. In 
doing so, this argument will be extremely important in explaining the structure of the sub-field 
of !"#$%#&' @!(,/A. It is in this third argument that one starts to comprehend how the different 
elements that are @!(,/A relationally define each other. In other words, it is in this argument 
that one starts to grasp how an animal's different parts are defined in relation to one another.As 
we will see, the parts' E92;!& will play a pivotal role in this articulation. Furthermore, the 
examples contained in this third argument also help to explain how perception of this complex 
structure, the structure of @!(,6, is defined in relation to C1,6'. 
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Let us start by describing Hierocles' argument and his first examples (I will save the 
remaining three for later). 
In order to prove that animals have !"#$%#&' @!(,/A, the author of the !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#. 
says that animals co-perceive their strengths and weaknesses. He then says that when preparing 
itself against an attack, a bull puts its horns in front of its body. Likewise, a turtle draws its feet 
and head under its shell, just as a snail rolls itself into its horny part. In the same way, a bear 
defends its head with its hands if beaten with sticks, and a toad inflates its skin if it has to jump 
across a distance it is not confident of crossing. 
Once again, Hierocles uses these examples to prove that, if animals did not have !"#$%#&' 
@!(,/A, they would not behave as they do. Regardless of whether these arguments prove that 
point or not, our question is still the same as before: what do these examples tell us about the 
meaning and structure of @!(,6 and  !"#$%#&' @!(,/A? 
1) The first thing to note it that these examples point at perception of one's own parts as a 
perception that compares those different parts. In the first examples, which concern an animal's 
defence — thus continuing along the same lines as the previous argument —, some parts are 
perceived as strengths because they are better suited to resist an attack than others, whereas 
some parts are perceived as weaknesses because they are less able to resist an attack and to 
fulfil a defensive E92*!. 
I would like to stress that, despite the fact that Hierocles never uses the comparative, he 
does use the superlative in the example of a tortoise, where he says that this animal hides its 
parts that are easy to grab ("2H<-3,!") under its part that is hard ("#1-%9?") and most difficult 
to arrive at ("P(#µ2,!E2&9*#,_"). However, a comparative perception of an animal's different 
parts is clearly implied in these examples. In fact, when a bull puts its horns in front of the rest 
of its body, it does so because it perceives them to be stronger (in resisting an attack) than the 
rest. In the same way, a tortoise hides its head and feet underneath its shell because one is more 
resistant than the others; and a snail does exactly the same thing. 
Now all these examples clearly point to a complex and interlaced perception of different 
parts. In order for a bull to put its horns in front of the rest of its body it has to perceive its 
horns as being stronger than the rest, and this comparison means putting two distinct things on 
the scales at the same time, or, put differently, on the same scale. This means that — strictly 
perception-wise and in a way that cannot yet be completely clear  — strengths are connected to 
weaknesses and vice versa. A tortoise’s head and feet are weak because they can be easily 
damaged by a predator, whereas its shell cannot. A snail perceives that its horn is harder to 
damage than its body too, and this is why it hides the latter inside the former. So this means 
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that, if attacked, a bull's perception of its horns is defined by being a perception of something 
stronger than the rest of its body, i.e. it is defined by being equal to something stronger than the 
rest of its body. Likewise, a tortoise's perception of its shell is equal to a perception of 
something harder and more difficult to damage than its paws and head. In the same way, when 
under attack, a bull's perception of its legs is a perception of something more likely to undergo 
damage than its horns, just as a tortoise's perception of its paws and head is a perception of 
something more likely to undergo damage than its shell.  
Now all this means that perception of each different part includes in itself perception of 
other parts as a decisive element. A bull's perception of its horns is intrinsically a co-perception 
of its legs, to such an extent that a bull's perception of its horns is defined by their being 
stronger and more able to resist an attack than its legs. If its horns were not perceived as 
stronger and more capable of resisting an attack than its legs, they would be perceived in an 
entirely different way. 
2) The second thing to note in this third argument is that it portrays !"#$%#&' @!(,/A as 
establishing a hierarchy amongst an animal's different parts. It can be objected that the 
comparative element has already created a hierarchy, and that this explanation is therefore 
irrelevant. Despite this being true, for the comparison amongst different parts does indeed 
entail a Hierarchy, there is another hierarchy at stake in the examples, one with a broader 
scope. Indeed, because !"#$%#&' @!(,/A appears described as a complex perception that not 
only entails an animal's different parts, but also compares these different parts, these examples 
present perception of a hierarchy. However, this hierarchy is not restricted to the comparison 
described above. In fact, instead of just describing which parts animals perceive as more 
capable of resisting an attack, this third argument also hints that some parts are more important 
for protecting from such an attack than others. 
Let us look at the other two examples. A bear, not seeming to be unaware ("/H1 +µ!$O' 
Q/&12) 2k)!&", II 27) of its head's vulnerability, uses its paws to cover it if beaten with sticks or 
other objects, because it perceives its head to be damageable by them. Now unlike the 
examples of a bull or a tortoise or a snail, it is hard to think that a bear's paws are harder to 
damage than its head. In fact, one can imagine its paws to be as easy to damage as its head. So 
what the example seems to suggest is that a bear perceives damage to its head as being more 
dangerous than damage to its paws, and this is why it "offers" them for taking the brunt. In fact, 
what seems to be here at stake is very simple to grasp: a concussion and a blind eye are 
perceived as worse than a broken hand or a couple of broken fingers. This does not mean the 
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head is less resistant than the hands; it just means it is more important to protect during an 
attack. 
The example of a toad is slightly different and entails both the former comparative element 
and this new hierarchical element. This animal, not believing it can make it all the way over a 
gap, inflates itself so that the inflated parts of its body protect its head and feet should it fall. 
Now a toad does perceive that the inflated parts are more suitable for resisting a fall than its 
head and feet, which includes the comparative element stressed in 1). However, by stressing 
that a toad raises its legs and head when it jumps, Hierocles also stresses this animal's attention 
to not damaging these parts. A toad perceives that the inflated parts can take the fall without 
suffering much damage, and that even if they did suffer damage, this damage would not be as 
dangerous as damage to ist head and feet.27 
All in all, this means that some parts are not only perceived as more capable than others of 
resisting an attack or undergoing a fall, but also as more important to protect than others. A 
bear perceives its head as more important to protect than its head, and this defines both a 
perception of its head and a perception of its hands in a relational way. If by any chance its 
hands became more important to protect than its head, its perception of each of these parts 
would radically change.  
3) Now both the comparative element and the hierarchical element establish a complex 
perception that compares and ranks a) which parts are more suitable for an animal to protect 
itself and b) which parts are more important to be protected. This is not directly stated in the 
examples, but these last two elements do describe a complex relational perception of different 
parts that entails both these elements. 
Let us take the bull example once again, now taking it beyond where Hierocles got to. 
When a bull is preparing itself for defence, it perceives its horns as stronger and more capable 
of such a task than the rest of its body; but at the same time, it would be hard to think that the 
rest of its body parts are equally unable to defend against such an attack and equally important 
to protect from it. In fact, if an attacker comes running up from behind, a bull perceives that its 
own legs are not as capable of defence as its horns, but are still able to kick the attacker, 
whereas its flanks are merely unable of doing anything. This is why a bull tries to defend its 
flanks with its horns (preferably) or with its hooves (if it cannot use its horns). Moreover, a bull 
perceives an attack to its tail as less dangerous that an attack to its flanks, while also perceiving 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27Of all these examples the one regarding the bear is the hardest to explain without /012*3#&'. It will be clearer in the 
second section. 
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an attack on its flanks as less dangerous than an attack on its neck  — just as a bear perceives 
damage to its hands as less dangerous than damage to its head. 
This extrapolation of Hierocles' examples is meant to clarify what is certainly presupposed 
in them: weaknesses and strengths are defined in relation to each other in an extremely 
complex and multidimensional perception. A bull perceives its horns as its strongest part when 
attacked, and perception of its horns includes perception of its weaker parts, but of parts that 
are weaker than the horns in different ways. At the same time, if attacked, a bull's perception of 
its hooves is perception of something that is defined by being weaker than its horns, but 
stronger than its flanks. In this same scenario, a bull's perception of its flanks is perception of 
something weaker that its hooves and than it horns — but at the same time perception of 
something that despite not being weaker than its neck, is less important to protect than it. 
Accordingly, a bull's perception of its legs is perception of something more capable of defence 
than its neck, but less important to protect than it. 
As one can easily understand, a full explanation of all the connections between all the 
different parts in the previous example would be very long and boring. On the other hand, the 
important point to remember from it is very simple: each and every part of an animal is 
perceived by it in connection with all the other parts, for it is always perceived as stronger or 
weaker than every other part, thus creating a rank and perceiving each part already in 
connection with all the other parts that place differently in it. But instead of having just a single 
hierarchy that compares which parts are stronger or weaker — (in the case of an attack) — an 
animal's perception includes another hierarchy of which of those parts — that are weaker and 
stronger to affect — are at the same time more or less important to protect. This means that an 
animal's perception of each and every single part involves a co-perception of all the other parts 
that are stronger or weaker and more or less important to protect — to such an extent that some 
parts are less important to protect and weaker than the more important ones, others are more 
important to protect and weaker, and so on. Whatever the connection between the parts may be, 
perception of each part is always and already a co-perception of all the other parts, in such a 
way that perception of each part is defined by its multiple connections to all other parts. 
4) This explanation cannot be complete without introducing yet another element, one that 
was mentioned in the second argument: the fact that all these examples presuppose a co-
perception — in the same sense — of an external threat. Indeed, a bull puts its horns in front of 
its entire body when preparing defence against an attack ("N86,2 49<,,/&,/ 89=' ,O) 
C8&G/(-M)" II 20-21); a tortoise withdraws its head and feet beneath its shell when co-
perceiving an assault ("E2-T)% PV #()!&#$!)/µB)% ,&)=' C8&$B#23' ,O) E24!-O) 1!R ,/Z' 
! &)!
86P!' ,? g#,9!1TP2& µB92& @!(,I' W8/#,B--2&" II 23-25); a snail does the same thing when it 
co-perceives danger ("N86,2 1&)PD)/( #()!*#$/&,/" II 26-27); a bear uses its paws to cover its 
head when beaten with sticks or other objects ("8!&/µB)% LD-/&' b ,&#&) @,B9/&'" II 29), 
showing that it does not seem to be unaware of — or stupid as regards ("/HE +µ!$O' Q/&12) 
2k)!&" ll 27) —  the vulnerability of its head; and a toad co-perceives how wide the gap is 
("!H,/A ,/A 86#/) C1,2*)2,!& P&<#,%µ! #()!&#$<)2,!&" II 38), and this is why it inflates itself 
to protect its head and feet if, when pursued (or being pursued "P&31/µB)%" II 38),  it needs to 
jump a distance it is not confident of crossing. All these examples put the complex perception 
of distinct parts in relation withperception of something external, something that, unlike 
animals' own parts, cannot be described as @!(,/A. For horns and body, head and feet and shell, 
body and shell, paws and head, head and feet and body can all be @!(,6. But in these examples 
they all appear in connection with something that is not @!(,6, something that is external 
(C1,6') and yet interferes with perception of what is @!(,6. 
This means that an animal's complex perception of each of its parts is not only defined in 
connection with all the other parts but also in connection with a specific external situation. This 
external situation plays a pivotal role in the hierarchy and comparisons that determine the 
relationships of the parts to each other. In fact, if instead of perceiving an attack, an animal 
perceives food or a female, the connections of its parts with each other will dramatically 
change, for weaknesses and strengths are not the same if it is dealing with an attack or with 
food or etc. Horns are very useful for defence, but not so much when it comes to eating. A lion 
may perceive its mouth as very helpful for defence, and also for attacking other animals, and 
even for eating those animals, but it can only be considered a strength when it comes to 
reproduction in a very indirect way — (although it can indeed be a strength in this indirect 
way,)28 — and it will not be as important as other parts, which are obviously less important 
when it comes to eating. 
5) The fundamental reason why the relationship between parts changes according to 
whatever is perceived as C1,6' must also be considered. And it is not difficult to grasp: as 
anticipated in the previous arguments, perception of C1,6' is functionally related to an animal's 
perception of its E92;!&. Depending on its different perceptions of external things, different 
E92;!& are at stake for the animal, and for each of the different E92;!& there are parts that can be 
considered more suitable than others. Put in other words, this means that the different 
hierarchical relationships between the parts, viz. the hierarchical relationships that define each !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28For example, if its mouth helps it to become the alpha mail, in which case he gets all the ladies. 
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and every part change in line with different E92;!&, which means that, through the change in 
perception of something external, an animal's perception of the E92*! at stake in such a situation 
changes, and accordingly the relationship between each and every part changes and 
consequently the animal's immediate perception of each and every part changes too. 
So the key to the connection between an animal's perception of its different parts is 
actually provided by the E92;!& that make them relative to one another. An animal's perception 
of each of its own parts is functionally related to the other parts involved in the specific E92*! at 
stake each time, and every single part is perceived in relation to that E92*!, which is connected 
to perception of C1,6' 
One must further add that these examples portray a direct relationship between an animal 
and its own E92;!&. It is easy to assume that an animal's perception of its E92;!& is mediated by 
its perception of its own parts. And this is likely to happen because an animal's perception of its 
E92;!& involves and is determined by its perception of the parts it has that are more or less 
suited to such E92;!&. However, one must also note that an animal's perception of its E92;!& is 
perception of its own E92;!&, not only in the sense that its own parts are connected to these 
E92;!&, but also in the sense that these E92;!& are E92;!& @!(,/A. This means that the parts are 
also perceived via being mediated by an animal's direct contact with its own E92;!&, just as 
much as that animal’s contact with its E92;!& is mediated via its perception of its parts. An 
animal's parts are functionally perceived depending on its specific E92*! at any given time, just 
like perception of this E92*! @!(,/A is functionally related to which parts are more or less suited 
to fulfil it. 
6) But this is only half of the third argument. The remaining examples concern the asp, the 
deer and the beaver. The one involving the asp is very much like the previous ones, but the 
other two bring something new that helps to illustrate the role of possibility in this already 
complex perception of one's weaknesses and strengths. The introduction of possibility will help 
to show how an animal's perception of each of its own parts is not only related to the other parts 
involved in the specific E92*! at stake each time, but at the same time functionally related to the 
same part's many E92;!& and to the other parts that play a role in each of those E92;!&.  
Let us start by the example of the deer. This example is described as seeming incredible, 
for despite having horns that are grand and amazing to see and legs that are skinny and easy to 
look down upon ("mnP&! 1!,!49/)%$I)!&", II 50), a deer perceives its horns as a weakness and 
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its legs as a strength. Hierocles says that this happens because 4D#&',29 being a more capable 
teacher than the eyes, has taught it that skinny legs are trustworthy when it is urgent to flee by 
running or jumping, whereas its horns are so big that they hinder it from life's normal business 
and especially when it needs to escape from a threat— (one can imagine these big horns getting 
stuck everywhere). The foundational structure behind this example is the one described 
previously: a deer perceives its different parts already in connection with their functions, and 
perceives these functions already in connection with something external. 
In this example Hierocles does not use expressions like "being pursued", but an external 
threat is clearly implied, for it is because a deer perceives a threat that it needs to run and jump 
in order to escape, and it is for this same need that its horns are an obstacle. Hierocles also 
widens here the scope of his examples when talking about life's normal business, showing that 
the examples concerning weaknesses and strengths are not strictly connected to a survivalist 
perspective. By doing so, he defines weaknesses and strengths not only in connection with 
external attacks, but primarily by their ability to perform the function at stake. It is obvious that 
the main concern in this batch of examples is indeed the consideration of weaknesses and 
strengths in connection with external threats, but this can mean that, within the context of a 
certain E92*!, which is defined in connection with ,F C1,6', an animal identifies which of its 
parts are well suited for that E92*! and which are not.  
Let us imagine that a deer tries to escape but ends up cornered: it perceives the surrounding 
environment and perceives it has no room to run because it has a precipice behind it and three 
lions surrounding it — will it still perceive its legs as a strength and its horns as a weakness? Or 
will it happen that, just as in the bull example, it puts its horns in front of the rest of its body, 
perceiving that its legs can be easily seized and that its horns are more capable of resisting an 
attack? According to all previous evidence, the second option is the correct one. This complex 
form of perception of one's own strengths and weaknesses is described here as being a form of 
diagnosis: perceiving an external environment in connection to one's own E92*! — namely that 
which suits the concrete situation — one identifies which parts of one's body are suitable to 
accomplish that E92*!. It is within this framework that perception of one's weaknesses and 
strengths as regards an external threat make sense.  
But, as I said above, the deer example brings another piece to this puzzle, one that has a 
key role in everything I have just said. The structure presented up until now identifies 
perception as a diagnostic perception that takes +),*-%.&' @!(,/A into account in connection !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29The role of 4D#&' as a more capable teacher than the eyes has to do with the role of experience in this process, which 
due to lack of time, I could not consider before my deadline. 
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with +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6', defining one in connection to the other, but in such a way that 
perception of an animal's different parts is only connected to an immediate E92*!, which is 
defined by what it perceives in the C1,6'. Now the part of the example where a deer shatters its 
horns' oversized parts (",F 8-2/)<>/),!" lll, 2) highlights that its perception of its horns takes 
into account a possible future use of those horns. Indeed, if a deer, driven by the urge to flee, 
perceived them as a mere weakness, it would just break them entirely. But, perceiving that 
there might be a circumstance in which they prove themselves useful for a future E92*!, it only 
snaps the excessive part of them, i.e. the part that has no possible connection to the different 
possible E92;!& connected to its horns.  
This brings to the table top an element that was always "under" it so far, one that 
exponentially increases the complexity of the structure of perception Hierocles is describing. 
As we have seen, the role of possibility affects not only what starts from now on, but also 
everything already stated in the previous examples. In fact, it means that a bull does not 
perceive its horns as being useful for its defence only when it needs to defend itself. In the 
same way a wild ass perceives its hooves as being useful for defence even when it is just using 
them to walk. The examples could keep on coming, but the main point is always the same: 
perception of oneself is always a co-perception of one's own parts in connection with each 
other and given the specific E92*! that is defined at any given time in relation to something 
external. But the point is that the relationship between each of one's own parts is already co-
perceived as a possible connection amongst other possible relationships between one's own 
parts according to other possible E92;!& defined in connection with other possible external 
circumstances.  
7) And this serves to reveal a new and unanticipated element — the fact that this 
perception of one's own possible passive and active E92;!& is always and already a perception 
that anticipates all possible passive and active uses of one's own parts in all the possible 
connections to each other and according to all the possible passive and active interactions with 
all the possible external things to which they can be connected. In other words, perception of 
any "single element" of @!(,6 is necessarily a co-perception of the whole realm of what is 
@!(,/A. At the same time, perception of one's whole realm of @!(,6 is defined in connection 
with all the possible external elements that interfere with it in a passive or active way. This 
means that perception of any "single element" of @!(,6 entails perception of all the elements of 
C1,6' possibly related to it. Accordingly, perception of any element of C1,6' entails perception 
of the whole realm of +),*-%.&' @!(,/A. But at the same time, because perception of any 
element of C1,6' entails perception of the whole realm of +),*-%.&' @!(,/A, it also entails 
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perception of one's own parts and E92;!& in connection with other external elements, which 
means it also entails all the other elements possibly included in the domain of +),*-%.&' ,:) 
C1,6' — (as the next example will clarify). Now this means that perception of any single 
moment of the aesthetic field is always and already a perception of the whole aesthetic field, 
which includes not only the elements explicitly present but also all those possibly related to 
what is actually being perceived, for those elements possibly connected play a pivotal role in 
what is actually happening. For example, perception of my hand includes and is defined by all 
its possible passive and active E92;!& and all the comparative and hierarchical relationships with 
other parts in all these E92;!&, and accordingly all the possible external objects according to 
which such E92;!& vary. 
The beaver example is also a good testament to this description. It is presented as an even 
more incredible example ("$!(µ!#&T,29/)", III 5), and is easy to select as the most surprising 
of the ones comprised in the !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#.. Hierocles says that a beaver does not ignore 
for which parts it is hunted ("µ%P' d) 2`)21! P&T12,!& µ/9*3) +7)/2;)", lll 13). Apparently, old 
time doctors had a liking for beaver testicles, thus increasing the demand for them, which 
translated into an increase in their hunting.30 Although Hierocles does not care to explain how 
beavers came to know that they were being pursued for their testicles, he does says that they 
know it, and uses such a "fact" to explain +),*-%.&' @!(,/A. He says that, when pursued 
("P&316µ2)/'", III 15), a beaver usually manages to stay intact and healthy for a while, but, if 
push comes to shove, this river animal cuts off its testicles with its own teeth, thus managing to 
escape poachers only after that part.  
I have explained the structure that underlies Hierocles' arguments several times already, so 
I excuse myself from doing it again. What I would like to stress regarding this example — at 
least for now — is the role of possibility. For it hints that it is because the beaver perceives 
these parts as having a possible future use — one that is clearly not immediately at stake when 
it is being pursued — that it does not want to cut them off at the beginning and avoid pursuit 
altogether.31However when, after running for a while, it perceives the external threat as 
something it may not escape, it perceives at that same time the possible consequences of being 
captured, and it is because of this that it cuts off its testicles. The fact that it uses its own teeth 
to cut them also stresses the already-mentioned complex relationship between different parts. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 The beaver's testicles had a medicinal use in ancient times. This utility lead to hunting of beavers for the sake of these 
parts. For more indications as regards this, cf.  Ramelli, Ilaria (ed.), Hierocles the Stoic: Elements of Ethics, Fragments 
and Excerpts, Society of Biblical Literature, Atlanta, 2009, 42. 
31 I realize that this argument may be subject to various objections. In fact, one can say that the beaver runs away 
because he wants to stay intact. I will not consider this problem for now, since it can be bettwe understood after the 
consideration of /012*3#&'. 
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But instead of focusing on only the ability of certain parts to protect others, this example also 
stresses the possibility of a certain part hindering another for the safety of the rest of the parts 
(or whole body).  This example is therefore a very complex one, which brings to the table all 
the aforementioned elements of +),*-%.&' @!(,/A in its complex relationship with +),*-%.&' 
,:) C1,6', 
There are yet other important aspects in the beaver example, but I will save them for the 
second section, where they can be fully discussed. 32 
 
 
1.d.4) The fourth argument. 
 
It is now time to move on to the fourth argument (a.4). This is the most surprising of the 
four, to the extent that, at first glance, it can even seem out of place. In fact, an argument 
aiming to prove that animals perceive the strengths and weaknesses in other animals sits 
uneasily in a list of arguments to prove perception of oneself. Contrary to perception of one's 
own parts, to perception of one's own weapons for defence and of one's own strengths and 
weaknesses, perception of the strengths and weaknesses in other (],29/&) animals seems to 
have nothing to do with +),*-%.&' @!(,/A. However, after the analysis of the previous 
examples, it appears less surprising. 
The argument is expressed in the following way: "o µO) QP2& ,!A,! -B72&), \8/( 72 ,F 
>?! 1!R C) @,B9/&' +#$2)2&:) 1!R P()<µ23) +),*-%.&) QE2&, 1!R ,*)! µV) !H,/;' V8*G/(-!, 89=' 
,*)! PV !H,/R' +)/E!R 1!R /i/) #DµG!#&' +P&<-(,/'." (III, 20-23). So the argument is not only 
focused on apprehending the strengths and weaknesses in other animals, but also on 
apprehending which animals are aggressive towards itself and which ones it is at peace with 
and has an indissoluble agreement with. It is in this later part of the sentence, which at first 
glance seems a mere appendix, that one finds the key to understanding the connection between 
+),*-%.&' @!(,/A and the weaknesses and strengths in other animals.  
Indeed, the end of the sentence shows that +),*-%.&' of the weaknesses and strengths in 
other animals happens within a context of +),*-%.&' of which animals are dangerous to itself 
and which are not. This was already at stake in the previous arguments, but this one explicitly 
stresses that perception of external things involves perception of oneself, as the double use of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32Despite the last two examples not using #()!*#$%#&' or #()!&#$<)/µ!&, it is clear that the phenomenon described by 
them it still the same that those words refer to, i.e. a complex structure of perception that entails multiple elements 
immediately and possibly related to each other in the very complex way I tried to picture. 
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"!H,/*'" attests. As anticipated by the previous examples, perception of external things, such as 
some threat, is related to perception of one's own parts and relative functions, in such a way 
that perception of one's own parts is also affected and determined by perception of what is 
external, and vice-versa. For now, the only thing new is how it is expressed, which, for the first 
time, expressly relates perception of something other (],29/)) than the animal — something 
external — with a use of +),*-%.&' and !H,/*'. In the second example there was already a use 
of ],29/), but not expressly connected to e(,6. 
But, as usual, there is something new in the examples used to explain this argument. These 
examples will help to clarify the complexity of what has been described as ,6 829&CE/) or ,6 
C1,6'. Consequently, they will shed some light on the complex relationship between +),*-%.&' 
@!(,/A and +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6'. 
1) In the first example, Hierocles says that, when a lion fights a bull, it looks (PBP/912)) at 
the latter’s horns, disdaining (1!,!82496)%12)) the rest of its parts. On the contrary, if this lion 
fights a wild ass, it is entirely focused on its kicks and tries to escape its hooves ("C) PV ,!;' 
89=' ,=) p)!79/) P&!µ*--!&' 8!),/;6' C#,& 89/#BE3) ,/;' -!1,*µ!#& 1!R ,F' N8-F' 42D72&) 
#82DP3)" III 25-26).  
This example describes a lion perceiving which parts of other animals may affect itself. In 
this sense, its perception of the strengths and weaknesses in other animals entails and is defined 
by its perception of itself. A lion perceives which parts may harm it, but it is also portrayed 
perceiving what parts of the other animals do not pose a threat. These are the ones it looks 
down upon (1!,!49/)B3), or, in other words, the ones it perceives as contemptible as far as 
fighting is concerned. 
So this means that perception of something external, like another animals, is not perception 
of a unitary and single content, but rather perception of a multiplicity of elements. A lion does 
not perceive just a bull or a wild ass, but perceives a bull as having horns and legs and body, 
and perceives a wild ass as having legs and hooves and neck and body.  
2) Now the fact that these examples distinguish between a lion's perception of a bull and its 
perception of a wild ass means that perception of external things is not merely a perception of 
multiple and different elements — such as legs and horns and teeth —, but perception of 
different elements grouped together in complex units. A lion perceives legs and horns and other 
body parts as parts of another animal, and perception of these parts is determined and defined 
by being parts of one animal or another. Put differently, a lion perceives a bull's legs aa being a 
bull's legs and not a wild ass's legs, and perception of the legs is different if they belong to one 
or the other.  
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It must be said here that Hierocles' examples do not explain with such care how the 
distributive and agglutinative elements described above work in perception of external things. 
In fact, the examples above explain not only that perception of oneself is plural, but also how 
that plurality forms a single sub-field of perception. This explanation relegates all the rest of the 
perceptive field to a general "not @!(,6" or C1,6'. But now Hierocles' examples start to depict 
how an animal's perception organizes ,6 C1,6'. Despite the examples not being so rich as 
regards this aspect, they do suggest that an animal's perception of external things involves 
multiple elements, which are organized into determined elements that involve other multiple 
components. For example, a lion does not perceive an "external threat" in general, it perceives a 
bull, which has multiple different parts that, despite being different, form a certain unity. But it 
does not perceive a bull without perceiving it as a threat. 
3) But all this entails that an animal's perception of external things is multiple at least on 
two different levels: it separates out different unities from the multiple elements present that are 
not @!(,6, but it also perceives each of these unities as being complex, i.e. as involving several 
different elements that are connected to each other because they are all part of that unity. So an 
animal's perception also identifies regions that have a specific determination, which spreads 
itself through its elements while grouping them together as the things that belong to it in the 
form of a genitive stamp, i.e. as being of X. For example, one perceives a bull as something 
different than the tree behind it and different from the ground underneath it and different from a 
bird in the sky. At the same time, one perceives that a bull has horns and head and body and 
legs and hooves, just like one also perceives that the tree has a trunk and branches and leaves 
and flowers, and each of these elements is different but still organized into particular unities 
such as "bull" or "tree". 
So this fourth argument starts introducing some resolution in the field of +),*-%.&' ,:) 
C1,6'. Instead of dealing with "something external", one is now dealing with a perceptive field 
that entails multiple elements organized into units, which are determined by being different 
from one another, but also by involving and being determined by having multiple different 
elements that compose it. Returning to the previous example, one can say that one's perception 
of a bull is determined and defined by being different from the perception of a tree and from the 
perception of the ground and from the perception of a bird — (just like perception of a bird is 
defined by being different from perception of a bull and from perception of a tree and so on) — 
but at the same it is determined by a bull having legs and horns and head and hooves, which in 
their turn are are also defined by being different from one another while still being that bull's 
horns and head and legs and hooves. At the same time, perception of a bull's legs is not just 
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percetion of legs, because a bull's legs are different from an ass's legs and hooves, and this 
means that a bull's legs are also defined by being different from an ass's legs and an elephant's 
legs and so on. 
Once again, one finds the structure of an equation that determines what is equal and what 
is not equal. One sees a bull as being equal to its legs and horns and hooves and other parts, but 
different from a tree and a bird and a wild ass, which means that a bull is also different from the 
branches that are equal to a tree and from an ass's legs that are equal to an ass.  
4)But, as has already been said, Hierocles' examples do not portray an +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6' 
that just defines its elements in connection to one another and not in connection to +),*-%.&' 
@!(,/A. In fact, it was said in 1) that perception of external things is determined by perception 
of oneself. Then it was said in 2) that perception of external things is a complex perception, 
divided into at least two levels, as explained in 3). So now we need to comprehend how the two 
different levels that form the complex perception of external things are defined in connection 
with perception of oneself. 
As pointed out above, this connection originates from the fact that animals apprehend 
which animals are aggressive towards them and which ones they are at peace and have an 
indissoluble agreement with. What we are dealing with here is an animal's perception of other 
animals — and external things in general — as a co-perception of the possible ways of 
affecting and being affected by those other animals.  
Let us consider the example of a domestic chick that stays calm if there is a bull stomping 
around, but screech and hide under its mother's wings as quickly as possible if a weasel or a 
hawk circles around it. This example portrays a chick’s perception as anticipating potential 
suffering from a hawk or weasel, but not from a bull. This means that a chick's perception of 
something external is defined by its possible relation to it: a chick's perception of a bull is 
defined by the latter not being able to harm it. As is easy to infer from the previous arguments, 
this shows that a chick's perception of itself is defined by not being able to be harmed by a bull. 
If a bull was suddenly to be perceived as dangerous, perception of it would be radically 
different, and so would a chick's perception of itself, for it would then be defined by being 
possibly harmed by the bull, whereas before it was defined by not being able to be harmed by 
it. On the contrary, a chick's perception of a weasel and a hawk is defined by their ability to 
harm it. So a chick's perception of itself is defined by its possibility of being harmed by a 
weasel or a falcon, but not by a bull.  
5) This means that a chick's perception of itself includes all the passive and active possible 
E92;!& that have already been described, but that these possible passive and active E92;!& are 
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connected to the possible passive and active E92;!& it perceives in other animals. In other words, 
this means that an animal's perception of other animals includes perception of their ability to 
interact with itself.  
It is true that so far the examples used in this fourth argument only consider an animal's 
perception of suffering passive interaction from the outside. In other words, the examples so far 
considered only explain that an animal's perception of another animal entails an animal's 
perception of its own possibility of suffering actions from that animal, which is connected to 
perception of the other animal's possibility of being actively able to affect the animal in 
question. A lion perceives which parts of other animals may harm it, whereas a chick perceives 
which animals are or are not agressive towards it. In the case of a lion, perception of which of a 
bull's parts could harm it is connected to that lion's perception of itself as able to suffer damage 
from those parts. In the case of a chick, it perceives which animals might harm it or not, which 
is in turn connected to perception of itself as being able to be harmed by these animals. 
Nevertheless, one shoud not forget that this argument deals with perception of strengths 
and weaknesses in other animals. In the context of a battle, which is the one explicitly 
portrayed, perception of another animal's strengths is obviously connected to an animal’s 
perception of the latter’s ability to harm it. Accordingly, one can easily grasp that, in this same 
context, an animal's perception of weaknesses in others is perception of the parts that it can 
harm in the other animals, and accordingly of the parts of the other animals that can be harmed 
by it. And this shows that an animal's perception of its possible active E92;!& is related to 
perception of the other animals’ possible passive E92;!&. It is important to notice that, when an 
animal is attacking another animal, the defending animal's strengths are as relevant to the 
attacking one as the weaknesses. Likewise, the weaknesses of the attacking animal are as 
relevant for the defending one as the attackers strengths. And this happens because when the 
animal is defending itself, it perceives the weaknesses of the attacker as parts it can damage, 
which is as relevant as perceiving which parts of the attacker can harm itself. 
So an animal's perception of itself is a perception that is connected to perception of 
external things via the animal's own multiple possible active and passive E92;!&. At the same 
time, an animal's perception of itself is defined by perception of the possible active and passive 
ways that exterior things have of interacting with it.  
6) But one must comprehend that, by making reference to the weaknesses and strengths in 
other animals, Hierocles introduces the hierarchical and comparative structure in perception of 
external things. And this brings us to what one might call the second level of complexity in 
perception of external things.  
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Let us return to the lion example. When fighting a bull, a lion perceives that that bull has 
several different parts, which are more or less capable of harming it — these are the bull's 
strengths. But, at the same time, it also perceives which parts of a bull are easier and more 
difficult for it to harm — these are the bull’s weaknesses. Now among the bull's strengths, i.e. 
among the parts of the bull a lion perceives as able to harm itself, there are parts that are more 
capable of harming it than others. For example, a lion perceives a bull's horns as more harmful 
than its hooves, but it also perceives a bull's hooves as more harmful than a bull's tail. The same 
holds for a lion's perception of a bull's weaknesses: a lion perceives a bull's neck as the most 
fragile part in a bull, more than its back and legs, but it also perceives a bull’s back as being 
more fragile than its legs.  
Now one must not forget that a lion's perception of the weaknesses and strengths in a bull 
is connected to a lion's perception of its own weaknesses and strengths. And this further 
multiplies everything just stated, because it entails that a lion perceives which of a bull's parts 
are stronger and weaker in defending it when attacked by a lion, but also that a lion perceives a 
bull's weaknesses and strengths should a bull attack it. At the same time, a lion perceives which 
of its own parts are weaknesses and strengths should it attack a bull, but it also perceives which 
are its weaknesses and strengths should it need to defend itself against an attack from a bull. 
And then there is also a lion's perception of which parts of itself are more important to 
keep safe in a fight against a bull, and which of a bull's parts are more important to hurt. As was 
said concerning the third argument, this is a different kind of hierarchy than the one defined 
just before. In fact, this means that a lion's perception of a bull's neck is not only perception of 
something that its weaker than its horns and its hooves and its legs and even its back, but also a 
perception of something that is more important to hurt than its legs and back and all its other 
parts. At the same time, a lion perceives a bull's back as something that is less important to hurt 
than its neck, but still more important than its legs.  
But this is not all, for a lion also perceives its own neck as something that is more 
important to protect from a bull's horns than its back and its legs, while at the same time it 
perceives its back as more important to protect than its legs but less important than its neck. 
And the important thing to note is that a lion's perception of itself is a complex co-
perception of all its own different elements in connection to all a bull's different elements and 
all the significant interactions between each of the different animals’ different parts — (and 
accordingly a perception of the position of an animal's own parts relative to one another and of 
another animal's parts relative to one another and also to the animals own parts according to all 
the significant active and passive E92;!& between the two). And on top of this, a lion's 
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perception of itself is not only related to its perception of a bull in all their possible interactions, 
but also a perception of all the possible passive and active interactions with all other animals. 
This means that a lion's perception of its teeth is a) a perception of their ability to bite the more 
and less important parts of a bull and b) also a perception of their ability to bite the stronger and 
weaker parts of a bull (which can be more or less important), but it is also a perception of their 
ability to bite both c) the more and less important parts of an ass and d) the stronger and weaker 
parts of an ass. At the same time, a lion's perception of its teeth is perception of a part that can 
defend its own weaker parts, which are perceived as more or less important to protect from a 
bull's and ass's stronger and less strong weapons. This means that a lion's perception of each of 
its own parts and of each of another animal's parts are defined by this whole complex network 
of intrinsically related and inter-defined elements, both @!(,/A and ,:) C1,6'.  
7) But all this analysis can still be considered a limited one, since it only deals with a 
situation of confrontation between two animals. Indeed, these examples identify multiple 
possible active and passive E92;!& within a specific situation,33 which is a battle. However, just 
as in the previous arguments, a lion's percepion of a bull is not limited to perception of an 
animal it can fight with. In fact, a lion perceives a bull as something it can fight with — and 
thus something it can harm and be harmed by (with all the complexity described) — but also 
something it can eat.34 And if it were to eat this bull, the horns would be perceived as 
something to be disdained and the legs as being relevant  
As stated above, a battle is just one specific case. The underlying structure of perception 
making this explanation possible goes far beyond attacking and being attacked, and even far 
beyond perception of other animals. In fact, a lion's perception of a tree involves perception of 
it being able to climb that tree, and to climb a branch and another branch, and also involves the 
lion's perception of the ability of its legs to jump and a perception of the capacity of its paws to 
press on the ground — and accordingly perception of the ground — among other things. So this 
means that a lion's perception of a branch involves perception of it being the branch of a tree 
that has other branches, but is also involves perception of the ability of the branches to hold its 
weight — a lions does not jump on thin branches, but only the thick ones able to bear it — and 
accordingly includes a perception that some parts of that same branch are more able to hold its 
weight than others. At the same time as perception of that same branch entails all these !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33In the end, we are talking about multiple E92;!& within on E92*!, involving all the complexity of articulating several 
active and passive E92;!& within an active or passive E92*!. 
34In fact, a lion’s perception of a bull as something it can fight with is also a perception of something it can fight with in 
order to eat, making this perception even more complex. However, this structure is not considered in Hierocles' text, and 
although there it will be referred to in the second section, I will not consider it in a thorough way. 
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elements, it also entails the lion's perception of its own ability to get there, and therefore of its 
own parts as being more or less capable of getting it there, and it therefore involves perception 
of other external things that are connected to the greater or lesser capacity of these parts — a 
lion perceives its paws and legs as able to jump, and perception of their ability to jump includes 
perception of the ground they have to press on in order to jump (indeed in such a way that it 
also involves which parts of the ground are more or less suitable for it to jump from, for if a 
lion perceives swampy terrain on one side of a tree and solid ground on the other, it will choose 
to jump from the solid ground). 
As I have said countless times, a thorough explanation of all the connections entailed by 
each moment of perception would be fundamentally impossible. This has to do with what was 
previously mentioned in the third argument: perception of every moment of the perceptive field 
includes in a way the entire possible perceptive field. And if the third argument focused on how 
vast and complex the realm of +),*-%.&' @!(,/A is, this fourth serves to show the complexity of 
the realm described as +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6'. But the point is still that, however vast both realms 
may be, perception of any moment of either of them is a co-perception of that whole realm viz. 
all the possible connections between all the possible elements of that realm and also a co-
perception of the possible connections to the other realm and accordingly a perception of the 
other entire realm and the possible connections between each and every moment of that realm. 
Now, regarding this description, one most notice that not all the elements involved in each 
perception possess the same importance. On the contrary, perception of a single object is 
characterized precisely by placing most elements in the "background", while still making a 
silent but decisive reference to all those elements that are in the background. What we are 
dealing with is a perception that works in depth, which has various levels and puts different 
elements closer to the audience and others further to the back— to keep on using the theatrical 
metaphor. At stake is the fact that each perception works by giving prominence to some 
elements, but such prominence is only a prominence because perception chooses some 
elements as the stars. However, they can only be stars compared to other actors in a play, and 
therefore in relation to them. As has already been said countless times, if I perceive a bull 
attacking me, the horns gain Hollywood proportions, whereas its back is perceived as the most 
junior  wardrobe assistant. 
8)Last but not least, these examples also show an asymmetry between +),*-%.&' @!(,/A 
and +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6'. This disproportion arises not only from the fact that +),*-%.&' ,:) 
C1,6' is defined by being +),*-%.&' of what is not @!(,/A, but also from the fact that Hierocles' 
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examples do not present the bilateral relationships between @!(,/A and C1,6' in a symmetrical 
way.  
In fact, one should note that all the examples analysed so far are meant to prove +),*-%.&' 
@!(,/A. In doing so, they try to analyse an animal's own perspective and how this determines 
external things from within. And this means that, even though an animal's perception of itself is 
also determined by its relations to external things, the fundamental element in perception of 
external things is their relation to the animal, whereas the fundamental thing in an animal’s 
perception of itself is still the fact that the parts are its own parts. Put in other words, an 
animal’s perception of itself is not as defined by external things as perception of external things 
is defined by that animal's perception of itself. 
I realize and assume that this point is not yet clear. But the fact is that it cannot be clear for 
now, because the fundamental elements to grasp it have not yet been introduced. They will be 
in the second section of this work, where a better understanding of this asymmetry will 
hopefully be achieved.  
 
1.e) There is no 5).*6%1&' ./) 0:.;' without 5).*6%1&' 7!(.89. 
 
Having arrived here, one needs to understand that perception — and, not least, perception 
of oneself — starts at birth and is continuous and uninterrupted (P&!)21O' 1!R +P&<-2&8,/', III 
55) from then onwards. As stated above, there are two arguments used to prove this. The first 
(b.1) deals with the relationship between body and soul. The second (b.2) claims that there is 
no better point of time for the beginning of !"#$%#&' than the first. 
As previously stated, the importance of these arguments for the established goal consists in 
them proving that there is no !"#$%#&',:)C1,6' without !"#$%#&'@!(,/A. Accordingly, I will 
not go into the complex details that the first of these arguments entails; I will only consider it to 
the extent that it contributes to explaining what perception is all about. 
Let us then start with the first argument (b.1). It is a long one, which includes four different 
points, all of them related to the relationship between #:µ! and .(EM.  
The first point stresses that the .(EM is $&1,M (III 57), since it belongs to the class of bodies 
("!H,O ,/A 7B)/(' C#,R ,:) #3µ<,3)", III 58-59). Besides this, "#:µ!PV/q#! $*L&), r' Q4%), 
1!R8/9#B92&#&))1!R+),*G!#&)1!RG/-O)1!R896#G-%#&) 1!R 8J) 20 ,& ,/D,/&' 8!9!8-M#&6) C#,& 
C8&PBE2,!&."(III 62 - IV 3). 
The second point is a rather long and complex one. It deals with the mixture (µ2,/EM, 
19J#&') between #:µ! and .(EM. The latter is not contained in the former like liquids in a jar; 
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it is rather marvellously knead together  ("#(µ824D9!,!& PV P!&µ/)*3'") and wholly 
intermingled ("#(71B19!,!&1!,F8J)") with the #:µ! (IV 3-7), so that not even the smallest 
part of the mixture fails to have its share of either of them ("r' µ%PV ,/H-<E&#,/) ,/A µ*7µ!,/' 
µB9/' ,I' N8/,29/( !H,:) +µ/&92;) µ2,/EI'" IV 6-7). Hierocles then gives the example of hot 
iron, and says that, just as in that case, there is a total juxtaposition between #:µ! and .(EM 
("P&' \-3) C#,R) c 8!9<$2#&'" IV 10). All of this leads to a total #(µ8<$2&! between them. 
Hierocles then gives some examples to prove this total #(µ8<$2&!. Regarding these examples 
(IV 11-23), I would just like to emphasize the total communion between body and soul. Each of 
them shares the affects of the other, and is constantly transformed by its relation to the other 
and by the other's affects. Each part of the .(EM is in contact with the #:µ!, and vice-versa. 
There is neither a single moment where there is only .(EM, nor is there one in which there is 
only #:µ!. The examples show a complete mixture ("19J#&' P&' \-3)")35 between the two, and 
this complete mixture entails that even the smallest part is already a compound of #:µ! and 
.(EM. As mentioned before, Hierocles makes a point of emphasizing that this complete mixture 
is characterized by total #(µ8<$2&!: each moment is already complex in such a way that the 
.(EM- and #:µ!- components communicate with each other and share each other's affects.  
The third point (IV 23-27) consists in saying that the .(EM is a PD)!µ&'!0#$%,&1M. 
Hierocles says that not even Margites would contradict this,36 for it is this that makes the .(EM 
be more than a mere 4D#&' (",!D,U 7F9 1!R 4D#2& 8-2/)<>2&", IV 24), since it would have 
remained 4D#&' if it (.(EM) did not include !"#$%#$&' and N9µM. This point clings therefore to 
the exposition concerning the genesis of beings endowed with .(EM, and once again reinforces 
that both !"#$%#$&' and N9µM are attributes of the .(EM, and not of the #:µ!. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35To better understand the concept of 19J#&' P&' \-3) cf. Boeri, D., "El valor de Alejandro de Afrodisia como fuente de 
la Stoa antigua (a propósito de pneûma, tónos y krâsis)", Méthexis 4 (1991), 129-136; Carvalho, Mário Jorge, 
Wahrnehmung und Selbstreferenz - Der Selbstreferentielle Charakter der Wahrnehmung nach Hierokles, in Edmundo 
Balsemão Pires, Burkhard Nonnenmacher and Stefan Büttner-von Stülpnagel (ed.), Relations of the Self, Coimbra 
University Press, Coimbra, 2010, 109-139 — cf. 129-130 for further bibliography —; Cohen, D. "Aperçu de la réception 
de la doctrine stoïcienne du mélange total dans le néoplatonisme après Plotin", Revue de philosophie ancienne 25 
(2007), 67-100; Collette-Ducic, B. & Delcomminette, S., “La théorie stoïcienne du mélange total”, Revue de philosophie 
ancienne 24 (2006), 5-60; Gill, Christopher, "Psychophysical Holism in Stoicism and Epicureanism", in: R. A. H. King 
(ed.), Common to Body and Soul. Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity, 
de Gruyter, Berlin 2006, 209-231; Lacrosse, Joachim, “Trois remarques sur la réception de la stXulu stoïcienne chez 
Plotin”, Revue de philosophie ancienne 25 (2007), 53-66; Long, A. A"Soul and Body in Stoicism", Phronesis 27 (1982), 
34-57; Mansfeld, Jaap, eno and Aristotle on Mixture", Mnemosyne 36 (1983), 306-310; Sambursky, S., Physics of the 
Stoics, Routledge and Paul, London 1959; Sorabji, Richard, "The Greek Origins of Chemical Combination: Can Two 
Bodies Be in the Same Place?", Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 4 (1988), 35-63; 
Todd, R. B. (ed.), Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics. A Study of De mixtione with Preliminary Essays, Text, 
Translation and Commentary, Brill, Leiden 1976; White, M. J., "Can Unequal Quantities of Stuffs be Totally Blended?“, 
History of Philosophy Quarterly 3 (1986), 379-389. 
36 As usual Margites stands for a dumb man, or rather a very dumb man. The goal is to say something like: not even a 
really stupid person would say that that the .(EM is not a PD)!µ&'!0#$%,&1M. 
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The fourth and final point deals with how the .(EM comes to have movement ("v) ,968/) 
2"-%E/) c .(EM ,I' 1&)M#23'" IV 29). This final point resorts to the first one and to the 
material status of .(EM, explaining how both the .(EM and the #:µ! have ,6)/' and 
,/)&1O1*)%#&'. It is because of these ,6)/' and ,/)&1O1*)%#&'— which are attributes both of the 
#:µ! and of the .(EM that is completely mixed with the #:µ! — that the .(EM stretches out 
from the c72µ/)&16), touching and perceiving all parts of the #:µ! and perceiving itself 
"touched" in return by it. In other words, it is because of these ,6)/' and ,/)&1O1*)%#&', which 
pervade every moment of the total mixture between .(EM and #:µ!, that the .(EM stretches out 
to and perceives all parts that are @!(,/A. It is because the .(EM is a PD)!µ&'!0#$%,&1M that, 
when it touches anything that is @!(,/A, it is also perceiving everything that is @!(,/A, and this 
is why this is equivalent to ",=>?/)!0#$<)2,!&@!(,/A."(IV 53) 
Hierocles then uses some examples or "facts" (",F#(µG!*)/),!") to prove that !"#$%#&' is 
continuous. These examples try to show that, even when !"#$%#&' is supposed to be interrupted 
— say, during sleep —, actually it is not.  
As I said, I will not thoroughly consider the very complex physical description entailed in 
the four arguments now presented. I will rather analyse the overall point Hierocles is trying to 
make and study his examples. These examples will trace back to the structure of perception and 
to the essential connection between +),*-%.&' @!(,/A and +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6'.  
Regarding the question in hand, the overall claim that Hierocles is trying to make goes 
back to the explanation concerning the 7B)2#&' ,:)Cµ.DE3). An animal is an animal from the 
moment it has .(EM — and that moment is birth. From that moment onwards, it has !"#$%#&' 
and N9µM.  Now, with these four arguments, Hierocles reinforces the claim that !"#$%#&' begins 
at birth, for it describes the .(EM as a PD)!µ&' !0#$%,&1M. The .(EM is intrinsically perceptive; 
it cannot cease to be perceptive; there is no single moment during which the .(EM is not 
!0#$%,&1M. This is the point Hierocles is trying to make. As we would recall, his analysis of the 
7B)2#&' ,:) Cµ.DE3) tries to show that an animal is an animal from the moment it has 
!"#$%#&'. And now, we can confirm that, as was stated there, such moment is the moment in 
which an animal acquires .(EM. Hierocles' insistence on the connection between #:µ! and 
.(EM is closely related to this: animal life is only animal life when there is a .(EM that is 
completely mixed with the #:µ!. The point is that every moment of one's life — which starts 
at birth — is characterized by the presence of the .(EM and therefore by being perceptive. 
But this is not all, for the .(EM perceives both itself and the #:µ!. In fact, it perceives the 
#:µ! by reaching out from the c72µ/)&16) and touching it; and in doing so it perceives itself 
touched in return by the #:µ!. This is why it is said to perceive every moment both of itself 
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and of the #:µ!. Although Hierocles does not phrase it like this, this insistence has to do with 
an implicit claim that animals and humans are this compound of #:µ! and .(EM — i.e. that life 
lasts as long as these two are together. Hence, given the fact that .(EM is always perceptive of 
itself and of the #:µ!, Hierocles is actually claiming that the +),*-%.&'@!(,/A begins at birth 
and is continuous throughout every moment of life.  
Additionally, this description of the relationship between #:µ! and .(EM gives us yet 
another important aspect. For the compound formed by the completely mixed #:µ! and .(EM 
is described as being the animal itself. This means that the whole animal is pervaded by the 
.(EM, which is the same as saying that it is pervaded by a PD)!µ&' !0#$%,&1M. If there is not the 
slightest bit of the animal that is not a mixture of #:µ! and .(EM, then there is not the slightest 
bit of the animal that is not characterized by having as its component a PD)!µ&' !0#$%,&1M. 
Besides, one should bear in mind that every moment of the .(EM, being a PD)!µ&' !0#$%,&1M, 
perceives the #:µ! and perceives itself being affected by the #:µ!. Now, given that the animal 
is this compound of #:µ! and .(EM —and that the complete mixture of #:µ! and .(EM 
amounts to what the animal is —, this argument leads us to conclude that there is a continuous 
perception of everything that is ;0<'(@. In other words: there is a continuous perception of the 
whole realm of what the A4'+B9C#.;0<'(@ is all about.  
However, this is not all. On closer inspection, it turns out that we are dealing with two 
types of continuity. On the one hand, we are dealing with a time-related or "temporal" 
continuity: a continuity of +),*-%.&' @!(,/A throughout one's entire life span. On the other 
hand, we are dealing with a "spatial" one: the continuity of +),*-%.&' @!(,/A throughout the 
whole body that is pervade by the .(EM and completely mixed with it.  
Obviously, both of them are related, since the temporal continuity of +),*-%.&' @!(,/A 
throughout one's life is the temporal continuity of +),*-%.&' @!(,/A as a perceptual "scan" of 
each and every component of the reality? of @!(,6. If the .(EM is always perceptive, and if life 
is the period during which the .(EM is mixed with the #:µ!, then the arguments presented 
above show both the "temporal" continuity of the +),*-%.&' @!(,/A and the fact that what is 
characterized by this temporal continuity is nothing but the "spatial" continuity of the +),*-%.&' 
@!(,/A. Still, one can say that the previous arguments focused more on what I have termed the 
"spatial continuity" of +),*-%.&' @!(,/A — although they also prove its "temporal" continuity 
—, whereas the examples we will consider briefly focus more on this " temporal " continuity.  
In order to fully understand all this, it is important to clarify what I have termed the 
“spatial” continuity of the +),*-%.&' @!(,/A. This “spatial” continuity has to do with the 
omnipresence of perception in the realm of what Hierocles calls the @!(,6 . Hierocles’ remarks 
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on this subject point to the fact that every single moment of both #:µ! and .(EM entails 
perception and is the object of perception.  That is, everything in the realm of oneself is filled 
with perception both because it perceives and because it has, as it were, a perceptual 
Doppelgänger.37 In other words, according to Hierocles, the sphere of oneself is simply 
saturated with perception. We can also say that the sphere of oneself is characterized by a 
19J#&'P&'\-3) (by a complete mixture) of being and perception; so that there is a strong 
contrast between the high concentration of perception (the high “density” of perception) in the 
field of the +),*-%.&' @!(,/A and the considerably lower concentration of perception (the 
considerably lower “density” of perception) in the field of the +),*-%.&' ,w) C1,6'. This high 
saturation of +),*-%.&' is also due to the fact that the sphere of the self is, as it were, the “seat” 
of all perception, including the +),*-%.&' ,w) C1,6' (more about this later). For the moment the 
point is that in the whole realm of perception the sphere of oneself (the sphere of +),*-%.&' 
@!(,/A) is the very opposite of an “archipelago” of scattered perceptions. It is rather something 
highly concentrated and dense – something continuous, in this sense of the word.  
But on the other hand, in order to fully understand Hierocles’ point one should bear in 
mind a) that we are dealing with different claims here and b) how these claims relate to each 
other. First, Hierocles contends that the .(EM is co-extensive with !"#$%#&'. This amounts to 
saying that animal life is co-extensive with !"#$%#&': there is no .(EM without !"#$%#&', and 
therefore there is no >?/) without !"#$%#&'. One is prepared to accept that animal life has to do 
with !"#$%#&'. But, on the other hand, this does not seem to mean that the !"#$%#&' is 
continuous and uninterrupted. And the same applies a fortiori to the +),*-%.&' @!(,/A; on the 
one hand, perhaps the G9!PD,29/& are right – and there is no such thing as +),*-%.&' @!(,/A; on 
the other hand, even if there is such a thing, there is no need for it to be continuous and 
uninterrupted. And that is why Hierocles feels the need to explain a) that there is actually 
+),*-%.&' @!(,/A, b) that it is co-extensive with !"#$%#&' (and therefore with .(EM and animal 
life), and c) that the +),*-%.&' @!(,/A is continuous and uninterrupted. In the final analysis, the 
point is that the +),*-%.&' @!(,/A is not an occasional and adventitious component of 
perception, but rather a fundamental one – one without which !"#$%#&' would not be what it is.  
And this is where the examples concerning the existence of +),*-%.&' @!(,/A during sleep 
have a role to play — for this is the way Hierocles finds to anticipate the most obvious 
objection:  animals are alive when they are sleeping, but they do not perceive themselves 
during that time. In order to refute this objection, Hierocles presents several examples showing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Thus, in the realm of oneself nothing escapes perception: to be inevitably means both to perceive and to be perceived.   
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that animals do perceive themselves when they are asleep. But his examples indicate not only 
that animals continue to perceive themselves during sleep, but also that, during that time, 
perception of themselves — and of external things — has exactly the same structure that was 
depicted in the previous analysis.38 Taken separately, these examples serve to show how 
perception is continuous and uninterrupted, even during sleep, but taken as a whole, they also 
serve to emphasize the idea of a "solid" and "massive"— of a highly concentrated and dense — 
perception of oneself (even during sleep). 
Let us then take a brief look at these examples.  
The first (IV 62 - V 3) says that, when one is asleep in winter, if one is cold and some part 
of one's body is exposed, one pulls the sheets to cover that part. First of all, this example shows 
that even during sleep, there is +),*-%.&'@!(,/A, since once perceives oneself as being cold. 
Secondly, this example also shows that such a perception is connected to perception of 
something external, which in this case are the sheets or blankets. This example, therefore, 
shows a concomitant and continuous perception of oneself and of eternal things, just like the 
ones considered in the previous chapters.  
To be sure the purpose of this example is to show that there is a continuous perception of 
oneself. However, in order to prove this, the example ends up showing that even during sleep 
there is both +),*-%.&' @!(,/A and +),*-%.&' ,w) C1,6', and that even during sleep they are 
intrinsically and continuously linked to each other. In fact, if one did not have any perception of 
oneself, one could not feel any cold — in which case one would sleep perfectly fine completely 
naked and exposed in the peak of winter. But this is not all: as the example also shows, one's 
perception of being cold is intrinsically connected to one's perception of the sheets (even if 
such perception is vague), since one grabs them and pulls them as soon as one feels cold. 
Hierocles is trying to point out that we perceive ourselves during the deepest sleep (G!$(,< 
,_x8)_), and it is for this reason that we cover ourselves if we feel cold. At the same time, if 
we only had perception of ourselves and not of external things, we could not cover ourselves if 
we felt cold, for we would not perceive anything to cover ourselves with. Furthermore, even 
during sleep, perception of oneself is still a complex perception, for the example talks about !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 This raises an obvious objection: if it is true that a) animals perceive themselves and external things 
during sleep and that b) this perception has the same structure of awaken perception, then what is the 
difference between one's perception when one is asleep and awake? On the one hand, it is very clear that 
Hierocles presupposes that there is some difference between perception during sleep and while one is 
awake, otherwise he would not claim that there is perception even during sleep. On the other hand, he 
does not care to explain what the difference between these two different perceptive states is. One may 
assume that it has to do with the clearness of the impression one has of oneself and of external things; 
but the text neither confirms nor denies such an assumption.  
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"some parts of the body" ("µB9% ,&)F ,/A #Tµ!,/'" IV 63). This means that, even during sleep, 
perception of oneself is still a perception of the various parts that are @!(,/A, in such a way that 
ones are perceived as being cold while others are, at the same time, perceived as not being cold. 
Both these parts are connected in the way I tried to depict above. For this reason, I will not 
repeat the explanation. 
The second example (V 3-5) amounts more or less to the same. It focuses on the fact that 
we try to keep our wounds free from pressure, even if we are in deep (G!$B3') sleep. Just as in 
the previous example, Hierocles is trying to show that even during sleep, one continues to 
perceive oneself, as otherwise one would be able to sleep on top of a serious wound without 
feeling any discomfort. The fact is that even in the deepest sleep, we avoid lying on top of a 
painful wound, precisely because we are somehow aware that the wound is there, and that to 
put pressure upon it would cause pain. Once again, although Hierocles' goal is to prove that 
even during sleep one perceives oneself continuously, his example shows that such perception 
of oneself is connected with the perception of something other than oneself — in this case, the 
surface against which the wound might be pressed. If one were to develop Hierocles' example, 
one might further note that the continuous +),*-%.&' @!(,/A is proved by the fact that, if one 
rolls over during the night and somehow puts pressure on the wound, one immediately wakes 
up. 
The third example (V 5-7) points out that, if one has set an hour to meet someone during 
the night, one wakes up at the appointed time, and this confirms that one perceives oneself 
during sleep continuously. In fact, if one did not perceive oneself, one could not do this, for one 
would sleep until one began to perceive oneself again, and before this one could not wake up 
by oneself. In other words, there is some kind of self-monitoring even during sleep. Hierocles 
clearly intends to say that one can actually wake up at any given time during the night, 
whatever the depth of one’s sleep, and this is why the +),*-%.&' @!(,/A must be continuous. 
This example amounts to more or less the same as the previous ones, and, since alarm clocks 
have pretty much ruined my familiarity with it, I will move on to the next. 
The following example (V 7-24) would be more accurately described as a series of 
examples, although they are all variations of the same. Hierocles claims that one's concerns 
follow one into one's sleep, and then says that the winebibber falls asleep without letting go of 
the flask from his hand, just like the miser sleeps with a tight grip on his purse, and Heracles 
sleeps grasping his club in his right hand. As regards the point we are discussing, these 
examples show the same as the previous ones: even during sleep one perceives oneself (namely 
one's concerns) and external things continuously. 
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Before moving on to the next argument (b.2), I would like to stress that in the very 
sentence that makes the transition between the two arguments, Hierocles adds yet another 
important aspect. The sentence is this: ",F 89:,! P&!-2E$B),! cµ;) 1!R !0#$<)2,!& ,:) µ29:) 
1!R ,:) Q973) ,= >?/) [8!) +P&!-2*8,3', PI-/) \,& ,= >?/) @!(,/A !0#$<)2,!& +8' +9EI'."(V 
39-41). If we focus on the part before the comma, we realize that Hierocles brings to the table 
something that was obviously present in all the examples we have just considered: even during 
sleep, perception of oneself and of external things is intrinsically and continuously connected to 
perception of the Q97! for which one has each part part of the body. As we saw previously, 
perception of the various Q97! for which one has each part is connected to the various Q97! for 
which one has other parts. This description, if followed to its conclusion, would lead once 
again to the multiple active and passive E92;!& and to the complex description made above. And 
the point is that perception is continuously shaped in this complex way — even during sleep.39 
As mentioned before, the sentence just considered also contains the beginning of the 
second argument (b2), which focuses on the fact that an animal perceives itself from birth, 
rather than on the fact that perception of oneself is continuous. This argument is phrased in the 
following way: "PI-/) \,& ,= >?/) @!(,/A !0#$<)2,!& 1!R +8' +9EI'. 1!R 7F9 !H,O µB9/' C#,R 
,/Z E96)/( ,= 89:,/). P&' \, ,/A,/ µV) 0#E(96,!,/) p) CL @,/*µ/( 4!*)2,!& 896' #()%7/9*!) 
20-I4$!&."(V 40-43) 
The reason why the "beginning of time" is the strongest ("0#E(96,!,/)") point for the 
beginning of !"#$%#&' @!(,/A goes back to the explanation of the 7B)2#&' ,:) Cµ.DE3) and 
also to the connection between #:µ! and .(E. As pointed out above, according to Hierocles, an 
animal becomes an animal at the very moment it acquires .(EM, which is the exact moment at 
which it acquires !"#$%#&' and N9µM. Additionally, the .(EM is a PD)!µ&' !0#$%,&1M which 
perceives each and every point of the #:µ! and of itself. This means that from birth, an animal 
is defined by its having a PD)!µ&' !0#$%,&1M that perceives everything that is @!(,/A. Given the 
fact that the moment of birth is a moment in the animal's life — indeed the first one —, and 
since the animal is already defined by its having a PD)!µ&' !0#$%,&1M at that time, it must have 
a perception of itself from that moment onwards, as long as its life consists of a complete 
mixture between #:µ! and .(EM. 
Now, if we recall a) that there is no moment of +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6' without +),*-%.&' 
@!(,/A, b) that these two fields complete constitute the whole of perception, and c) that the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39If we compare the examples given by Hierocles, we observe the following: in the final analysis, they do not just show 
that there is a quantum of +),*-%.&' @!(,/A even in the deepest sleep; they show that even in the deepest sleep the 
+),*-%.&' @!(,/A turns out to be complex and multifaceted. 
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animal has a PD)!µ&' !0#$%,&1M that perceives everything that is @!(,/A from birth, we 
conclude once again that there must be +),*-%.&' @!(,/A (and +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6') from the 
very moment of birth onwards. 
To show that this is indeed the moment at which +),*-%.&' @!(,/A begins, Hierocles asks 
what other point in time would be more suitable, if not the first (V 44-45). This question is a 
rhetorical one, since Hierocles' answer to it has already been given in the previous arguments. 
The question adds nothing new to the argument. However, it does stress that, given the 
structure depicted by Hierocles, an animal is not likely to start to have +),*-%.&' @!(,/A 
anywhere in the middle of its life, but rather at the very beginning. Saying that an animal does 
not perceive itself from the beginning of its life amounts to saying that an animal does not have 
.(EM from the beginning of its life — and without .(EM it would not be what it is.40 All in all, 
it seems clear that Hierocles' purpose with this rhetorical question is to show that "+4' /y a) z 
E96)/( >?/), 2H$Z' !0#$%,&16) C#,&" (V 52-53). Given the fact that, as we have seen, an 
animal —being " !0#$%,&16)" — always entails both +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6' and +),*-%.&' 
@!(,/A, Hierocles concludes that every animal has +),*-%.&' @!(,/A from the very moment it 
is born. 
After these two arguments, Hierocles goes on to confirm that an animal also has perception 
of external things from the moment it is born. He says that after this explanation certainly no 
one can say that an animal does not perceive anything that is external ("µ2,F ,!A,! ,/*)() /H1 
K) µ/& P/12; ,&' +),2&82;), r' /H1& 8<),3' ,&)=' ,:) C1,6' !0#$<)2,!& ,= >?/)" V 53-54). 
By saying this, Hierocles establishes an explicit connection between the proof of +),*-%.&' 
@!(,/A and that of +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6', for he claims that, after the proof concerning !"#$%#&' 
@!(,/A, it is impossible to deny !"#$%#&' ,:) C1,6'. In any case, the empirical arguments the 
author of the {$&1O u,/&E2*3#&' gives in the lines that follow do not contain the heart of his 
proof of !"#$%#&' ,:) C1,6', since he already considers the point demonstrated before using 
them. They are nevertheless important, and need to be looked at. 
 To prove that animals have a perception of external things from the moment they are born, 
Hierocles says immediately after the sentence last quoted: "1!R 7F9 N9J, \#! 72 µO W86,(4-! 
,*1,2,!&, 1!R +1/D2&. 20 PV µM, 72D2,!& µV) 1!R [8,2,!&."(V 54-56).41 Once again, the most !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 To refute Hierocles an objector would have to prove either that the .(EM is not intrinsically !0#$%,&1M, or that an 
animal can be an animal without .(EM, or that a new-born animal is not an animal stricto sensu, but still a form of 4D#&'. 
I will not consider these options nor identify who defended them and how. 
41 Incidentally it should be noted that the +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6' can be composed of various kinds of !0#$M#2&'. |2D2#(!& 
and K8,2#$!& are, as it were, the primary layers, and the +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6' cannot do without them. They form the 
basis of all +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6'; whereas N9J) and +1/A2&) add a new dimension to it. One can therefore speak of a 
scala naturae within the realm of +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6'. 
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important part of his argument is not this empirical fact that we see, as witnesses, animals 
seeing or hearing or tasting or feeling (in a tactile sense), but rather the fact that they could not 
do what they do from the moment they are born— what we see them doing from the moment 
they are born42— if they did not have +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,=': "/#3 '(@'(1!R ,F µV) C8R $%-F' 
µ%,9:!' NrµM#!),! +8/#8} ,= 7<-!, ,F P' W8= 8,B9(L& ,I' 72&)!µB)%' 1!,!PD2,!&, ,= +8%)V' 
C1,9286µ2)! ,/A 829&BE/),/', ,F P' 1-!(µ(9*>2,!& /i/) ,(8,6µ2)! 1!R G!--6µ2)! W8= ,/A 
+B9/'."(V 56-60, my emphasis). Hierocles' point is that we see animals doing these things, and 
that they are only able to do them if they have some kind of perception of something external 
and of themselves (as is clearly implicit here). 
It is now easy to grasp that both hunger and fear (namely, what these examples are all 
about) presuppose the complex connection between +),*-%.&'@!(,/A and +),*-%.&',:)C1,6' 
that we have been trying to explain. The rushing of some new-borns to their mother's breasts, 
the fact that some hide under their mother's wings, escaping the severity of the environment, or 
that some cry because they are beaten and struck by the air — all this substantiates the claim 
that new-borns have a perception both of themselves and of external things. In fact, in order to 
feel beaten by the air, a new-born needs to perceive the air that beats and strikes it, but it also 
needs to feel itself being beaten and struck by it. Likewise, for a new-born to hide under its 
mother's wings, it needs to perceive its mother. Actually, it needs to perceive that its mother has 
multiple parts, amongst which are her wings, which in turn are perceived as capable of 
protecting it. But it also needs to perceive an external threat that might harm it. And last but not 
least, it has to perceive itself as capable of being harmed by that external threat and protected 
by its mother's wings. Finally, for a new-born to rush to its mother's breasts, it needs to 
perceive its mother and her breasts, but also to perceive those breasts as capable of feeding it — 
and accordingly to perceive itself as able to be fed by them (and ultimately to perceive its 
mouth as the part that allows it to feed itself). So, even though +),*-%.&' @!(,/A is not what 
these examples are explicitly about, it is implicit in each and every one of them, as is the 
complex relationship between +),*-%.&' @!(,/A and +),*-%.&',:) C1,6' that we analysed 
above. 
The fact that all these examples come after Hierocles tries to prove that !"#$%#&' @!(,/A is 
continuous and begins at birth serves to summarise everything Hierocles said in these two 
previous arguments (although it also affects everything said so far). One must bear in mind that 
all the text we have considered so far was introduced as an "excursus" to elucidate the "slow !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42More on this problem in annex 2. 
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ones" that there could not be +),*-%.&',:) C1,6' without +),*-%.&' @!(,/A. And here is where 
this "excursus" ends. In fact, the passage concerning the existence of a perception of external 
things from birth onwards is something that the "slow ones" would agree with; but, ironically 
enough, it is used by Hierocles to refute them, for it introduces the synthesis that concludes the 
entire connection between +),*-%.&' @!(,/A and +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6': the fact that the entire 
analysis we have performed so far leads "20' 8<)( 1!-O) 1!R +)!),*-21,/) W86µ)%#&) ,/A 
89/12&µB)/(. 1!$6-/( 7F9 /H #(),2-2;,!& ,:) C1,=' ,&)/' +),*-%.&' P*E! ,I' @!(,:) 
!0#$M#23'." (VI 1-3). 
To end this first section, I would just like to consider a problem that is brought up 
immediately after this conclusion, although, whether we were aware of it or not, it was also 
present in the last few pages. I will call it the problem of the "!"#$%#&' !0#$M#23'". My goals 
regarding this problem are very simple: to show a) that this "!"#$%#&' !0#$M#23'" is not equal 
to +),*-%.&' @!(,/A, b) that nevertheless it is part and parcel of the +),*-%.&' @!(,/A, and c) 
that what Hierocles says about the "!"#$%#&' !0#$M#23'" is intended to show that the +),*-%.&' 
@!(,/A is continuous and uninterrupted, begins at birth, and is the very opposite of an 
archipelago of scatered +),&-M.2&'. 
This problem emerges in the examples used after this conclusion. Hierocles says that "µ2,F 
7F9 ,I' ,/A -2(1/A 4B92 2082;) !0#$M#23' 1!R @!(,:) +&#$<)/µ2$! -2(1!&)/µB)3) 1!R µ2,F 
,I' ,/A 7-(1B3' 7-(1!>/µB)3) 1!R µ2,F ,I' ,/A $29µ/A $29µ!&)/µB)3) 1+8R ,:) K--3) 
,+)<-/7/)" (VI 3-7). Hierocles then sums up his previous reasoning: an animal perceives 
something as soon as it is born, and, since perception of external things is always accompanied 
by perception of itself, this means that the animal perceives itself as soon as it is born. But my 
concern here is not to repeat what I have already said; it is rather to clarify A) what I mean by 
"!"#$%#&' !0#$M#23'" and B) its connection to +),*-%.&' @!(,/A. 
Let us start with A). By "!"#$%#&' !0#$M#23'" I mean a form of "internal perception". To 
be more specific, I mean an internal perception in the sense of a perception that perceives that 
one is perceiving something. For example, an internal perception is a perception that perceives 
that one is perceiving white, a perception that perceives that one is perceiving something sweet, 
and so on. I believe that this is what Hierocles means when he says that "we perceive ourselves 
whitened" ("@!(,:)+&#$<)/µ2$!-2(1!&)/µB)3)" VI 4) when we perceive white. He means that 
there is a perception of something in us that is capturing white (or something in us that 
becomes white43), and this corresponds to our perception of our perception of white. Perhaps it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 So that this "becoming white" or being whitened belongs to the percipient, to wit, to oneself. 
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is easier to grasp this with the other two examples. When we perceive something sweet, we 
perceive our tongue sweetened, and this means that we perceive we are perceiving something 
sweet through our tongue. Likewise, when we perceive that the air is really hot, we perceive it 
with our skin, and this means we perceive that we are perceiving heat through our skin. Given 
the fact that our tongue and skin are parts of ourselves, we are perceiving that we perceive parts 
of ourselves in connection with external things. Hierocles has already shown that there could be 
no perception of sweetness or heat or white without perception of oneself; but now he seems to 
introduce a "second perception" that accompanies every external perception: every perception 
of ,F C1,6' (and, for that matter, every +),*-%.&' @!(,/A in the above-mentioned sense of the 
word) is also accompanied by a perception of oneself, whatever is perceived.  
The above does not entirely hold water, because in some cases the perceived content viz. 
the perceptum is not to be found in what we believe to be the sensory organ. For instance, the 
white we see is not to be found in the eye itself (to use Hierocles’ terminology, we have no 
direct experience of the eye “being whitened”, etc.). So what Hierocles seems to have in mind 
is that in each perception, no matter how “external” its perceptum may be, some part of oneself 
(something belonging to oneself) is affected by the perceptum, and there is some perception of 
oneself being affected by it. 
To better understand what is at stake in Hierocles' point, one needs to go back to the 
connection between #:µ! and .(EM. In fact, this is the route taken by the text, as it returns to a 
"physical" analysis and to the consideration of the c72µ/)&1g). I will not go into the new 
physical elements introduced by this argument, although what I said before regarding the 
relationship between #:µ! and .(EM will appear in a short while. It is true that, just as in the 
previous case, such an investigation would help to grasp Hierocles' point. However, it would 
require me to spend time and space that I do not have. Furthermore, although such a study 
would help in better understanding several problems, it is not a decisive one for my purpose, 
since my goal can be fully attained without it. For this reason, I would just like to stress that the 
final sentence of this analysis is the one where we find the explicit use of "!"#$%#&' 
!0#$M#23'": "N PV 8!9!8-M#&/' -67/' 1!,F 8<#%' +9EI', ~#,% 1!R c !"#$%#&', C82&PO 1!R 
!H,M PD)!µ&' C#,&) +9E&1M, 1!R #()2EB#,29/) P2; E9Iµ! b ]L&' ,2 1!R 4D#&' 2i)!&, PI-/) \,& 
K9E/&,a) +4 @!(,I' 1!R 89R) b @,B9/( ,&)=' +),&-!µG<)2#$!&, ;0<'D. 0E-">4(#'("(VI 17-23, 
my emphasis). 
In the end analysis, I think that this passage provides the key to understanding the 
examples of the white, the heat and the sweet. In fact, if we bear in mind what Hierocles says 
about the total mixture between #:µ! and .(EM, we understand that what is really perceptive in 
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our skin or our tongue or our eyes is the .(EM, and not the #:µ!. It is the .(EM (the .(EM that 
is completely mixed with the flesh of the eyes that sees, just like it is the .(EM (the .(EM that is 
wholly mixed with the flesh of the skin) that senses, and so on. In sum, it is the .(EM that is a 
PD)!µ&' !0#$%,&1M, and not the #:µ!. But, as we have also seen, the .(EM perceives each and 
every part of the body  (no matter how small) and, because it is completely mixed with it in the 
way described by Hierocles (i.e. because it has with it a total #(µ8<$2&!), it also perceives itself 
being affected by what is going on in the body. Put briefly, the .(EM perceives each and every 
inch of the #:µ! and perceives each an every inch of itself perceiving each and every inch of 
the #:µ!. Returning to the example of the white, the sweet and the heat, we realize that 
Hierocles is claiming that the .(EM perceives itself perceiving through the eyes, through the 
skin, through the tongue, and so on. In this sense, there is a perception of perception — an 
!"#$%#&' !0#$M#23' — that accompanies each and every perception (and please bear in mind 
that each perception is already a perception of both oneself and external things). 
But we should not forget that VI 17-23 is meant to show that the .(EM, being a PD)!µ&' 
!0#$%,&1M and +9E&1M, must perceive itself from the very beginning. Although I will not explain 
this very complicated argument44, we still have sufficient elements from the previous analysis 
to understand Hierocles' conclusion regarding !"#$%#&': from the very beginning of life, an 
animal perceives itself and external things, but it also perceives itself perceiving itself and 
external things.  
Let us now consider B). The above shows that this !"#$%#&' !0#$M#23' is also a part of the 
+),*-%.&' @!(,/A, for it also bears what I have termed the @!(,/A stamp. In fact, !"#$%#&' 
!0#$M#23' is not equivalent to +),*-%.&' @!(,/A, but only a part of it. Ä),*-%.&' @!(,/A is 
perception of whatever is @!(,/A, and our perception of our perception is just one of many 
things that is @!(,/A. It is one of the components of this realm — just one more citizen (or a 
group of citizens45) of the city of the @!(,6. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 To consider this passage one would have to understand why !"#$%#&' is a PD)!µ&' +9E&1M, and also what being a 
PD)!µ&' +9E&1M means. One would also have to consider the comparison between this kind of PD)!µ&' and the inferior 
ones, which are not so binding. This would lead us back to the 7B)2#&' ,:) Cµ.DE3), but also to what we termed the 
scala naturae, at the beginning of the first section. In fact, there would be many problems to deal with, and I would like 
to underline just one more: this passage suggests that Hierocles is almost identifying !"#$%#&' with .(EM, since the latter 
was described as a PD)!µ&' !0#$%,&1M, but now it is described as a PD)!µ&'. This hints that we would have to study the 
relationship between !"#$%#&' and .(EM with much more care if we were to really understand what these passages 
involve. 
45 Even if an important one. 
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2) Second Section — !"#$%#&' and 8=:-*4#&' 
 
After this long analysis, the structure of perception so far considered is still far from being 
complete. I believe it will still be very incomplete by the end of this second section, since, as 
pointed out above, I will only deal with what Hierocles' text offers, which is far from covering 
everything there is to say about perception. But what I mean is that the analysis so far 
considered still leaves out one — and in a certain way the fundamental — aspect of Hierocles' 
explanation. This aspect is commonly referred to by the word /012*3#&'. 
As anticipated in the first section, /012*3#&' is a necessary component in any respectable 
exposition of Stoic ethics. Thus, its presence in the !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#. is anything but a 
surprise. Nonetheless, the connection between this crucial ethical term and the structure of 
perception earlier described is far from being obvious. My goal in this second section is to 
make it as clear as possible. 
To fulfil this task, I will try to show how Hierocles' text establishes a fundamental 
connection between !"#$%#&' and /012*3#&'. This connection goes far beyond just adding 
/012*3#&' to the picture portrayed above.  On the contrary, /012*3#&' is a fundamental element 
already presupposed in it. In other words, I will try to demonstrate that everything just said has 
a huge gap at its core. Indeed, the whole structure of perception described so far is anchored in 
the concept of /012*3#&', to such an extent that the arguments and examples previously 
analysed are still missing the key piece that enables one to truly understand how they portray 
animal and human perception. 
 
2.a) Brief introduction to the concept of 8=:-*4#&'. 
 
It is rather boring to start any new chapter by emphasizing what cannot be done. 
Nonetheless, /012*3#&' is a concept worthy of libraries, not of a few pages. Thus, I do not hope 
to explain its intricacies and the whole ethical system it ultimately entails. In line with my 
purpose, this concept will be dealt with for the sake of understanding what perception is all 
about. To be even more specific, I will treat /012*3#&' within the context of Hierocles' work and 
only bearing in mind its intrinsical connection to perception. Yet, it is true that the explanation 
of perception clarifies what Hierocles takes /012*3#&' to be, and such outcome will obviously 
be considered.  
There are however some pieces of the complex /012*3#&' puzzle one needs to identify 
before getting there. This does not mean I hope to crack this puzzle. On the contrary, I only 
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hope to correctly identify some of the fundamental pieces that enable one to understand the 
overall picture. Just like when attempting to solve a puzzle, the first task is to identify and 
locate the main regions or areas. It is only after this first step that one starts to go into the 
details of each region and into the connections between all the different regions. The following 
explanation is equivalent to this preliminary step. 
The first piece of this puzzle has to do with the meaning of the word. I will neither 
consider the genesis and evolution of the word — who used it first and with what sense and 
who used it afterwards and in what way —, nor will I take into account the various complex 
meanings it can have within the Stoa. In fact, in a way there are about as many meanings as 
there have been people who studied and used this concept. Despite the divergences concerning 
the deeper meaning of /012*3#&', everyone46 tends to agree that the verb is a verbal noun !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 For a thorough look into the doctrine of /012*3#&' cf: Primary sources: Aphrodisias, Alexander von, De anima libri 
mantissa, apud I. Bruns (ed.), Alexandri Aphrodisiensis praeter commentaria scripta minora (Commentaria in 
Aristotelem Graeca, 2.1), Reimer, Berlin, 1887, reed. de Gruyter, Berlin, 1961; Cicero, DeFinibus Bonorum et Malorum, 
Harvard University Press/ Heinemann, London/ Cambridge, 2006 ; Diels, H./ Schubart, W. (ed.), Anonymer Kommentar 
zu Platons Theaetet (Papyrus 9782), Weidmann, Berlin, 1905; Epictetus, The Discourses as Reported by Arrian and 
Encheiridion, Volumes I and II,Harvard University Press / Heinemann, London/ Cambridge, 1998; Laertius, Diogenes, 
Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Volumes I and II, Harvard University Press/ Heinemann, London/ New York, 1925; 
Long, Anthony A & Sedley, David N., The Hellenistic Philosophers, Volume I and II, Cambridge University Press, 
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derived from the verb /012&63. Its semantic field is therefore that of /016', which is the Greek 
word for "house". Another close word to /012*3#&' is the adjective /012;/'. The latter means 
something like “of the house” or “belonging to the house”, but it can also mean “related to the 
house” and accordingly “having some kind of kinship with the house”. When it comes to the 
verbal forms, they are used both in the active voice (/012&/A)) and in the middle and passive 
voices (/012&/A#$!&).  
This semantic field is used both for things and for people. People who belong to the family 
are said to be "of the family" or "of the house"47. But such titles are not limited to people who 
share the same blood. The being "of the house" suggested by this semantic field embraces 
family, but also the slaves who work in the house, adopted children and even close friends. In 
sum, /012*3#&', /012;/' and related terms refer to everything that can be described as being "of 
the house" in a very formal sense (as we will see). This means that they apply both to people 
born already as part "of the house", such as children (or even the children of the slaves), and 
also to acquired slaves or adopted children or people that become intimate friends of the house. 
The fundamental note is being "of the house" and not being born there or "acquired" so to 
speak. In fact, this happens to a point where a son might cease to be "of the house" and be 
kicked out, whereas a slave continues to be "of the house.48 The same can be said of things: 
there are things that can be "of the house" in the sense that they are an intrinsic part of it — 
such as its structure or trees that were already there when the land was bought — and others 
that are acquired. Nevertheless, the fundamental aspect in the semantic field at stake is being 
"of the house". 
Another piece of the /012*3#&' puzzle described above is what one might term its affective 
facet. As can easily be grasped, the words that pertain to this semantic field also denote a 
positive non-indifference to the things that are "of the house". In other words, the verb /012&63 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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and the word /012*3#&' entail an affective dimension, which corresponds to a form of positive 
affective connection between someone and whatever pertains to the house (like, for example, 
the connection between members of the same family, or the relation someone has with the 
objects one has in one's house). The adjective /012;/' also has this meaning, as can already be 
seen in Plato's Lysis, in which there is an attempt to root ,=4*-/) in ,=/012;/).  
The first thing to note is that ,=/012;/) already has a broader sense than considered so far. 
In fact, /012;/' is no longer limited to things that are specifically "of the house", but comes to 
mean "that which is proper to X", "that which belongs to X", or "that which is of X" — and in 
these cases X does not need to be "house". In other words, /012;/' no longer has a specific 
connection to a house or family, but instead coems to be used to denote the kind of relationship 
that involves "belonging to" and "being proper to".  
The second thing to note is that, by attempting to derive ,=4*-/) from ,=/012;/), a certain 
continuity between "belonging to" or "being proper to" relationships and affective relationships 
is stressed. Put differently, this means that there is already a certain 4&-*! (in a positive sense) 
directed towards whatever is /012;/). Over the course of time, /012;/', /012*3#&' and /012&63 
become more and more associated with this affective dimension, to such an extent that these 
words start being used to denote affective relationships, no matter whether these come directly 
from"belonging to" or "being proper to" relationships or not.49 
However, these terms are not used to express all forms of affection. Instead, they all come 
to signify only the positive aspects of affective relationships. In this sense, /012*3#&', /012;/', 
/012&/A), /012&/A#$!& and so on contain a reference to a form of "endearment", of “looking 
after", of "caring for" or of "devoting oneself to". It is probably because this affective side is 
already present in this semantic field that /012;/' ceases to be used only with regard to the 
context of a house, and starts being used in the broader way described above. 
Continuing on this point, it is important to note that all these words, and especially 
/012&63, are not used to denote just the existence of a positive affective relationship, but also 
the creation of such a relationship. In other words, this verb is not only used to describe the 
existence of a positive affection, but also the process or act through which such positive 
affection comes to exist.  
In fact, /012&63 also refers to the constitution or creation of a positive non-indifference that 
makes possible any form of affective relationship with something (and this continues to lie at 
the core of every affective relationship with something). I will explain myself. When talking !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49Lysis 221e-222. 
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about a positive affective relationship, I mean something like an "endearment for something ", 
a "looking after something ", a "caring for something " or a "devoting oneself to something". 
Now, all these forms — which are definitely present in the semantic field at stake — 
necessarily entail that one is not indifferent to whatever happens to the object of such 
endearment and devotion. It is with the constitution of such positive non-indifference towards 
something that the affective relationship with it begins — the endearment and devotion and so 
on. 
In this sense, the verb /012&63 is used to describe both a) the process or act by which this 
positive non-indifference begins and b) the existence of this positive non-indifference.  
Perhaps an example will help to clarify all this: when I make a new friend, /012&63 — 
especially, but also /012*3#&' and /012;/' — refer to two different but related things: a) to the 
constitution of such person as a friend, i.e. to the creation of a relationship of positive non-
indifference towards that person, a relationship which amounts to me becoming fond of such 
person, caring for that person (for whom I did not care before) and looking after him or her; b) 
to the continuous positive non-indifferent affective relationship that I have with that person 
from that moment onwards. 
All that has been said so far concerns a rather broad semantic field, which conveys a more 
or less broad meaning to words such as /012*3#&', /012;/', /012&/A) and /012&/A#$!&.  But, at 
least starting with Theophrastus, these words start to (also) be used in a more technical and 
therefore limited sense, especially in connection with ethics. However, one must bear in mind 
that, just as there is an evolution of these terms before this technical dimension comes into play, 
their meaning as termini technici also changes over time. In fact, the way these terms are used 
by Theophrastus is not an exact match with the way they are used by the Stoa. Nonetheless, the 
fact remains that the whole terminological use of these words derives from the broad semantic 
field I have tried to depict so far. 
It is within this specific technical context that one finds the third piece of the above-
mentioned puzzle: /012*3#&' becomes the terminus technicus for positive non-indifference. In 
fact, as termini technici, both /012*3#&' and the verb /012&63 start being used to denote a form 
of positive non-indifference every animal and human is said to have. In other words, both terms 
are used to depict that an animal or human is fond of something and has a positive relationship 
with it, in such a way that it or he devotes itself or himself to it. Obviously, different schools 
and authors say animals and humans have a positive interest in different things, but regardless 
of those differences, /012*3#&' and /012&63 are terms used to express this kind of relationship. 
! )*!
But then there is a turning point in the technical use of these terms. At a certain 
point,50/012*3#&' and /012&63 are not only used to denote some form of positive non-
indifference each animal and human has regarding certain things, but they start being used to 
denote the process by which each animal and human establishes a fundamental positive non-
indifference, from which all positive non-indifference derives. In a way, this "turning point" is 
made possible by the above-mentioned fact that /012*3#&' and /012&63 are used to describe the 
creation of a relationship of positive non-indifference towards something. However, the Stoic 
technical use of this term goes far beyond this. In fact, the Stoics do not focus on /012*3#&' and 
/012&63 as being the process of creation of a new relationship of positive non-indifference, but 
go further back and focus on the original and founding moment that constituted and created all 
positive non-indifference. 
Instead of just noting that animals and humans have a positive non-indifference towards 
certain things — a positive non-indifference that is shown in their behaviour, which evinces 
that they care for things such as their body or their children — the Stoics take a step back and 
ask: but where does this come from? Some times, one needs to take a step back in order to take 
two steps forward. This is one of those instances. 
 In fact, by asking where this positive non-indifference comes from, the Stoa realize  the 
need for a first and founding positive non-indifference. It is within this context that the 
expression 89:,/) /012;/) gains importance in Stoic philosophy.  
Now, this expression (89:,/) /012;/)) is used to denote two different — albeit closely 
related — things: a) an animal's or human's first object of positive non-indifference, i.e. an 
animal's (or human’s) first object of /012*3#&', which is first in the sense that there is no object 
of non-indifference prior to it; b) the first moment of /012*3#&', which constitutes the 
foundational positive non-indifference from which all other positive interests derive, i.e. the 
89:,/)/012;/) as the source of all positive interest.  
It must be said that this use of 89:,/) /012;/) is not specific to Stoicism. However, the 
Stoic way of using this expression has a different meaning than the one it has in other schools, 
precisely because of the Stoics’ original identification of the foundational positive non-
indifference from which all other positive interests derive (b). In fact, their focus on the 
question "where does this positive non-indifference come from?" leads them to a particular 
identification of this original source of non-indifference. It is this particular identification of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 This technical sense emerges probably with Theophrastus. I will no go over this problem, since it would lead us astray. 
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phenomenon that grants a new and particular meaning to the Stoic use of /012*3#&' and related 
terms. It is on this meaning that I will from now on focus. 
Now, what do the Stoics identify as the source of all positive non-indifference?  They 
identify it as the process by which a) one comes to have a fundamental positive non-
indifference (/012*3#&') towards oneself, which is, at the same time b) rooted in the process 
that founds selfhood as such. This means that the fundamental positive non-indifference from 
which all non-indifference stems is derived from one's positive non-indifferent relationship 
with oneself, which in turn stems from the fact that one is constituted as oneself. I realize this 
may sound very obscure. My task is therefore to explain this enigmatic sentence. In doing so, I 
hope to explain the meaning the Stoics give to /012*3#&', /012&63 and related terms. 
One must start by noticing that the Stoic answer to the question "where does this positive 
non-indifference come from?" has two distinct elements (even though they are inseparably 
connected): one of them is positive non-indifference; the other is selfhood. I will try to explain 
both of them and how they connect to each other.  
Let us start by focusing on selfhood and its connection to the semantic field here at stake. 
Given the above-mentioned meanings for /012*3#&' and /012&63, the problem of selfhood 
has to do with the process by which "an animal makes itself belong to itself", or, in other 
words, it has to do with the process by which "an animal makes itself proper to itself", “an 
animal puts itself in relationship with itself”, " an animal puts itself in a familiar kinship with 
itself”, "an animal appropriates itself", "an animal makes itself its own" or "an animal makes 
itself of itself".51 However, these expressions per se do not render the whole meaning of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51All this is closely connected with an important problem concerning this description, which has been abundantly 
discussed in recent studies concerning the doctrine of /012*3#&'. It concerns the discussion on whether animals or 
humans "make themselves of themselves", or if it is 4D#&' that makes an animal or human "of" that animal or human. 
This is a very complicated problem, since it has to answer if 4D#&' is the real agent behind human and animal /012*3#&' 
and how this can happen. This discussion has to do with the interpretation of /012&/A#$!&as passive or middle. Be it as it 
may, even if 4D#&' is the real agent making an animal "belong to itself" or "proper to itself", nevertheless, as Stoic texts 
abundantly show, this happens in such a way that 4D#&' makes an animal "make itself belong to itself" or makes it "make 
itself proper to itself ". Being feminine, 4D#&' is keen on making others doing what she wants as if they were doing it of 
their own free will. A very interesting book for studying this problem is Bees, Robert., Die Oikeiosislehre der Stoa. I 
Rekonstruktion ihres Inhalts, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2004. For an opposite view (which, as is easy to 
infer, I am more inclined to accept), cf. Forschner, Maxilian, "Oikeiosis: die stoische Theorie der Selbstaneignung", in: 
B. Neymeyr & J. Schmidt & B. Zimmermann (ed.), Stoizismus in der europäischen Philosophie, Literatur, Kunst und 
Politik : eine Kulturgeschichte von der Antike bis zur Moderne, vol. I, de Gruyter, Berlin/N.Y 2008, 169-191, esp. 189-
191; Schönrich, Gerhard, "Oikeiosis – Zur Aktualität eines stoischen Grundbegriffs", Philosophisches Jahrbuch 96 
(1989), 34-51, esp. 51. 
 I will not go into this discussion now, for it would take this text way off course. Nevertheless, I believe that the analysis 
I am going to make may contribute to this discussion, for Hierocles' text does describe important aspects of /012*3#&', 
which can help to solve this problem. However, it will not be me that  establishes the connection between these elements 
and the bigger-picture problem. But if someone uses my work to do so, I will be glad. 
Still as regards this, I would like to stress that, whether or not 4D#&' is the real agent that makes one relate to oneself, the 
fact remains that one relates to oneself (and perceives oneself) as oneself. And this means that, whether such selfhood is 
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/012*3#&' and /012&63, since they do not give the appropriate emphasis to the positive non-
indifference at stake. The complete formula goes more like "the animal makes itself of itself 
and thereby establishes a positive non-indifference towards itself".  
But this is still not all there is to say about the Stoic use of /012*3#&' and /012&63. In fact, 
the Stoic claim is actually bolder than this: they claim that the process by which one becomes 
non-indifferent towards oneself and the process by which one is constituted as oneself (@!(,6) 
are one and the same. As we can already anticipate — and will see later on —, this is a very 
complicated matter. I would go even further and claim that understanding this strange self-
referential non-indifferent relationship an animal or human has with itself is the key to the 
whole theory of /012*3#&'.  
To better understand this problem — and consequently the meaning of /012*3#&' — one 
may begin by considering the novelty of the Stoics’ perspective. This originality has to do with 
the angle from which they approach the problem of selfhood and non-indifference towards 
oneself. 
As we saw in the first section, when we examine the problem of selfhood, we tend to 
consider it — whether aware of it or not — from an exterior standpoint that sees an animal or 
human as a thing amongst others. As we said, this creates what we called a witness standpoint, 
that sees an animal or infant and then says that this animal or human relates to itself/himself. 
From this same perspective, it could now be added that such animal or human relates to 
itself/himself and has some positive non-indifference towards itself/himself. For example: right 
now I am in a park and I see people and birds, which I assume to have some kind of 
relationship with themselves. It is from this assumption that I analyse their behaviour and come 
to say that they have some kind of positive non-indifferent relationship with themselves.52 
However, as we also saw, the Stoics differ from this perspective. Indeed, this is not their 
way of considering the problem of selfhood.  The decisive change in Stoic angle comes not 
only from the already mentioned incisive question concerning the constitution of one as 
oneself, but also — and especially — from the first person perspective in which this question is 
asked. Their problem is not how one perceives a "third person" as a Self, but rather how one 
comes to perceive oneself as oneself,i.e. where the oneself comes from: how a little bird comes 
to perceive itself as itself from its own perspective, how its brother comes to perceive itself as 
itself from its own perspective, how a new-born bear already perceives itself as itself from its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
founded by an act of 4D#&' or not, there is a form of selfhood by which one perceives oneself as oneself and has a 
positive non-indifference towards oneself. This problem will be dealt with from now on.  
52As was said in the first section, this has to do with a kind of witness standpoint.  
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own perspective, how I come to perceive myself as myself from my own perspective. The Stoic 
approach is to describe how each and every human and animal comes to perceive itself as itself 
— as @!(,6 — in the first person. Indeed so much so that a) there is a world of difference 
between the first person and the third person self and b) the @!(,6 in the Stoic sense only takes 
place in the first person. Thus, when talking about /012*3#&' and /012&63, we are talking about 
the very origin of this first person.  This means that, when trying to uncover the meaning of 
these words, we are actually trying to find out what this @!(,6 — which is only an @!(,6 as 
such in the first person — is all about. Put differently, the Stoics ask from a first person 
perspective: what is this @!(,6 that I am all about?53 
I would also like to add that, after all that was said in the first section, one can easily see 
that this explanation identifies this "first person perspective" from which the animal or infant 
perceives itself as itself with the perspective of !"#$%#&' @!(,/A. As antecipated in the first 
section, the moment at which an animal becomes an animal — which is birth — is also the 
moment at which !"#$%#&' @!(,/A begins. And now we can go even further and say that birth is 
the moment at which an animal becomes itself, perceives itself as itself and has a positive non-
indifference towards itself.  
So the problem here concerns the inaugural moment of selfhood as such from a first person 
perspective: how is it that an animal or infant, from its own perspective — perceives itself as 
itself from birth? There must be an act or process by which the animal or infant comes to 
perceive itself as itself immediately at birth. And because this is seen from a first person 
perspective, there must be an act or process by which the animal becomes itself; otherwise it 
would not perceive itself as itself. So there must be an act or process by which the animal 
becomes itself and perceives itself as itself in such a way that it is non-indifferent towards 
itself, otherwise it would not perceive itself as itself in a non-indifferent way (as we will see it 
does). 
Now this brings us closer to the Stoic meaning of /012*3#&' and /012&63, while also 
explaining that their use by the Stoa concerns problem both of positive non-indifference and of 
selfhood. In this sense, /012*3#&' and /012&63 acquire a new and original sense.  They are used 
to describe the process by which one becomes positively non-indifferent to oneself, a process !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 It can be said here that the Stoics go further than they actually realise. Although I will not have time to consider this, I 
would like to stress that Hierocles' text points at something it does not have the means to explain. The analysis of the 
scala naturae presented in annex 2 is a good example of this: Hierocles' text is built upon the concepts of this scala 
naturae, and this happens because Hierocles presupposes his ability to grasp other forms of being from a witness 
standpoint that sees other animals and describes them from the third person perspective. At the same time, his examples 
clearly point to the fact the identification of the @!(,6 is an identification that can only happen in the first person. And 
this is where he cheats, for he pretends to see from the third person perspective how animals relate to themeselves in a 
first person perspective. 
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that coincides with the constitution of one as oneself — or, to use the terms we looked at in the 
first section, a process that coincides with the constitution of an @!(,6 that has a positive non-
indifference @!(,?. In fact, the Stoics focus on the process that establishes an animal or human 
not only as @!(,6, but as an @!(,6 that relates to itself in a positive non-indifferent manner. It is 
therefore from this constitution of an animal or human as a @!(,6 that comes the "genitive 
stamp" refered to in the first section: everything that is @!(,/A is @!(,/A because it belongs to 
this @!(,6. 
In Stoic texts, such a self-referential dimension appears first in the form of the above-
mentioned 89:,/) /*12;/). At stake in this expression is both the animal's identification of 
what the animal itself (@!(,6) is, which is at the same time an identification of what is its own 
(@!(,/A), and a positive non-indifference towards what the animal itself is and consequentially 
towards what is its own. The 89:,/) /*12;/) can thus be described as the result of the animal's 
first /*12&/A#$!& towards itself. It can therefore be described as the first thing that the animal 
makes proper to itself, the first thing that the animal makes its own and towards which it has a 
positive non-indifference.  
As described above, at stake here is a kind of "genitive stamp" that determines what 
belongs to the animal, while at the same time describing the animal as "that to which those 
things belong". In this sense, this 89:,/) /*12;/) can be seen as what the animal first takes 
itself to be. In fact, the animal takes itself to be the sum of its own parts (its #D#,!#&'), the sum 
of those parts that are defined by being its own. Accordingly, /012*3#&' is the process by which 
the animal comes to be what it is, i.e. the process by which an animal or infant gains its own 
selfhood. Such selfhood is not a neutral one, but rather the identification of that towards which 
the animal is first and foremost non-indifferent in a positive way, namely itself (@!(,6).  
In Stoic studies, this strictly self-referential dimension of /012*3#&' has been termed its 
intransitive dimension. This is the dimension that concerns one's self-referential non-indifferent 
positive relationship with oneself. As stated previously, this is  the corner stone upon which the 
whole doctrine of /012*3#&' is built.  
But here the distributive aspect of the "@!(,/A stamp" mentioned in the first section comes 
again into play. In fact, as explained with regard to the fundamental equation we referred to in 
the first section, one perceives oneself as being multiple, as being spread across whatever is 
deemed to be @!(,/A, such as hands and feet and so on. In our previous description, the 
distributive element had to do with one perceiving oneself as a multiplicity that spreads 
throughout all that one perceives as @!(,/A, while, at the same time, it also has to do with one 
perceiving oneself as not being only hands or only feet and so on, but as being that to which 
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hand and feet and so on belong — which was termed its agglutinative aspect. Now we see that 
the Stoics also use /012*3#&' and /*12&63 to describe this same form of “belonging to oneself”,  
“being part of oneself”, “being related to oneself” or "being of oneself ". In fact, they use these 
words to describe the process by which something is “made to belong to oneself”, “made part 
of oneself”, “put in relationship with oneself”, “put in a familiar kinship with oneself”, 
"appropriated by and to oneself " or "made of oneself ".54 This means that the distributive 
character of the "@!(,/A stamp" is connected to /012*3#&' and /*12&63. Indeed it is through this 
very process — the one described by the words /012*3#&' and /*12&63 — that the "@!(,/A 
stamp" spreads out through all the different elements that end up composing one's !"#$%#&' 
@!(,/A.  At the same time, this process is not only the process by which the "@!(,/A stamp"  
spreads out throughout whatever is @!(,/A, but also the one by which it makes everything that 
is @!(,/A belong together. 
But here the most important thing is to stress the inclusion of positive non-indifference as a 
fundamental piece in this process. In fact, this distributive process not only distributes the 
identification @!(,/A: it also distributes non-indifference — i.e. it is a concomitant distributive 
process of positive non-indifference towards whatever is @!(,/A. In other words, what we are 
dealing with is not only a process by which "X appears to itself as itself" and a process by 
which "X makes Y of itself", but a process by which X makes Y of itself in such a way that, 
because X has a positive non-indifference towards itself, it also has a positive non-indifference 
to what is of itself, and therefore has a positive non-indifference towards Y.  
For example, /012*3#&' and /*12&63 are used to denote the process by which an infant 
comes to be itself and non-indifferent towards itself, and because of that, /012*3#&' and /*12&63 
are also used to describe the process by which an infant comes to "appropriate" its hand as part 
of itself in such a way that, because it has a positive non-indifference towards itself, and also 
because it perceives its hand as being @!(,/A, it also has a positive non-indifference towards its 
hand. 
Now this means that the animal's positive non-indifference towards itself is a positive non-
indifference towards whatever it perceives as @!(,/A. And the point is that, in order for there to 
be a positive non-indifference towards whatever is perceived as @!(,/A, there needs to be an 
original positive non-indifference towards oneself (@!(,6). For example, in order for one to 
have a positive non-indifference towards one's own body parts, one needs to have a positive !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 C.f. Forschner, Maximilian "Oikeiosis: die stoische Theorie der Selbstaneignung", in: B. Neymeyr & J. Schmidt & B. 
Zimmermann (ed.), Stoizismus in der europäischen Philosophie, Literatur, Kunst und Politik : eine Kulturgeschichte von 
der Antike bis zur Moderne, vol. I, de Gruyter, Berlin/N.Y 2008, pp. 169-191, esp. 170. 
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non-indifference towards one's own body. But, as the Stoics would claim, in order for one to 
have a positive non-indifference towards one's own body, one needs to have some kind of 
positive non-indifference towards oneself, since if I did not give a damn about what happens to 
me, I would not give a damn about what happens to my body. 
All in all, there is a self-referential relationship at stake in “X making Y of itself” or  “X 
making X of itself” (and please do not forget the fundamental equation mentioned in the first 
section, according to which Y — a hand, for example — is immediately seen as X —oneself). 
It is this self-referential dimension that leads many authors to describe /012*3#&' as a process of 
attaining or creating some kind of identity.55 But the process by which "X makes itself of itself" 
is also the process by which X comes to have some kind of non-indifferent relationship with 
itself and to whatever is @!(,/A.  
So, as stated, we are dealing with two components: a) a form of non-indifferent 
relationship with oneself, and also, underlying it, b) a process by which oneself comes to 
constitute oneself as oneself (or in other words, the process by which one comes to be what one 
is). And the point is that the Stoics start using /012*3#&' and /012&63 precisely to describe both 
these phenomena, since they always appear intermingled: the creation of a fundamental 
positive non-indifference (/012*3#&') towards oneself is always concomitant with the process 
that founds selfhood as such. One the one hand, there could be no positive non-indifference 
towards oneself if there were no "oneself" (@!(,6); but on the other hand, the "oneself" (@!(,6) 
we are dealing with would be radically different from what it is if it were indifferent towards 
itself — which means that, without this positive non-indifference, there would be no @!(,6 (at 
least not in the way it is considered here, i.e. even it there were something to which the word 
@!(,6 pointed, it would be radically different from what it is, and  @!(,6 would mean 
something completely different). 
I must now confess that the description given so far overlooks several difficulties. On the 
one hand, this is perfectly normal, considering the magnitude of the problem at stake. On the 
other hand, what I mean to say is that the considerations made so far overlook some problems I 
will have to deal with in order to make what I want to say clear. One of these problems has to 
do the re-introduction of the distributive element of the @!(,/A stamp occurring a few lines 
above. There is some controversy about whether to define this first moment of distribution of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55Cf.: Forschner, Maxilian Oikeiosis: die stoische Theorie der Selbstaneignung", in: B. Neymeyr & J. Schmidt & B. 
Zimmermann (ed.), Stoizismus in der europäischen Philosophie, Literatur, Kunst und Politik : eine Kulturgeschichte von 
der Antike bis zur Moderne, vol. I, de Gruyter, Berlin/N.Y 2008, 169-191; Schönrich, Gerhard, "Oikeiosis – Zur 
Aktualität eines stoischen Grundbegriffs", Philosophisches Jahrbuch 96 (1989), 34-51; Kerferd, G. B., "The Search for 
Personal Identity in Stoic Thought", Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester 55(1972), 177-196. 
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the @!(,/A stamp as being an intransitive or a transitive moment of /012;/#&'. The problem 
regards defining what belongs to a transitive or intransitive dimension of /012*3#&'. As stated, 
the intransitive dimension of /012*3#&' deals with one's connection with oneself, and this 
means that its transitive dimension has to do with one's positive non-indifference towards 
external things (as defined in the first part). However, the problem gets a bit more complicated 
than this. 
The focus of this discussion concerns the point where the transitive dimension of /012*3#&' 
starts. And the difficulty in finding it has to do with the "formal" character of @!(,6 defined in 
the first section. The question is whether a) the intransitive dimension of /012*3#&' concerns 
only the positive non-indifferent relationship one has with oneself as a completely "formal" 
@!(,6, i.e. as a @!(,6 that is defined as being whatever is @!(,/A — in which case one's 
positive non-indifference towards a specific @!(,/A (such as a hand) already corresponds to a 
transitive dimension of the founding positive non-indifference one has with a "formal" @!(,6 
—, or whether b) one's positive non-indifference towards @!(,6 is from the outset a positive 
non-indifference towards what is @!(,/A, in such a way that the positive non-indifference 
towards oneself as a formal @!(,6 cannot be separated from one's positive non-indifference 
towards what is @!(,/A — or, put differently, in such a way that there is no actual positive non-
indifference towards oneself as a formal @!(,6, but from the very outset a positive non-
indifference towards what is @!(,/A.56 
As we will see, this is a complicated matter, and there are important nuances between a) 
and b). 
But regardless of this problem, the positive non-indifference towards external things 
belongs to the transitive dimension of /012*3#&'. And this brings us to the fifth point of the 
above-mentioned /012*3#&' puzzle: /012*3#&' is not merely used to denote this complex 
original positive non-indifference towards oneself, but also a positive non-indifference directed 
towards external things. 
One must start by stressing that the transitive side of /012*3#&' and the intransitive side of 
/012*3#&' are not two different forms of /012*3#&', but rather two sides of the same /012*3#&'.  
But one must go one step further and note that, as found in Hierocles' text, the transitive 
dimension of /012*3#&' is anchored in its intransitive dimension. This relationship can be 
explained through a new side of the distributive element. In fact, by the introduction of a 
positive non-indifference, this distributive element gains a new dimension. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 As we will see, at stake here is whether the animal's first and founding /012*3#&' is directed towards itself (in a 
completely formal way), or already towards its #D#,!#&'.  
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As was said, this distributive aspect not only spreads the @!(,/A stamp over multiple 
elements, but it also spreads the positive non-indifference towards oneself over all the elements 
that are perceived to be @!(,/A. This happens because these elements are perceived as being 
equal to oneself (in the sense of the fundamental equation mentioned in the first section), and 
therefore one's positive non-indifference towards oneself entails one's positive non-indifference 
towards these elements. This creates a relationship of positive non-indifference towards 
whatever bears the @!(,/A stamp, in such a way that one's relationship with whatever bears that 
stamp is different from one's relationship with what does not bear that stamp. 
But there is still a second57distributive moment of this positive non-indifference, which has 
to do precisely with one's relationship with what does not bear the ;0<'(@ stamp but 
nevertheless interferes with what does. I.e. this second distributive moment is related to one's 
relationship with external things. In fact, both /012*3#&' and /012&63 serve to express one's 
positive non-indifference to one's house, to one's family, to one's car, food and so on. Here, too, 
one is dealing with a positive non-indifference towards oneself that spreads out and makes one 
have a positive non-indifferent relationship with what is not @!(,/A but interferes with it in a 
positive way.  These are the things one is fond of, the things one likes, such as one's friends and 
possessions, but also such as food or water, and also activities such as swimming and surfing 
and so on.58 And this introduces a new distributive moment become this distribution of positive 
non-indifference does not stop at the frontier of what bears the @!(,/A stamp. Unlike what we 
saw in the first section, the distribution of non-indifference towards oneself goes beyond the 
limits of what is perceived as oneself, making one non-indifferent in a positive way towards 
things that are not describable as @!(,/A but interfere with it. There is still another another 
reason why the distribution of non-indifference does not stop where we set the frontier in the 
first section, but we still do not have the elements necessary to introduce it, and will therefore 
go back to it at an appropriate time.  
One must note that the strong claim the Stoics are trying to make is this: one's positive 
non-indifference towards all these things (friends, possessions, food, water, activities etc.) 
stems from one's positive non-indifference towards one-self. In other words, they claim that for 
an animal or human to have a positive non-indifference towards anything (and not just @!(,/A), 
it/he must not be indifferent to itself/himself. To put this in connection to what we already saw !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 The problem here is not whether this is a second moment in time, although such a question might be raised. By a 
second moment I mean a secondary moment, one that derives from the previous one, even if it happens at the same 
moment in time. 
58 In a way, one's house and one's car and one's family are also @!(,/A, although not in a direct way until as it is used 
now (?). I will not have time to deal with this problem, although it is easy to get a glimpse into what is at stake here  
from the analysis of the concentric circles presented at the end of 2.4). 
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in the first section, this means that, just as perception of any external thing is connected to and 
defined by its relationship to perception of oneself, so too one's positive non-indifference 
towards any external things is connected to and defined by one's positive non-indifference 
towards oneself.59 
I am aware of how lacunose and imperfect this explanation is. Nevertheless, I am only 
trying to create a platform from which this analysis can start. My point for now is only one: as 
used by the Stoa, /012*3#&' describes a process by which one comes to have a non-indifferent 
positive self-referential relation with oneself. It is through this process that one comes to 
identify what makes one what one is. In other words, it is through this process that one 
becomes what one is — we can also say that it is through this process that one comes to have 
an identity. But this process also defines one's relationship with oneself as an interested 
relationship; to such an extent that one is interested in oneself and accordingly in whatever 
forms one's identity. Besides this, one also has a positive non-indifference towards other things 
that affect oneself in a positive way, even if these things can not be described as "what one is". 
So that in the final analysis all non-indifference stems from the self. 
Given the complexity of everything entailed in the meaning of /012*3#&', stating that this 
term is impossible to translate has become a cliché; one that I find myself forced to use. This 
difficulty is related to the fact that any translation is ultimately and inevitably a strongly 
interpretative one,60 but also to the fact that /012*3#&' involves a variety of different aspects 
that are difficult to find in a single English word.  In fact, any translation of /012*3#&' is bound 
to leave out some substantial part of the concept's semantic value. 
But there is still a sixth and final aspect one needs to consider in order to get a general 
survey of /012*3#&'. Unlike the previous ones, this point is not directly linked with the semantic 
field of /012*3#&', but instead with that of +--/,9*3#&'. The Stoic uses of /012*3#&' and related 
terms are often coupled with that of +--/,9*3#&', establishing a deep connection between the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59This will be clearer when we go back to Hierocles' text. But for now an example might help: A few hours ago my 
computer fell on the ground and would not turn on: it was mayhem catastrophe. Not only it is my computer, but it also 
contains the thesis I have been writing for a long time and am due to deliver in a few days. And the point is precisely 
this: the computer is not just my computer, but it is my computer in such a way that I would be desperate if it stopped 
working, firstly because I am very interested in keeping it functioning well, and secondly because losing it would be my 
disaster — and I have such a relationship with myself that I would not like my disaster to happen. This means that the 
interested relationship I have with my house comes from the fact that it is my house and I am interested in what is mine. 
As we will see, my interest in my brother's well-being is also derived from the fact that he is my brother, for it he was 
someone else’s brother I would not care so much. 
   All this makes raises the question if my interest in my brother is not ultimately an interest in myself or at least derived 
from it. We will also deal with this problem later on. 
 
60Cf. Schönrich, Gerhard, "Oikeiosis – Zur Aktualität eines stoischen Grundbegriffs", Philosophisches Jahrbuch 96 
(1989), pp. 34-51, esp. 35   
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two terms. This connection becomes so strong that the Stoic use of /012*3#&' is defined by its 
connection to +--/,9*3#&', even when they are not both explicitly mentioned. In fact Stoic 
texts sometimes use /012*3#&' to refer to the whole phenomenon of non-indifference, and not 
just that of positive non-indifference. When this happens, the use takes the form of a 
synecdoche, in which the word used to describe only the positive branch (/012*3#&') of non-
indifference also stands for both branches, and therefore for the negative one (+--/,9*3#&') 
too. But even when this is not the case, i.e. even when a text refers to only one of these 
branches, this does not mean that the other is not at stake. On the contrary, every time that 
+--/,9*3#&' is at stake, so is /012*3#&', and vice-versa. 
Bearing this in mind, let us try to do an even briefer sketch of +--/,9*3#&' and related 
terms. This will help us grasp how both these words, their semantic field and the phenomena 
they stand for, end up being two sides of the same coin. As a result, this will help to further 
reveal the meaning of /012*3#&'. 
Contrary to /012;/', the adjective +--6,9&/' means something like "belonging to another", 
and it is consequently used to denote what is not one's own. In the same way, this adjective is 
used to describe something as foreign, as strange in the sense of not being close or familiar to 
one. In other words, +--6,9&/' can be used to describe something as "not being of the house". 
It is not hard to grasp how such a word comes to incorporate a sense of hostility, especially 
given the predominantly military context of ancient times. When in battle, those who are not on 
one's side tend to be seen as being on the other side, and therefore as one's enemies. In such a 
scenario, foreign countries are not only the ones who are just beyond our borders, but also — 
and most probably — the ones who want to invade us. In this sense, +--6,9&/' is not only used 
to describe what is foreign and "not of the house", but also "that which is hostile". This second 
meaning gets progressively detached from the original sense, to a point where it comes to 
describe something as hostile, even if it belongs to one's own house. For example — as we all 
have experienced — there are many circumstances where people of the same family and house 
describe each other as something equivalent to +--6,9&/'. 
Now, just as /012*3#&' comes to describe the positive affective relationship with other 
people and things, +--/,9*3#&' also becomes the term used to describe a negative affective 
relationship with other people and things. Such a negative affective relationship covers a broad 
scope of meanings (just like /012*3#&'): estrangement from someone or something, being 
disinclined towards something or someone, having an unfavourable disposition towards 
someone or something, and even having an utter aversion to someone or something. To sum 
up, this semantic field is used to describe a broad range of negative non-indifference.  
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Once again, as happens with /012*3#&', +--/,9*3#&' and related terms are used to describe 
not only the existence of a form of negative non-indifference, but also the original constitution 
of such a relationship of negative non-indifference, i.e. the process of becoming hostile or 
estranged. 
Without repeating the discussion above on the self-referential aspect of /012*3#&', it is 
important to note that, at least in the case of the Stoa, +--/,9*3#&' also entails a form of self-
reference. In fact, in this case, +--/,9*3#&' has to do with making something or someone 
estranged, distant or hostile towards oneself. As Hierocles' examples will show in a while, the 
Stoic use of +--/,9*3#&' entails a fundamental positive non-indifference towards oneself that 
creates a negative form of non-indifference directed towards whatever is perceived as harmful 
or negative to oneself in any way.  
This means that, as used by the Stoa, /012*3#&' and +--/,9*3#&' are  two sides of the same 
non-indifference one has in one's relationship with oneself. Put differently, the Stoics claim that 
each human and animal is not indifferent to itself, and that non-indifference expresses itself in 
a) a positive non-indifference towards itself — and accordingly towards what it considers itself 
to be and also towards the things that promote and protect whatever that might be— and that 
also expresses itself in b) a negative non-indifference towards whatever is prejudicial to itself 
— and accordingly expresses itself in an aversion to things that can harm itself and in hostility 
towards what is perceived as an enemy of itself. 
As we will see, this creates a certain asymmetry between /012*3#&' and +--/,9*3#&', for 
despite the fact that they are two sides of the same coin, one is derived from the other (and this 
is the asymmetry referred to in the first section). 
It is this derivation of +--/,9*3#&' from a fundamental /012*3#&' towards oneself that 
alows us to complete the explanation of the distributive moment of non-indifference. We have 
said that it did non stop at the boundaries of what is perceived as @!(,/A, but instead extended 
towards what is not @!(,/A but interferes with it in a positive way. And now it must be added 
that this second distributive element also does not stop at the distribution of positive non-
indifference, but also distributes negative non indifference both towards a) what is @!(,/A and 
towards b) what is not @!(,/A. Good examples of b) are plentiful in the !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#., and 
we have considered many of them, for every time an animal perceives another as hostile 
towards itself, it perceives it as non-indifferent towards it in a negative way. Examples of b) 
can also be found, in the examples of the beaver or the deer, who show a negative non-
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indifference towards some of their own parts, either because such parts hinder their escape or 
because they are being chased. 61 
The connection between /012*3#&' and +--/,9*3#&' is much harder to explain than 
portrayed here. As I said, I will not go into the details unless they help to explain what 
perception is all about.  But I do venture to stress that, without grasping both, one is doomed to 
lose each of them, for they represent both sides of the same fundamental non-indifference and 
are hence intrinsically connected to each other.  
To carefully analyse all these pieces of the /012*3#&' puzzle, one would have to consider 
the main sources for this kind of problem, which are Diogenes Laertius VII 85 ff, Cicero fin. III 
76ff., Seneca ep. 121 and Hierocles' !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#.. As I already said, the last is the only 
one I will consider. I will try to survey the appearances of /012*3#&'-related terms in the !"#$% 
&'(#)*+,-#., in order to get the sense in which Hierocles uses them. Just as in the previous 
section, the actual meaning of the word in Hierocles' work will only surface/appear when 
analysing the text. 
 
2.b) The use of 8=:-*4#&' in Hierocles' text. 
 
Bearing in mind that our goal is to explain what perception is all about, it is important to 
consider how the text puts /012*3#&' in connection with !"#$%#&'. But one still needs to 
understand what the author of the !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#. takes /012*3#&' to be. To do so, one must 
start by considering Hierocles' arguments to prove that animals have something that can be 
described as /012*3#&'. Such arguments not only come in Hierocles' series of proofs that 
animals have +),*-%.&' @!(,/A, but are also several times expressly connected to !"#$%#&'. Just 
as in the first section, I will start with a broad overview of the arguments used to prove that 
animals have /012*3#&', and then proceed to analyse these arguments and respective examples. 
It is only after studying how Hierocles uses /012*3#&' that I will establish the connection 
between /012*3#&' and !"#$%#&'. Only then will we have the necessary elements to elaborate 
the structure of perception that results from the!"#$% &'(#)*+,-#.. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 Both these examples paint a picture much more complex than now pictures (as in fact all others also do), because they 
show that the animal can have both positive and negative non-indifference for the same part at the same time. At stake is 
a very complex articulation of positive and negative non-indifference that determines each and every part of the animal 
— and each and everything that belongs to C1,6' — according to all their possible passive and active uses in different 
E92;!&. This subject will surface further ahead.  
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It is important to note that the first two references to /012*3#&' come in the form of the 
89:,/) /012;/), and are both used at the beginning of the text. The first comes at its very 
beginning (I, 2) and says that the 89:,/) /012;/) is the best starting point for a consideration of 
the elements making up ethics. The second comes after Hierocles' remarks concerning the 
7B)2#&' ,:) Cµ.DE3), where he says that a consideration of !"#$%#&' contributes to the 
understanding of the 89:,/) /012;/). At this point in the text, one still does not know what the 
89:,/) /012;/) is, and for that matter, neither does one really know what !"#$%#&' stands for. 
Nevertheless, one can already grasp that !"#$%#&' is related to /012*3#&'.  
After the subsequent exposition of !"#$%#&' analysed above, in the heading of column VI 
Hierocles introduces the phrase "20 !0#$!)6µ2)/) @!(,/A E!*92& ,= >?/) 1!& /012&/A,!& @!(,?". 
But it is only at VI 24 that the text really starts to consider the problem, when it is said that, 
given the fact that an animal has a certain representation of itself, it holds to the representation's 
persuasiveness and — how could it be otherwise? — assents to it" ("Å2,F ,!A,' /q) PI-6) 
C#,&) \,& 4!),!#*!' ,&)6' @!(,/A 72)/µB)%' !H,? ,= 8&$!)=) "#E2& —8:' 7F9 a) K--3' 
PD)!&,/; — 829R ,I' 4!),!#*!' 1!R ,/D,_ #(71!,!,*$2,!&." VI 25-28). It is important here to 
note that this happens as soon as the animal is born. In fact, the previous sentence, which sums 
up the explanation of !"#$%#&', concludes with the chief point (124<-!&/)) of such explanation 
being that an animal perceives itself as soon as it is born ([µ!,S72)B#2&). And now, by saying 
that "4!),!#*!' ,&)6' @!(,/A 72)/µB)%' !H,?" the animal assents to the persuasiveness of this 
4!),!#*!, Hierocles is already claiming that, just like !"#$%#&', so too /012*3#&' begins at 
birth. 
After this, at VI 29-31 Hierocles remarks that it is necessary to dwell ("C8&#,I#!&") on 
three points in total: either the animal is pleased with the representation it has apprehended of 
itself ("2H!92#,2; ,S 4!),!#*Ç, h) @!(,/A 2"-%42)"), or it is displeased ("P(#!92#,2; [by it]") 
or else it remains indifferent ("+9928:' "#E2& [to it]"). 
After this last point the text becomes lacunose until VI 40, where Hierocles observes that, 
if the animal were not pleased with itself or remained indifferent to itself, the efforts of 4D#&' to 
generate it would have been in vain ("QE/& P' K) ,O) !0,*!) 1!R c 4#D#&', r' µ+,%) ,F ,/&!A,! 
1!µ/A#! 89= 72)B#23', 20 µO µB--2& ,= >?/) 2H$Z 72)6µ2)/) +9B#2&) @!(,?." VI 40-42). And 
this happens because, if the animal were indifferent to itself or displeased with itself, this would 
lead to its destruction (4B92& 896' ,2 p-2$9/) ,/A >?/() and would cause one to have contempt 
for nature ("1!R µO) /HP' +9928:' "#E2&: /HE É,,/) 7F9 ,I' P(#!92#,M#23' 1!R !H,= ,= µO 
2H!92#,2;) 896' ,2 p-2$9/) ,/A >?/( 1!R 89=' 1!,<7)3#&) 4B92& ,I' 4D#23'" VI 47-48). It is 
striking that this passage associates both  "+9928:'"#E2&)" and "µO 2H!92#,2&)" with 
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“P(#!9M#,%#&'withp-2$9/' ,/Z >?/(”. In this sense, it creates a dichotomy — a form of 
either/or — between 2H!9M#,%#&' on the one hand and both "+9928:'"#E2&)" and 
P(#!9M#,%#&' on the other. In other words: according to Hierocles, either the animal is pleased 
with the representation it has of itself and this leads to the preservation of its life, or, if the 
animal is displeased or remains indifferent, this leads to its destruction. Everything depends on 
the animal's survival and, in this respect, P(#!92#,2;) and +9928:'"#E2&) amount pretty much 
to the same. Assuming that his reader knows that animals seek their preservation, as he will 
explain in the following lines, the author of the !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#. concludes that this makes 
one recognize that ",O) 89T,%) !"#$%#&) @!(,/A -!G6), 2H$D' ?&12&T$% 89=' @!(,/A 1!R ,O) 
@!(,/A #D#,!#&)" (VI 51-53). Once again, this stresses that /012*3#&' and !"$%#&' @!(,/A 
begin at the same time, which is at birth.  
Hierocles then presents a series of empirical arguments to prove that each animal does 
what it is able to do to contribute to its own preservation ("1!,F ,O) @!(,/A PD)!µ&) ]1!#,/) 
8/&2; ,= C8&G<--/) W8V9 ,I' @!(,/A #(),%9M#23'" VI 54-55). Such examples come under the 
heading of "!H,F ,F 7&)6µ2)!" mentioned above and are meant to prove that an animal is 
pleased with the representation it has of itself, and that such a thing is equivalent to the animal 
/012&/A#$!& @!(,? E!R ,S @!(,/A #(#,<#2&.  
One must pay attention to the expressions used in these examples, for they reveal the 
phenomena with which /012*3#&' and /012&/A#$!& are connected. In fact, the arguments are 
meant to prove that an animal, in accordance with its own ability ("1!,F ,O) @!(,/A PD)!µ&)"), 
does what it can to contribute  to its own preservation ("8/&2; ,= C8&G<--/) W8V9 ,I' @!(,/A 
#(),%9M#23'"). Thus #(),M9%#&' is an important "character" in the proof that animals are 
characterized by an /012&/A#$!& towards themselves. The same should be said about ,M9%#&' 
too, since it is used as a synonym of #(),M9%#&'. It is important to bear in mind that both these 
terms have a somehow twofold meaning. On the one hand, they are clearly used to refer to 
preservation. But on the other hand, they have a sense similar to the Latin tueor: a sense of 
"watching over", "looking after", "caring for" "keeping safe", " guarding", or, in one word, a 
sense of vigilance. Now both these senses are connected, and at stake in Hierocles’ use of 
#(),M9%#&' and ,M9%#&' is the animal's vigilance over its own preservation.  
This "vigilance" component of #(),M9%#&' and ,M9%#&' leads to another important aspect 
surfacing. In fact, when talking about "guarding", "looking after", "keeping an eye on" and so 
on, one is talking about a form of anticipation. Entailed in this specific anticipation — the one 
connected with guarding and so on — is both the anticipation of the things that might possibly 
happen to what one is guarding and the anticipation of an action in response to this (still only) 
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possible threat. When looking after something, a night-guard is not just standing there watching 
and waiting to see what happens: he is anticipating the things that mighth possibly happen to 
what he is guarding and anticipating his possible reactions to these things. And the point is that 
#(),M9%#&' and ,M9%#&' in the sense of preservation depend upon both the anticipation of what 
might hinder this preservation and upon the anticipation of possible actions to respond to such 
a threat.  
I would like to stress that this anticipation played a pivotal role in the first section. There, 
possibility was highlighted as a pivotal "character" in the structure of perception. And it is this 
same possibility that returns to the stage right now: #(),M9%#&' and ,M9%#&' entail a perception 
that is non-indifferent towards possible situations, i.e. that perceives everything already with an 
eye towards the future. In this sense, it scans the present percepta looking for what they might 
give away as regards a still possible future, in such a way that whatever is perceived right now 
is connected to and defined by what may come from it. As stated in the first section, this 
perception is at the same time defined by one's possible reaction to such a circumstance. It is 
this form of anticipation of future possibilities within the present moment that makes 
#(),M9%#&' and ,M9%#&' in the sense of preservation possible. In other words, it is only because 
one sees the future already in the present — shaping the present — that one can look after 
oneself. And this means that #(),M9%#&' and ,M9%#&' make reference to an animal's 
preservation and at the same time to its active effort to preserve itself (which is connected to 
the structure of perception explained in the first section, as one can now? begin to understand). 
Now, this semantic field obviously presupposes that an animal has a positive non-
indifference towards itself. In fact, this is why it "looks after" itself, "keeps itself safe" and so 
on. Hierocles is saying that an animal's positive non-indifference towards itself entails a 
positive non-indifference towards its preservation. Actually, he is saying even more than this, 
as we will see in due course.62 
In these examples Hierocles also uses P&!µ/)M to refer to an animal’s survival. This term 
does not entail the same complex semantic field, and is used to denote a survival in the sense of 
staying alive, of permanence. Still, it stresses that an animal's positive non-indifference towards 
itself makes it want to stay alive. Placed in connection with #(),M9%#&' and ,M9%#&'m, P&!µ/)M 
seems to focus more on surviving as such, whereas the other two terms also refer to 
preservation — not ony connected to survival, but also to not suffering harm (even if they do !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62Other than this, Hierocles is also defining !"#$%#&' as an!"#$%#&' pervaded and shaped by an animal's non-indifference 
towards itself.  At the same time, he is saying that an animal's positive non-indifference towards itself is also shaped by 
perception. As we will see later on, this means that an animal's positive non-indifference towards each and every thing is 
connected to its positive non-indifference towards various possible outcomes. 
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not lead to death). One must also note that it is the "vigilante" aspect of #(),M9%#&' and 
,M9%#&' that enables an animal to survive in the face of risks and to avoid those risks that lead 
to death.  
But, as anticipated, this is not all. In fact, an animal's positive non-indifference towards its 
own preservation and survival entails a positive non-indifference towards the things that 
contribute to its own preservation and survival. 
The text refers to what contributes to an animal's own #(),M9%#&' as ",= C8&G<--/) W8V9 
,I' @!(,/A #(),%9M#23'". As to the things that favour an animal's own survival, the text refers 
to them as ",F89='P&!µ/)M)" — it is said to avoid every attack and to strive for 
("µ2E!)Tµ2)/)") its survival (P&!µ/)M), procuring the things that favour its survival 
(",F89='P&!µ/)M)").  
Here one must note that, just as #(),M9%#&' and ,M9%#&' refer to a positive non-
indifference towards oneself and therefore towards what contributes to one's safety or 
preservation (,= C8&G<--/) W8V9 ,I' @!(,/A #(),%9M#23'), so too P&!µ/)M and 
",F89='P&!µ/)M)" refer to a positive non-indifference towards one's own survival and towards 
the things that contribute to it (,F89='P&!µ/)M)).  
And this brings to the table the distributive element of non-indifference stressed above. In 
fact, these examples show that the positive non-indifference that an animal has towards itself 
spreads to the things that are somehow favourable — "89='", "C8&G<--/)" — to it and rubs off 
a positive non-indifference on them (and please note that the text suggests that these 
"favourable" things are external things). Put differently, an animal's positive non-indifference 
towards itself makes it look after itself and strive for its preservation and survival, which in turn 
"distributes" the positive non-indifference the animal has towards itself by everything that 
somehow contributes to its own preservation and survival (creating a form of positive non-
indifference towards external things that stems from its positive non-indifference towards 
itself.) 
After this, Hierocles explains that this positive non-indifference is also present in animals 
that are "µ&19<","2H,2-I" and "20P2E$I". He writes: "P2&)O 7F9 c 4D#&' 1!R ,/;' ,/&/;#P2 #4:) 
!H,:) C),IL!& #4/P9=) `µ29/), ,? ,O) #3,%9*!) +--:' K8/9/) W8<9E2&)."(VII 3-5). Here, the 
text resorts to #3,%9*! to refer to preservation, and associates this with a #4/P9='`µ29/' (n.b.: 
a #4/P9='`µ29/' @!(,/A), which even these despicable animals have for themselves (and 
without which they would not survive). A few lines below, Hierocles also refers to the 
4!),!#*! +)!&9B#23' that makes a baby cry. In his view, a baby cries because it is not fond of 
its own destruction (+)!*92#&'), and it is not fond of it because it has a relationship of /012*3#&' 
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with itself from the very moment of its birth (it is not by chance that the example deals with a 
new-born). In other words, the #4/P9='`µ29/' @!(,/A goes hand in hand with an equally strong 
negative non-indifference towards one's destruction.  
So at stake in this passage is a complex structure I will now try to picture. First of all, there 
is a fundamental tension of positive non-indifference that revolves around the self. Such tension 
is described as a #4/P9='`µ29/' @!(,/A. But despite revolving around oneself, this 
fundamental tension of positive non-indifference towards oneself is not closed within oneself, 
so to speak. It rather entails a positive non-indifference towards one's survival (P&!µ/)M) and 
preservation (#(),M9%#&',,M9%#&', #3,%9*!) and a negative non-indifference towards one's 
death (p-2$9/') and destruction (+)!*92#&'). So the fundamental tension of positive non-
indifference that revolves around the self "distributes" itself throughout two "branches". But it 
is important to note that each of these branches is not simple. On the contrary, just as we have 
already seen, an animal's positive non-indifference towards its survival and preservation 
spreads itself throughout all the things that are perceived as "89='P&!µ/)M)" and towards ",= 
C8&G<--/) W8V9 ,I' @!(,/A #(),%9M#23'". So within the "branch" of positive non-indifference 
towards one's survival and preservation there is: a) positive non-indifference towards one's 
survival and preservation as such and b) positive non-indifference towards what contributes to 
one's survival and preservation. And the same happens within the branch of negative non-
indifference towards one's death (p-2$9/') and destruction (+)!*92#&'): it contains both a) a 
negative non-indifference towards one's death and destruction as such, and b) a negative non-
indifference towards what is perceived as contributing to one's death and destruction. 
So the fundamental tension of positive non-indifference that revolves around the self 
"distributes" itself throughout two "branches" and after that, each of those two "branches" splits 
into two other branches, throughout which the fundamental tension of positive non-indifference 
towards oneself is again distributed. On the one hand, this fundamental positive non-
indifference towards oneself distributes itself as a positive non-indifference towards one's 
survival (P&!µ/)M) and preservation (#(),M9%#&',,M9%#&', #3,%9*!) and towards the things that 
are favourable to one's survival (P&!µ/)M) and preservation. But on the other hand, this same 
fundamental positive non-indifference towards oneself distributes itself as a negative non-
indifference towards one's death (p-2$9/') and destruction (+)!*92#&') and towards what is 
perceived as contributing to one's death and destruction.63 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63I have intentionally overlooked the fact that Hierocles uses these examples to prove that an animal has a positive non-
indifference towards itself and towards its own#D#,!#&'. This is a sensitive point in the discussion about /012*3#&', and 
going into this problem would take more time and space than I have. As far as I can grasp, the main question at stake is 
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After this set of examples, Hierocles says that there is such a superabundance of signs able 
to prove that ",= >?/) /012&/A#$!& @!(,?", that it is even possible to prove this assumption is 
sound on the basis of things contrary to nature ("Ñ/#!D,% P' K9! 829&/(#*! ,21µ%9*3) B#,R ,? 
,= >?/) /012&/A#$!& @!(,?, ~#, ÖP% 1!R +8= ,:) 8!9F 4D#&) QL2#,&) W86µ&µ)M#12&) W7&V' Ü) 
,= +L&/Dµ2)/)" VII 15-17). Then, after a few lost lines, in VII 20, he says that the /012*3#&' 
89=' @!(,/D' gives animals a starting-point ("1!,!9EM)"), thanks to which each animal is 
bearable ("/0#,6'") to itself, even if it is unbearable ("+469%,/'") to others. The goal here is to 
prove that we can endure the most stinking wounds ("]-1%(...) ,F P(#/#µT,!,!"), those that 
are most repulsive to the sight (",F 89=' ,O) p.&) +8%)B#,!,!") and every other unpleasantness 
(",M)K--%)+%P*!)"), if they are our own. According to Hierocles, this happens because the 
unpleasantness is clouded ("C8&#1/,/(µB)%)") by 4&-!(,*!. Thus, Hierocles is describing the 
/012*3#&' 89=' @!(,/D' as a form of 4&-!(,*! that makes us relate to ourselves in such a way 
that we can stand the most disgusting things, provided they are our own. Because of its non-
indifference toward itself, viz of the resulting 4&-!(,*! an animal has, as it were, double 
standards: if the wounds and other unpleasant things belong to others, it cannot endure them, 
but if they are its own, it bears them and looks after them. Once again, this has to do with the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
whether the animal's positive non-indifference towards itself is or is not strictly identified with a positive non-
indifference towards its #D#,!#&', in such a way that the animal's positive interest in itself is just an interest in its 
-F-'0-#. and can only be an interest in its -F-'0-#.. I believe that everything I have written so far clearly gives away my 
position. In fact, at stake in my analysis is precisely an alternative to this view of /012*3#&'89='@!(,6. According to 
Hierocles' text, an animal's positive non-indifference towards itself is a positive non-indifference towards what it 
perceives itself to be, and this happens in a completely "formal" way. The physical #D#,!#&' corresponds to a 
"deformalization" of this in the way expressed by the fundamental equation we referred to in the first section. In fact, 
there is a positive non-indifference towards one's own #D#,!#&' because this #D#,!#&' is perceived as @!(,/A (as one's 
#D#,!#&'). This is where the fundamental equation comes into play: this #D#,!#&' is seen as being equal to oneself 
(@!(,6) and this is why one has a positive non-indifference towards it. Otherwise it would be somebody else's #D#,!#&' 
or nobody's #D#,!#&' (somebody else's or nobody's mouth, somebody else's or nobody's eye, etc.). So that in the final 
analysis everything depends on the pivotal phenomenon owing to which the #D#,!#&' is one's own (not somebody else's 
or nobody's #D#,!#&'). To be sure, a mouth is still a mouth, and an eye is still an eye if it belongs to somebody else. But 
the point is that what is responsible for there being one's own makes a world of difference. And so, even if this pivotal 
phenomenon we are talking about has a "formal" character and needs to be "deformalized", it is anything but 
insignificant. In fact, this is the only way to make any sense out of Hierocles explanation of /012*3#&'.  
Grammatically speaking, there is no reason why one cannot interpret the "1!R" in " /012&/A#$!& @!(,? 1!R ,S @!(,/A 
#(#,<#2& " as having an explicative sense. Cf. Carvalho, Mário Jorge, Wahrnehmung und Selbstreferenz - Der 
Selbstreferentielle Charakter der Wahrnehmung nach Hierokles, in Edmundo Balsemão Pires, Burkhard Nonnenmacher 
and Stefan Büttner-von Stülpnagel (ed.), Relations of the Self, Coimbra University Press, Coimbra, 2010, 109-139, esp. 
129-130. 
Now, if my hypothesis is correct, this means that the above-mentioned distributive aspect of positive non-indifference — 
and also of negative non-indifference — becomes even more complex. For the positive non-indifference towards one's 
own #D#,!#&' already corresponds to a first moment of "distribution" of the fundamental non-indifference towards 
oneself throughout the whole field of what is perceived as being @!(,/A (i.e. everything having the" @!(,/A stamp"). In 
this case, the #D#,!#&' amounts to the composition of the parts @!(,/A. But this also means that — as the structure of 
perception presented in the first section shows — the second moment of distribution of positive and negative non-
indifference towards external things is anchored in this first moment. In other words, this means that the bull's 
perception of the lion's mouth as something hostile  is referent to the bull's positive non-indifference towards itself and 
its different parts (its #D#,!#&' in general), and similarly its perception of hay as something that it can eat and helps itself 
to keep alive and healthy bears the imprint of a positive non-indifference that stems from the bull's positive non-
indifference towards itself and accordingly from the positive non-indifference it has towards its own #D#,!#&'. 
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pivotal role @!(,6 and @!(,/A play in the !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#., for it shows that perception and 
/012*3#&' have double standards as regards what is @!(,/A and what is not @!(,/A. This 
argument is followed by some rather uninviting examples.  
Such examples are followed by one of the most important passages in the !"#$% 
&'(#)*+,-#.. It lasts from VII 44 to VII 49 and binds together #()!*#$%#&' and /012*3#&' by 
saying: "72)B#23' W8V9 ,/A P&!#T>2&) 1!R #(),%92;) @!(,= 89/GI)!& .... ,O) 209%µB)%) 
/012*3#&), 2H$Z' .... N9µM, 1!R ,/A 89=' ,= #3,M9&/) @!(,/A #()!*#$%#*' C#,&) c -2-27µB)% 
/012*3#&'". In this intermittent sentence, Hierocles links most of the fundamental surviving 
pieces and some of the most important concepts in the !"#$%&'(#)*+,-#.. He not only re-
connects N9µM with #()!*#$%#&', but also says that /012*3#&' is equal to a #()!*#$%#&' of that 
which contributes to one's own preservation (89=' ,= #3,M9&/) @!(,/A: "1!R ,/A 89=' ,= 
#3,M9&/) @!(,/A #()!*#$%#*' C#,&) c -2-27µB)% /012*3#&'"). And then, knowing that he has 
already proved that an animal perceives itself from the moment it is born, Hierocles concludes: 
"P&= 4!*)2,!& ,= >?/) [µ! ,S 72)B#2& !0#$<)2#$!* ,2 !W,/A 1!R /012&/A#$!& @!(,? 1!R ,S 
@!(,/A #(#,<#2&" (VII 49-51). 
Given that this passage establishes a fundamental connection between /012*3#&' and 
!"#$%#&', it is not surprising that Hierocles continues his explanation of /012*3#&' by 
explaining ",I'4!),!#*!',=),968/)" (VII 52). Unfortunately, this part of the text is not very 
well preserved and there is not much to be gathered from it. 
Finally, there is an indirect reference to /012*3#&' in the title of column VIII — 
"2H)/%,&1:'@!(,?,=>?/)" — which is dealt with only in column IX, when Hierocles says that 
"1!-2;,!&7F9c/012*3#&'8/--/;'g)6µ!#&)" (IX 4-5). He then divides /012*3#&' into: a) 
/012*3#&' 2H)/%,&1M — /012*3#&' towards oneself, b) /012*3#&' #,291,&1M — /012*3#&' 
towards one's "family" (#(772)&1M), and c) /012*3#&' !á92,&1M — /012*3#&' towards external 
things. After this he specifies that just as we /012&/Dµ2$! towards our descendants 
(",/;',B1)/&'") in a loving way, and towards external things (,/;'B1,='E9Mµ!#&)) in a 
preferential way ("'!á92,&1:'"), so too an animal /012&/A,!&64 towards itself in a well-disposed 
way ("2H)/%,&1:'") and /012&/A,!& towards the things that contribute to the preservation of its 
constitution (",/;' PV 89=' ,M9%#&) ,I' #(#,<#23'") in a preferential way ("C1-21,&1:'") — 
introducing hence another kind of /012*3#&': d) the one an animal has towards the things that 
contribute to the preservation of the #D#,!#&'. 
Regarding this passage, there are three points I would like to stress:  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64This is supposed, although it is not written exlicitly. 
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The first is the fact that Hierocles uses two different types of construction: (E$*+,-#. plus 
an adjective and (E$*#(@-"0# plus adverb. As we will see later on, both these constructions play 
a very important role in Hierocles' account of /012*3#&' and therefore in his final explanation of 
perception. 
The second point has to do with Hierocles' distinction between the various sub-fields of 
/012*3#&'. In fact, the text points to /012*3#&' towards oneself and to /012*3#&' towards what is 
not oneself, such as children (,B1)!) and external things (,F C1,=' E9Mµ!,!). One is dealing 
with the fundamental opposition between @!(,6 and non-@!(,6 explained in the first section. 
But now, this fundamental opposition carries the weight of non-indifference: there is a 
fundamental /012*3#&' towards oneself, and there is also a positive non-indifference towards 
what is not @!(,/A. But this is still not all there is to say on the second point. In fact, besides 
creating two distinct sub-fields of /012*3#&', Hierocles also describes both these fields as being 
multiple and complex (just as in the first section). In fact, within /012*3#&' towards oneself, 
there is an /012*3#&' towards oneself as such — which is 2H)/%,&1M — and there is an 
/012*3#&' towards the #D#,!#&' — which is an /012*3#&' that "works" C1-21,&1:'. In the same 
fashion, within the /012*3#&' towards what is not oneself, there is both an /012*3#&' towards 
children (,B1)!) and relatives — which is described as #,291,&1M — and an /012*3#&' towards 
external things in general (,F C1,=' E9Mµ!,!).   
 One would suppose that children viz. relatives, not being oneself, would belong to the sub-
field of external things, and would therefore fit the description of ,F C1,=' E9Mµ!,!. And one 
would suppose rightly. However, this means that within the sub-field of external things, there 
are different things corresponded to by different kinds of /012*3#&'. And the same applies to the 
sub-field of /012*3#&' 89=' @!(,6: the #D#,!#&' is a #D#,!#&' @!(,/A — it is perceived as 
being equal to oneself, in the sense of the fundamental equation we referred to in the first 
section —, but Hierocles still points out that this #D#,!#&' is not stricto sensu the same as 
@!(,6 (that is why it is often refered to as #D#,!#&' @!(,/A and not as @!(,6). This distinction 
between @!(,6 and #D#,!#&' is the reason why there are two different kinds of /012*3#&' within 
the /012*3#&' 89=' @!(,6 sub-field — (the one described as 2H)/%,&1M and the one that "works" 
C1-21,&1:').65 
Still continuing on this second point, one must also note that Hierocles is not only 
identifying two sub-fields that entail multiple elements, but also suggesting a specific way of 
organizing both the sub-fields and the elements contained therein.  The key point is easier to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 This is one of those passages in Hierocles' text that only makes sense if one separates @!(,6 from #D#,!#&' and 
accordingly if one makes a distinction between /012*3#&' towards oneself and /012*3#&' towards one's #D#,!#&'. 
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grasp if one considers what is at stake in the distinction between ,B1)! or relatives (which are 
external things) and the remaining ,F C1,=' E9Mµ!,!. This distinction is made because one's 
children are closer to one than most external things: Hierocles is trying to point out that my 
positive non-indifference towards a son or a daughter is not quite the same as my positive non-
indifference towards a cousin or an aunt, let alone towards other things such as books and 
furniture and so on. So he is saying that according to different "emotional distances" there are 
different kinds of /012*3#&'. And the same matter of distance is at stake in the distinction 
within the sub-field of /012*3#&' @!(,/A: the closest thing to me is myself, and then there is my 
constitution. This happens in such a way that, if push comes to shove, I can and will sacrifice 
parts of my constitution that risk the safety and well being of myself. 66 Although it is not 
explicitly at stake here, one can assume that even? within one's #D#,!#&' there are parts that are 
perceived as "closer" to me than others, as the examples of the first section show: a bear is 
more concerned with its head than with its paws. (II, 27-31)  
Now this concept of non-indifferent-related "distance" helps us to understand that this 
"distance" is what the distinction between the sub-fields of /012*3#&' towards ,F @!(,/A and 
/012*3#&' towards ,F C1,6' is all about.  Furthermore, within each of these sub-fields there are 
different elements that have different "distances" to @!(,6, and the kind of /012*3#&' that binds 
an animal to each of them will depend on this functional "distance". This means that Hierocles 
is describing a form of "hierarchical distance" to @!(,6, and claiming that both /012*3#&' 
towards what is @!(,/A and /012*3#&' towards what is not @!(,/A will change according to this 
non-indifference-related distance.67 In this sense, all these types of /012*3#&' are self-referential 
(in the above-mentioned sense). 
And this brings us to the third and final point regarding this passage, for this shows that 
/012*3#&' is not a simple and singular phenomenon, but a plural one. Indeed, this passage 
presents /012*3#&' as a constellation: it is directed towards different objects, corresponded to by 
different kinds of /012*3#&'. And the important thing to notice here is that /012*3#&' itself 
changes according to the objects it is directed towards: /012*3#&' towards oneself is not exactly 
the same as /012*3#&' towards one's #D#,!#&', nor is it the same as /012*3#&' towards one's 
children, nor is it the same as /012*3#&' towards other external things. Likewise, an /012*3#&' !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 And here there is the easy example of amputation, which still deals with a physical #D#,!#&' and the safety of the 
remaining #D#,!#&', but there can be more radical examples, like moral examples, in which one  sacrifices one's 
#D#,!#&' because living with it in this world would imply a destruction of the moral @!(,6 a wise man takes himself to 
be. 
67 The structure at stake is in fact far more complicated than this, for it has to deal with the changes this distance goes 
through according to different possibilities and different passive and active E92;!&. We will get back to this problem later 
on. 
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that is directed towards one's #D#,!#&' is not the same as /012*3#&' that is directed towards 
one's children, and so on and so forth. It is this very change in (E$*+,-#. itself that is expressed 
by the syntactic structures of /012*3#&' plus adjective and /012*3#&' plus adverb. The adjectives 
show that /012*3#&' is a different /012*3#&' according to the objects it is directed towards: it is 
2H)/%,&1M in one instance, but #,291,&1M in another, and so on. The adverbs show the different 
ways in which one relates in a positive non-indifferent way to different objects — objects 
corresponded to by different kinds of /012*3#&', as the adjectives show. 
This is the outline of how /012*3#&' is treated in the !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#.. It contains the 
alleged proof of its existence and also some details on how it works. However, just as in the 
first section, it is from Hierocles' examples that one can extract the core of his argumentation.  
 Let us start with the title of column VI and the arguments used to explain it, which come 
from VI 29 onwards. We will start here rather than at the beginning because  the latter does not 
contain any explanation by Hierocles of the meaning of the expression "89:,/) /012;/)". 
Acordingly, in order to see what the result of the first moment of /012*3#&' is, one must first 
grasp what /01263#&' and /012&63 stand for.  
Consequently, the title of column VI says " 20 !0#$!)6µ2)/) @!(,/A E!*92& ,= >?/) 1!& 
/012&/A,!& @!(,?". The first thing to note regarding the meaning of "/012&/A,!&" is that is 
comes associated with "E!*92&". The semantic field of the verb E!*93 is quite wide, but the 
meanings contained in it have what we might call a positive sense. Once again, I will not dwell 
on the philological details. Instead, I would like to focus on the association of "/012&/A,!&" with 
something positive. Hierocles is (rhetorically) asking whether an animal, when it perceives 
itself — which happens as soon as it is born — also E!*92& with itself and /012&/A,!& towards 
itself. By associating these words as he does in this sentence, Hierocles not only suggests that 
they happen at the same time — " !0#$!)6µ2)/) @!(,/A" —, but also that they have a similar 
meaning. 
This suggestion is then confirmed in VI 29. Here, Hierocles envisages what might be 
termed three logical possibilities regarding the first time an animal perceives itself — which is, 
as stated in the first section, at birth, (i.e. at the very moment an animal becomes an animal): 
either it is pleased with the representation it apprehends of itself ("2H!92#,2; ,S 4!),!#*Ç, h) 
@!(,/A 2"-%42)"), or it is displeased ("P(#!92#,2;") or else it remains indifferent ("+9928:' 
"#E2&"). And the first thing I want to make clear regarding these three options is the reason why 
I call them three logical possibilities.  
Part of the reason is very obvious: I say that these are three logical possibilities because 
Hierocles is presenting three possibilities that do not seem to imply any logical contradiction. 
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In fact, these three possibilities appear as three hypotheses that do not pose an obvious 
contradiction: logically, it is possible that an animal — when it receives the first impression of 
itself — is pleased with this impression (4!),!#*!), but it is also possible that it is displeased 
with it, as it is possible that it remains indifferent to such a 4!),!#*!. 
But the other part of this reason is not so obvious. I called these three hypotheses logical in 
order to stress that they are not seen by Hierocles as real possibilities — they are not regarded 
as possibilities de facto. Behind this tri-partition of the possible ways an animal has of 
responding to its 4!),!#*! @!(,/A is a very clear intention: to show that, de facto, there is only 
one possible way for the animal to respond to its own 4!),!#*! — it can only be pleased with 
it. 
In fact, Hierocles' intention is very clear from the outset. Before introducing these three 
possibilities, he concludes that animals perceive themselves from the moment they are born. 
And subsequently he says that, given this conclusion, it is obvious that, since it has, in itself, a 
representation of itself ("4!),!#*!' ,&)6' @!(,/A 72)/µB)%' !H,?"), an animal holds to this 
representation's persuasiveness (,= 8&$!)=) 829R ,I' 4!),!#*!') —"how could it be 
otherwise?" (8:' 7F9 a) K--3' PD)!&,/;) — and assents to it (1!R ,/D,_ #(71!,!,*$2,!&.). The 
fact that an animal assents (#(71!,!,*$2,!&) to the persuasiveness of its representation makes it 
very easy to see what mindset Hierocles has before introducing the three possibilities 
mentioned.  
That Hierocles assumes that de facto there can be only one possibility does not take long to 
surface. After a few lines that are not preserved, the author of the !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#. promptly 
claims that no one —  no matter how stupid he or she may be — could say that an animal is 
displeased with its representation of itself. Hierocles then hurries to explain that an animal 
could not remain indifferent to itself, for that would lead to its destruction. Behind the claim 
that both these possibilities should be excluded is a very specific view of 4D#&'. According to 
this view, 4D#&' could be accused of making efforts in vain (prior to the birth), if an animal 
were not pleased with the representation it has of itself at birth. The reason why such efforts 
would be in vain is simple: if an animal were displeased with itself or indifferent to itself, that 
would lead to its destruction (4B92& 896' ,2 p-2$9/) ,/A >?/(), since, as shown by the 
examples, it would neither avoid ("C11-2;)/)" VI 56) risks nor procure what helps it to stay 
alive (,F 89=' ,= #3,M9&/) @!(,/A/ ,F89='P&!µ/)M)/ ,= C8&G<--/) W8V9 ,I' @!(,/A 
#(),%9M#23'). The corner-stone of this argument is the concept of 4D#&', according to which 
4D#&' cannot make efforts in vain. If it did, that would be a contradiction (a logical one, given 
the concept of 4D#&'). For obvious reasons, I will not explore this concept; neither will I study 
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the cosmological and teleological arguments at stake here. However, I would like to stress that 
Hierocles' argument is an argument in the logical sense of the word: what he is trying to say is 
that, if, given the fact that 4D#&' cannot make efforts in vain, one looks carefully at the three 
possibilities he presents, only one of them ends up not involving a contradiction. This is why 
Hierocles terms this a "#(--/7&#µ6'".68 
But this passage has more to offer than just this. It is true that here the three possibilities at 
stake are connected to the time of birth, and are therefore geared towards what happens when 
an animal has the first representation of itself. Nevertheless, Hierocles never states that this 
tripartite possibility is restricted to the first representation an animal has of itself.  On the 
contrary, despite being connected to this first moment of life by the context, the three 
possibilities in question represent the three different possible ways an animal has of relating to 
the representation it has of itself at any given time. Furthermore, Hierocles does not restrict 
these three possibilities to an animal's representation of itself (4!),!#*! @!(,/A). In other 
words, this passage suggests that these three possible ways of relating to a 4!),!#*! are the 
three ways of dealing with 4!),!#*!& in general, wheter they are @!(,/A or not. Now, this 
means that we need to dig deeper.69 
First of all, one must realize that, having oneself as the object of the 4!),!#*!, these three 
possibilities — "2H!92#,2;)", "P(#!92#,2;)" and "+9928:' "#E2&)" — correspond to a positive 
non-indifference towards oneself, a negative non-indifference towards oneself and to 
indifference towards oneself. In other words: "2H!92#,2;)" corresponds to /012*3#&' towards 
oneself, "P(#!92#,2;)" corresponds to +--/,9*3#&' towards oneself and "+9928:' "#E2&)" 
corresponds to being indifferent towards oneself (having neither /012*3#&' nor +--/,9*3#&' 
towards oneself). 
And the point is that one's relationship with the 4!),!#*! @!(,/A both at birth and at other 
moments in life could in principle take the form of any of these three possibilities: /012*3#&', 
+--/,9*3#&' and being indifferent.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 This is obviously a problematical claim. But my point is simple: Hierocles is trying to say that, if 4D#&' is indeed what 
we (Stoics) take it to be, then, given that she/it arranges the cosmos in a rational way, she/it could not make efforts prior 
to an animal's birth, only to see those efforts wasted by the animal's reaction to its representation of itself (namely by its 
lack of commitment to itself). In order to better understand this argument, one would have to go into the Stoic concept of 
4D#&', which is a path I will not follow here.  
69 Hierocles seems to present these three hypotheses as the only ones possible. However, one could ask him if it was not 
possible for the animal to be pleased with some parts of the representation and displeased with others. According to 
Hierocles’ text, at this first moment, an animal is necessarily pleased with the representation it has of itself, but the text 
does not claim that these possibilities cannot interfere with each other. As we will see, if the object represented is 
multiple and complex (which, as stated in the first section, is always the case, even with @!(,6) it is possible for one to 
be pleased with some aspects of that object and displeased with others or to remain indifferent (in a very specific sense I 
am yet to consider) to others. Nevertheless, whatever the combination of these possibilities may be, it is still a 
combination of these three options.  
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But, secondly, much the same applies to any4!),!#*!  — be it @!(,/A or not. Hierocles’ 
remarks mean that, at any given time, one's relationship with any 4!),!#*! could in principle 
take the form of any of these three possibilities: /012*3#&', +--/,9*3#&' and being indifferent. 
In other words, the three possibilities we are talking about do not hold only for the 4!),!#*! 
@!(,/A (as if we were talking of a particular case). They apply to the 4!),!#*! @!(,/A because 
they are universally valid — because these are the three possibilities of "emotional relation" to 
any given 4!),!#*! (if we were to use a German word here, we would write Überhaupt) 
Having made these two remarks, we can now focus on the complex structure that is being 
portrayed.  
This passage begins by considering these three possibilities an animal has of relating to its 
representation of itself at birth, but it rapidly reduces these three possibilities to only one. As 
pointed out above, Hierocles creates a dichotomy between 2H!92#,2;) and both P(#!92#,2;) 
and +9928:' "#E2&). Only the former urges an animal to seek its own preservation and survival, 
while the latter lead to its destruction. Accordingly, there is what one might term a contraction 
of the three initial possibilities. Either an animal is pleased with itself — which leads to its 
survival —, or it is not pleased with it itself — which can happen both if it is displeased and if 
it is indifferent, but both cases lead to its destruction. Now, since 4D#&', being 4D#&' in the 
Stoics sense, could not create an animal in such a way that it would not be pleased with itself 
and would therefore fail to strive for its own survival and preservation, Hierocles concludes 
that an animal is necessarily pleased with the representation it has of itself and therefore has 
positive non-indifference towards itself.  
My concern is not whether or not this argument based on the concept of 4D#&' is valid. The 
only thing I want to stress is that, from three possibilities, only one remains: as regards the 
representation it has of itself, an animal can only be pleased, which means that towards itself, 
an animal can only have a positive non-indifference.  
But, mutatis mutandis, something similar applies to everything else. Here too, the three 
possibilities we have been talking about — 2H!92#,2;), P(#!92#,2;) and +9928:' "#E2&) — 
provide the basis. As pointed out above, one's relation to any single perception could, in 
principle, be marked by one of the three. But Hierocles' remarks on /*12*3#&' seem to suggest 
a) a contraction owing to which each 4!),!#*! ceases to be open to all three possibilities and b) 
that what is responsible for this is nothing other than one's positive non-indifference towards 
oneself. So that, in the final analysis, all positive non-indifference towards external things, all 
negative non-indifference towards external things and all indifference towards external things 
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are anchored in one's positive non-indifference towards oneself and derived from it. Let us see 
how. 
As antecipated in the introduction to the concept of /012*3#&', Hierocles is saying that an 
animal has a positive non-indifference towards itself from the very outset of its life. Now, 
because it has such a positive non-indifference towards itself, it ends up having a positive non-
indifference towards whatever it takes itself to be (towards whatever is @!(,/A), and also 
towards the things that favour whatever it takes itself to be (that are "896'" whatever it takes 
itself to be, to use a category Hierocles employs). At the same time, because an animal has a 
positive non-indifference towards itself, it has a negative non-indifference (+--/,9*3#&') 
towards the things that are somehow "against" or prejudicial to whatever it takes itself to be; 
and this is why their 4!),!#*! displeases ("P(#!92#,2; ") the animal. Thirdly, those things that 
neither harm nor help an animal are seen as indifferent, precisely because an animal which is 
non-indifferent towards itself identifies them as neither harming nor helping (they are not seen 
in an indifferent way — so to speak —, because they are seen as things that the animal finds 
neither interest in nor revulsion towards).70 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
70 It is very important to make a clear-cut distinction between two different senses of indifference. On the one hand, there 
is a more "radical" sense of the word, which is to be taken as the opposite of non-indifference and incompatible with it. 
This "radical" indifference is a form of "not caring" about anything: it is the indifference of someone to whom being 
burned or eating seafood amounts to the same thing. It is this very indifference that Camus tries to replicate in L' 
Etranger (and fails). The reason why Camus fails in his attempt to replicate a standpoint to which everything amounts to 
the same is precisely what we are talking about. In fact, in order for one to absolutely not care about anything, one would 
have to be absolutely indifferent to oneself, i.e. one would have not to care about oneself. Only then would one be 
indifferent to whatever happens to oneself. But that would ultimately mean that a bull or a lion running towards me 
would not be perceived as dangerous, because in a perspective that is completely indifferent to whatever happens to 
oneself there can be no such thing as danger. Such a radically indifferent perspective would be incompatible with the 
normal categories that shape our perception: things would not be perceived as dangerous or safe, as repulsive or 
attractive, as beautiful or ugly, as mine or not mine, and so on. And the point that Hierocles stresses over and over again 
is that, when we perceive something, we perceive it already as dangerous or safe, as repulsive or attractive, as beautiful 
or ugly, as mine or not mine, and so on (or combinations of these opposites, since one can perceive something as 
simultaneously beautiful and ugly, beautiful and dangerous, for example — but this is still a use of these categories). In 
sum, Hierocles is saying that our perception is intrinsically interested and shaped by that interest — i.e. that the content 
of perception never appears as a pure content, but already shaped by one's positive non-indifference towards oneself. If it 
were not shaped by non-indifference, it would be completely different from what it is. Indeed so much so, that a 
perspective of radical indifference is something we cannot picture. We have no idea as to what can be a perception that 
is not intrinsically interested in what happens to oneself. And this is why Camus fails in his attempt: he is trying to 
construct a point of view that has a radical indifference to everything, but he is forced to do it from a point of view that is 
interested and has no clue as to what such indifference would amount to —the result being that he is forced therefore to 
use categories that can only occur in an interested perspective in order to describe a radically indifferent perspective. 
On the other hand, the indifference we are talking about right now is an "interested indifference", so to speak. Something 
indifferent in this second sense is something that is perceived as affecting oneself neither in a positive nor in a negative 
way. In this sense, something indifferent is something that is perceived within a "diagnosis" — a term used in the first 
section — of the relationship everything has with oneself at any given time. Within this perspective, some things are 
perceived as non-indifferent in a positive sense because the positive non-indifference one has towards oneself makes one 
positively interested in them; others are perceived as non-indifferent in a negative sense because one's positive non-
indifference towards oneself makes one negatively interested in them; and still others are perceived as indifferent 
because the positive non-indifference one has towards oneself makes them neither positive nor negative. For example, 
during a stroll, stones by the side of a trail are perceived as indifferent, precisely because they are out of the way and I 
will neither stumble on them nor have any good use for them. However, if I were a scout in need of fire, these same 
stones would become important, because I could make fire out of them. And if  someone appeared to mug me, I could 
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In order to make this as clear as possible I will try to explain it in more detail. For this 
purpose I will now use the examples. 
1) Probably the most important thing to clarify here is the connection between an animal 
being pleased with the representation it has of itself and it having a positive non-indifference 
towards itself. 
And the first thing to notice is that an animal does not have a positive non-indifference 
towards itself because it is pleased with the representation it has of its #D#,!#&'. Instead, an 
animal is pleased with the representation it has of itself (@!(,6). This means that an animal is 
pleased with what we have termed a formal @!(,6. What Hierocles is really trying to explain is 
that each animal has /012*3#&' towards itself. Indeed, it is pleased with the representation it has 
of itself as itself, even if the representation of its #D#,!#&' is not very flattering. 
But this is where the problems start to arise. And they arise because of a question we dealt 
with in the first section, to wit: what kind of representation does one have of oneself other than 
the representation of one's #D#,!#&'? The (not so) funny thing is that, even after a long time 
explaining that the +),*-%3&' @!(,/A — and therefore the 4!),!#*! @!(,/A — is not a 
perception of a physical thing amongst others, such natural comprehension tends to cling to 
one. The problem is that, when one perceives oneself, because of the fundamental equation 
used in the first section, one perceives oneself as being one's #D#,!#&'. In other words, when 
one perceives oneself, one perceives oneself as the perceptive "content" that corresponds to 
one's #D#,!#&'. In other words, one perceives oneself immediately as whatever bears the " 
@!(,/A  stamp". 
But what these examples are trying to show is that the fundamental non-indifference 
towards oneself is not directly attached to the #D#,!#&' (to whatever bears the " @!(,/A  
stamp"), but to a formal ;0<'?, even if one then perceives this @!(,6 as if it were the #D#,!#&' 
;0<'(@. As the examples show, this "being pleased" is not due to the perceptive "content" of 
one's representation of one's #D#,!#&' (is not due to the perceptum per se). On the contrary, one 
only has a positive non-indifference towards whatever is perceived as one's #D#,!#&' because 
this #D#,!#&' is a #D#,!#&' @!(,/A (and one is pleased with the representation of @!(,6 as 
such). This is why Hierocles says that those animals that are small (µ&19<) and worthless 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
become interested in the stones in a positive way, since I could use them to defend myself against the attacker, or in a 
negative way, if he used them to threaten me. In this sense, this second indifference is a situational indifference, framed 
within a context of fundamental non-indifference towards oneself. 
This kind of indifference is essentially non-indifference-related, for a) it is possible only in a framework of non-
indifference and b) it is essentially related to this or that particular direction of non-indifference. 
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(2H,2-I) are also pleased with the representation they have of themselves.71 On the contrary, 
what shapes an animal’s representation of itself and gives meaning to its "content" (to its 
perceptum per se) is the positive non-indifference that animal has towards itself — and that is 
why a creature that is small and worthless can be pleased with the representation it has of itself. 
72 
To use the expression contained in another set of examples, one's perception of oneself is 
being described as clouded (C8&#1/,/(µB)%)) by one's positive non-indifference towards 
oneself. This term is used in the examples concerning how one can endure horrible wounds if 
they are one's own (if they are perceived as one's own).  However, it can be used here, precisely 
because these examples also prove that one's positive non-indifference towards oneself 
intrinsically shapes perception, for they show that the same wounds are perceived and endured 
in a completely different fashion if they are one's own or not. Both the perception of one's 
wounds and that of another animal's or person's wounds are shaped by one's positive non-
indifference towards oneself: a) one's wounds are perceived as being one's own, and therefore 
one's positive non-indifference towards oneself rubs off on them, b) another animal's or 
person's wounds are defined by not being one's own, and are therefore also defined by their not 
being a direct object of one's positive non-indifference towards oneself, which means they are 
defined by their more distant relation to one's positive non-indifference towards oneself. As 
was said above, the distinction between a) and b) has to do with a non-indifference-related or 
functional distance from the "formal" @!(,6. In other words, my wounds, because they are 
mine, are closer to me than someone else's wounds.73 
2) The second thing to note is that, as this first point suggests, the contraction of the three 
possibilities into one is the very origin of what I have termed the animal's double standard. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71 Of course one can ask: but are they pleased with the representation they have of their own #(#,+#2&'? Do they 
perceive their #(#,+#2&' as being small and worthless? Or is this an outside perspective that perceives them as being 
small and worthless, whereas they perceive themselves differently? The text does not seem to provide a clear answer to 
these questions; at least in this passage. In fact, the description I have made here is obviously one-sided. For the problem 
is that, as we will see, an animal or human can be displeased with the image it has of its #D#,!#&' (as anorexia and other 
related problems show). Nevertheless, one can only be displeased with the representation one has of one's #D#,!#&' if 
one has any interest in the image one has of oneself, and this means that one can only de displeased with one's image — 
and therefore have a negative non-indifference towards one's #D#,!#&' — if one has a positive non-indifference towards 
oneself. Or, better still, one is pleased or displeased with one's #D#,!#&' in a very particular way; and this particular way 
has to do with the fact that one is steeped in positive non-indifference towards oneself. 
72 At stake here is a bigger problem, which I am currently overlooking, to wit: no perceptum per se can be small (µ&19<) 
and worthless (2H,2-I). The real problem is that, when we see things, we see them immediately as small and worthless or 
grand and amazing. In other words: we never see the perceptum per se. It is this that allows different creatures to see the 
same thing as something completely different. It is also this, therefore, that allows an animal to have double standards 
regarding itself and external things. Accordingly, as we will see, the fact that we do not directly with the perceptum per 
se is a fundamental characteristic of our perception.  I will get back to this problem in my final analysis of the structure 
of perception resulting from the !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#.. 
73 And see the example of the circles presented at the end of 2.4): my brother's wounds are closer to me than my cousin's 
wounds, and my cousin's wounds are closer to me than a stranger's wounds, and so on. 
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This notion was used to express that one's own wounds are bearable (/0#,6') because they are 
one's own (@!(,/A), whereas those same wounds — with the same nauseous smell and 
disgusting appearance — would be unbearable (+469%,/') if not one's own. The next lines 
after this (VII 25-27) seem taken out of a medical book (one of those usually accompanied by 
horrible images): they talk about "1!91&)Tµ!,!", "gE$TP2&' C8!)!#,<#2&' #!91:)", 
"µ2-!)*!&", "#%82P6)2'", "1!R -/&8F 89=' p.&) +,298I". Hierocles is clearly trying to portray 
some of the most repelling and repulsive things "89=' p.&)". He does this to stress that even 
such things as these — which make any 4!),!#*! far from 2H!9B#,%#&' — are not enough to 
stop one's positive non-indifference towards oneself. On the contrary, not only are they 
bearable because they are one's own, but they can only be disgusting (being one's own or being 
somebody else's) because one has a positive non-indifference towards oneself. In other words: 
for me to be disgusted with some awful smell or sight, I need to have such a positive non-
indifference towards myself that I do not like it when I see or smell certain things. It is only 
because I have a positive non-indifference towards myself that I can like what I see or dislike 
what I see or be indifferent to what I see.74 And this is the very origin of an animal's double 
standard: for it is this positive non-indifference towards myself that shapes everything I see, 
and makes wounds (or beautiful parts) look completely different if they are mine or not.  
As the examples show, this means that, time-wise, this positive non-indifference towards 
oneself is not only necessary at birth, but it also necessarily lasts throughout the entire length of 
an animal's life. Towards itself, an animal always has a positive non-indifference (although this 
gets a bit more complicated, as we will see shortly) 
3) It is also important to note that the constitution of a /012*3#&' towards oneself entails 
necessarily and at the same time (at birth)— at least as Hierocles puts it — the constitution of a 
positive non-indifference, of a negative non-indifference and of indifference towards the things 
that are not @!(,/A but interfere with what is @!(,/A.. And this brings us to the "second 
contraction" of the initial three possibilities75 and also to the "distributive" aspect of one's 
positive non-indifference towards oneself. 
This "second contraction" can be explained like this:  
It is true that an animal has — from the moment it is born, and because it has a positive 
interest in itself — three possible ways of relating to external things: it can have a positive non-
indifference, a negative non-indifference and it can have indifference (in the sense explained 
above). However, these three possibilities are not "wide open", so to speak. In fact, these three !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 As we see in Seneca's Ep. 121, for example. 
75 This time with regard to the realm outside the +),*-%.&' @!(,/A.
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possibilities are contracted and limited by the animal's positive non-indifference towards itself. 
Because an animal has a positive non-indifference towards itself, there are some things that 
would hardly ever be the object of a positive non-indifference — such as death and starvation, 
and lions trying to hunt one or sharks swimming freely around one — and other things that 
would hardly ever be the object of negative non-indifference (such as air, or food when one is 
hungry, or water when one is thirsty).  This means that an animal's perception of something 
external does not have a 33.3% chance of giving rise to one of these scenarios; and this is so 
because the formula that determines one's relationship with external things can be described 
like this: /012*3#&' towards oneself X /012*3#&' towards something external, or /012*3#&' 
towards oneself X +--/,9*3#&' towards something external, or /012*3#&' towards oneself X 
"+9928:' "#E2&)" regarding something external.  
This not only shows that /012*3#&', +--/,9*3#&' and indifference towards external things 
stem from /012*3#&' towards oneself, but also that they are conditioned by it. And this brings 
one back to the "distributive" aspect of /012*3#&'. 
I have already explained this "distribution" of /012*3#&' towards oneself throughout 
external things. I said that this "distribution" of /012*3#&' towards oneself neither a) stops at the 
frontier of what is @!(,/A, nor b) does it stop at the "distribution" of positive non indiference 
towards external things — since it also "distributes" negative non-indifference (which stems 
from one's positive non-indifference towards oneself). The novelty here consists in the 
introduction of a third possible element, to wit, indifference, which means that this 
"distribution" of /012*3#&' towards oneself does not c) stop in the "distribution" of positive and 
negative non-indiference towards external things. 
But there is still another aspect that needs highlighting: the all-embracing character of this 
"distribution". For indeed what this passage suggests is that every single external thing is either 
seen as positive, or as negative or as indifferent. There are no blind spots of interest in the 
perceptive field: the sub-field of !"#$%#&' @!(,/A is perceived through and through as 
something towards which one has positive non-indifference; and everything perceived in the 
sub-field of +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6' is perceived from the very outset as something worthy of 
positive non-indifference or negative non-indifference or indifference76, depending on each 
thing's relationship with one's positive non-indifference towards oneself. In sum, everything 
one perceives is perceived through the eyes of a positive non-indifference towards oneself.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76 In the essentially non-indifference-related sense I tried to highlight above. 
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4) And yet, this is not all. For this consideration still deals with /012*3#&' towards oneself 
as if this @!(,6 was simple. But, as we have seen, the @!(,6 is complex, and so is /012*3#&' 
towards oneself. Furthermore, this analysis assumes that the /012*3#&' towards the whole 
sphere of @!(,/A can only be positive. However, as the examples show, this is not true. 
This is a core moment in Hierocles' account of /012*3#&', and, for that matter, of any 
attempt to explain /012*3#&'. This is an intricate and arduous problem, which I cannot fully 
explore here77. Still, in what has been said, there are some elements that can help to grasp the 
complexity of one's positive non-indifference towards oneself.  
The first thing to bear in mind is that, as pointed out above, the fundamental and necessary 
positive non-indifference one has towards oneself is directed towards oneself as such. This 
means that one's positive non-indifference towards one's own#D#,!#&' is derived from this 
fundamental positive non-indifference, since it is only directed towards the #D#,!#&' because 
the #D#,!#&' is ;0<'(@. Given that this #D#,!#&' is complex, the positive non-indifference 
towards oneself "passes on" and rubs off on the -F-'0-#. — because this #D#,!#&' is seen as 
equal to oneself (in the sense of what we have termed the fundamental equation). The 
/012*3#&' towards oneself as such is termed "2H)/%,&1M" and the one towards the #D#,!#&' is 
implicitly termed C1-21,&1M.78 These are two distinct types of /012*3#&', and each of them is 
characterized by a certain degree of functional "distance" from the @!(,6. In this scenario, the 
"first distribution" —not in a temporal sense79 — of the fundamental non-indifference towards 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77See/Compare? Attachment 1. 
78What Hierocles says explicitly is that /012*3#&' towards the #D#,!#&' works (nao percebo mas de qualquer forma 
“works” nao soa bem) C1-21,&1:'. 
79  According to Hierocles’ text, the constitution of an animal's positive non-indifference towards itself at birth entails, at 
the same time, a constitution of the respective positive non-indifference towards its constitution — which is more 
complicated than this — and, also at the same time, a constitution of positive non-indifference and negative non-
indifference and indifference towards external things. As one can already grasp, this has to do with the explanation of 
!"$%#&' in the first section: as soon as an animal is born, it perceives both itself and external things. Now, given that both 
perception of oneself and perception of external things are intrinsically shaped by one's positive non-indifference 
towards oneself, this means that, as soon as an animal is born, it is non-indifferent to external things. In other words, this 
means that, as soon as an animal is born and has a positive non-indifference towards itself, it also has, at the same time, a 
positive non-indifference and a negative non-indifference and  indifference towards external things.  
All this means that, at birth, there is already a "first distribution" and a "second distribution". Both of them happen at the 
same time, which is the moment of the constitution of an animal's positive non-indifference towards itself. 
Badalamenti — cf. Badalamenti, Guido, "Ierocle Stoico e il concetto di #()!*#$%#&'", Annali del Dipartimento(confie 
no meu italiano!) di Filosofia 3 (1987), 53-97. — claims that one's positive non-indifference towards oneself has both a 
logical and a temporal precedence.  Regarding the logical priority, my understanding is that, if there were no positive 
non-indifference towards oneself, there could be no non-indifference towards one's constitution or towards external 
things (at least not in the same sense we are talking about). However, it must be made clear that, at least in Hierocles' 
text (although other texts, such as Seneca ep. 121 also point to this), one's positive non-indifference towards oneself 
necessarily entails a non-indifference towards everything one relates to. It can be argued that this positive non-
indifference towards oneself would still exist even if one did not relate to anything. Nevertheless, in this circumstance, 
one's positive non-indifference towards oneself would also be radically different from what it is (i.e. it would be 
radically different from the positive non-indifference towards oneself that the Stoics say one has). Regarding the 
temporal precedence, I think Hierocles' text clearly points out that one's positive non-indifference towards oneself has no 
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oneself consists in its distribution throughout the different elements that are @!(,/A (throughout 
the #D#,!#&' @!(,/A). This "first distribution" then generates a positive non-indifference 
towards all these elements, even if this positive non-indifference varies in degree/quality, in 
accordance with each of these element's distance from @!(,6 ( so that one can speak of a kind 
of hierarchy). 
This is the sum of what I have explained so far. However, this is a very incomplete picture. 
In fact, it leaves out several decisive elements. One of them consists in the fact that this "first 
distribution" does not stop at the distribution of positive non-indifference. A second consists in 
the complexity of the hierarchical and self-referential character of /012*3#&', which has to do 
with the notion of "functional distance".  A third consists in the role of possibility introduced by 
#(),M9%#&' and ,M9%#&'. And yet a fourth deals with the relationship between this re-
discovered "first distribution" and the already explained "second distribution" (the one related 
to external things). 
To better understand how these elements come into play, let us consider the example of 
wounds, and also the examples of the deer, the beaver and the bear (which were used in the first 
section). 
The first example we can consider is the one regarding the deer, for it helps to explain how 
one can have +--/,9*3#&' towards one's own #D#,!#&'. In fact, a deer is said to 
scorn/despise/look down upon (1!,B7)312)) its horns. Now, a deer's horns are its own horns — 
are ;0<'(@ — and are certainly a part of its own #D#,!#&'. Nevertheless, a deer is said to have 
something that can be described as a negative non-indifference towards them, since it scorns 
them. But, at the same time, it is said to trust (8&#,2D2&)) its legs (which shows that it has 
/012*3#&' towards them). Thus, this example portrays an animal that has different forms of non-
indifference towards its different parts: towards some it has a positive non-indifference, and 
towards others it can have negative non-indifference.  
Now, if we consider why a deer should have /012*3#&' towards its legs and a mild80 
+--/,9*3#&' towards its horns, we go back to the necessity of escaping danger and respective 
E92*!, as pointed out in the first section. This animal perceives its legs as something positive 
because they help it escape danger; and it perceives its horns as something negative because 
they hinder it from escaping danger. And now one has the necessary elements to see that this !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
temporal precedence, since it necessarily entails, at the same time, a non-indifference towards one's #D#,!#&' and 
towards external things. 
80 As we will see, just as there are different levels and different intensities of /012*3#&', so too there are different levels 
and different intensities of +--/,9*3#&'. In fact, it is not hard to grasp that one's positive and negative non-indifference 
towards different things (or different parts of the same thing) varies within a considerably broad  range of intensity. 
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E92*! is connected to a deer's positive non-indifference towards itself, for it is only because a 
deer is non-indifferent towards itself in a positive way that it feels the need to escape danger.81 
This connection leads us back to the semantic field of #(),M9%#&' and ,M9%#&' and to the role 
possibility plays in it. Linking the elements from the first and second sections will lead to a 
better comprehension of why the animal has a positive non- indifference towards some of its 
parts and a negative non-indifference towards others (i.e. linking these elements will help in 
understanding how the "first distribution" works). 
As pointed out above, the meanings of #(),M9%#&' and ,M9%#&' are connected to a sense of 
vigilance, i.e. to anticipating things that can happen to one and anticipating one's reponse to 
them. It is easy to grasp that this sense is connected to the possible active and passive E92;!& 
mentioned in the first section.82 There, it was said that a deer does not perceive its legs as 
helpful for running and escaping only when it is escaping; neither does it perceive its horns as a 
hindrance only at the very moment it is urgent to flee. On the contrary, it perceives its legs as 
useful for running even when it is standing still, just as it perceives its horns as a hindrance 
even when it is not running away from anything. And this is precisely what anticipating means. 
Now we understand that an animal's perception anticipates possible passive and active E92;!& 
because it is non-indifferent to whatever happens to itself. Or, to put it in a more precise way: 
we understand that an animal’s perception is intrinsically defined by the positive non-
indifference it has towards itself. 
As we have also seen, the meaning of #(),M9%#&' and ,M9%#&' has to with this vigilance 
and anticipation, and also with preservation. In fact, one could even say that an animal's yearn 
for preservation is what drives it to anticipate what might happen to itself. In this sense, the 
vigilance at stake is a vigilance exclusively geared towards survival and preservation. This is 
indeed the main focus of most examples used by Hierocles, and we have seen that /012*3#&' 
appears strongly connected to preservation and survival. The connection is so strong that at 
times it seems that /012*3#&' has to do exclusively with them. However, as pointed out above, 
this is a limited view of one's positive non-indifference towards oneself. In truth, one's positive 
non-indifference towards oneself seems to go beyond striving for survival.83 As was said !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
81And, as we shall see, it is only because a deer is non-indifferent towards itself that it perceives something as dangerous 
in the first place. 
82 In fact, this vigilance, taken in a strictly defensive sense, is an example or instance of such E92;!&. But if taken in a 
broader sense, which is the one it ultimately gains in Hierocles’ examples, this vigilance is precisely what is at stake in 
the possible passive and active E92;!&: a form of looking after oneself that is characterized by anticipating what can 
happen to oneself in connection with an external environment (829&BE/)) that acts upon one, but upon which one can 
also act. 
83 This is a very complicated point. In fact, Hierocles' arguments focus mostly on survival, but this does not mean that 
one’s positive non-indifference is only survival-related. In the case of adult humans, this problem is easier to solve. 
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above, this positive non-indifference towards oneself is always active, i.e. it is the constant way 
an animal has of relating to itself — and, luckily, an animal's life is not just a question of 
survival, at least not directly.84 And even if it turns out to be, there are many active and passive 
E92;!& connected to surviving, such as drinking when thirsty and eating when hungry, but also 
walking to get water or food. This means that, even if all an animal's E92;!& ultimately amount 
to an indirect vigilance and anticipation in order to prevent its death or destruction, nevertheless 
the animal's constant non-indifference towards itself leads it to anticipate much more than 
harms and perils: it leads it to anticipate the possibility of drinking, eating, walking, running 
and many other not so obvious things.  
Now this brings us precisely to an animal's "distribution" of positive and negative non-
indifference towards its own #D#,!#&' (which I termed the "first distribution"). It is easy to see 
that an animal perceives its #D#,!#&' as a complex #D#,!#&'. And the point is that not all 
elements of such #D#,!#&' are always helpful in every possible E92*!. If we now return to the 
example of a deer, we see that its horns are a hindrance when it comes to escape, and this 
makes it look down on them — which corresponds to a negative non-indifference towards its 
horns. But in the final analysis, the latter stems from the deer's positive non-indifference 
towards itself. As we saw in the first section, this leads the deer to shatter the horns' oversized 
parts. As we also saw, the reason why it only shatters the oversized parts is very significant, 
since it has to do with an anticipation of its future use fro them: the deer perceives it might have 
a future use for them (for example when it has to face an aggressor and has nowhere to run). It 
is this anticipatory element in the deer's perception of its horns that leads it not to shatter the 
horns entirely. And this in turn shows a positive non-indifference towards the part of the horns 
that is not oversized. But the fact is that the latter stems from the very same positive non-
indifference towards itself that leads the deer to have a negative non-indifference towards the 
oversized parts of its horns.  
So, in the example of a deer, we see that this animal has a positive non-indifference 
towards its legs, a positive non-indifference towards the not-oversized part of its horns and a 
negative non-indifference towards the oversized parts of its horns (showing thus that there can 
be positive non-indifference and negative non-indifference towards different parts of the same 
#D#,!#&' component). We also recognize that this "distribution" of the deer's positive non-
indifference towards itself throughout its own #D#,!#&' is connected to an anticipation of — !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
However, Hierocles' examples do not focus on adult humans. One would have to consider, for example, whether a 
mother's care for her cubs could  be described as a form of striving for her survival.  
84 Compare with the previous note. One would have to explain how an animal's reproductive instincts are connected to 
its survival 
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passive and active — possible E92;!&. As seen in the first section, this leads us to think that an 
animal's "distribution" of non-indifference throughout its #D#,!#&' will vary according to the 
circumstance this animal is in: if a deer is running to escape, it has a positive non-indifference 
towards its legs and a negative non-indifference towards the excess of its horns, but if it is 
trapped with nowhere to run it will have a positive non-indifference towards those same horns 
it despised a few seconds ago. This change has to do with the deer's perception of external 
things, since it is the perception of a different 829&BE/) that makes the deer anticipate a 
different E92*!, which, connected with the deer's perception of its horns as being useful for its 
defence, makes it have a positive non-indifference towards its horns.  
We shall soon see that the picture gets a bit more complicated than this. Still, this helps to 
clarify that this "first distribution" — the "distribution" of an animal's positive non-indifference 
towards itself throughout its own #D#,!#&' — does not take place once and for all; it does not 
happen at birth and remain unchanged thereon; it is rather always happening and changing 
according to whatever the animal perceives as its 829&BE/). Just as in the first section, 
perception of one's own #D#,!#&' is intrinsically connected to perception of ,F C1,6', and a 
change in either of them affects the other. 
Let us now move on to the example of the beaver, which helps us to better understand all 
that was said about the deer and at the same time calls our attention to other important aspects 
of this "first distribution". 
A beaver is said to cut off its own testicles with its teeth, if it is being pursued and if it 
senses it will not escape intact. The text says that this animal is not unaware that  ("µ%P' (...) 
+7)/2;)" III 12) it is being hunted because of its testicles; and this is why it cuts them off in 
order to end persecution and escape alive. This passage thus shows a form of +--/,9*3#&' 
towards some of its own parts, a form of +--/,9*3#&' that only happens when it is being 
pursued. Now, unlike the deer, that shatters the oversized parts of its horns when it sees an 
outcropping rock — because perception of those oversized parts is connected to them hindering 
a still possible escape —, a beaver does not cut off its testicles unless it is being pursued and 
senses it will not escape without doing this. So, unlike the deer, it seems that a beaver would 
rather not cut off its testicles unless it is really forced to, even when it is being pursued. And 
this shows that a beaver has a positive non-indifference towards its testicles. The question now 
is whether the positive non-indifference a beaver has towards its testicles gets transformed into 
a negative non-indifference when it perceives it is not going to escape unless it cuts them off, or 
if it has some kind of "mixed feelings" regarding these specific parts, combining both a positive 
non-indifference and a negative non-indifference towards these same parts, in which case the 
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latter "wins" and makes the beaver cut off its testicles. In other words, the question is whether 
an animal can have both a positive and a negative non-indifference towards the same part of its 
own #D#,!#&' at the same time. 
According to Hierocles’ text, it seems that a beaver is reluctant to cut off its testicles, and 
this would point to it having both a positive and a negative non-indifference towards them at 
the same time. However, ultimately, this passage does not give away if this really is the case, or 
if the beaver just begins to have a negative non-indifference towards its testicles when it 
perceives it is not going to escape. Nevertheless, the previous considerations allow one to make 
an educated guess. 
Bearing in mind that the animal's perception of each of its parts anticipates a possible 
future use, the reason why a beaver would like to hold on to its testicles seems very obvious: it 
perceives they could be used in the future — for something towards which the beaver has a 
positive non-indifference —, and therefore the animal would like to keep them. If I had an 
infected foot and needed to cut it off so that the infection would not spread and contaminate my 
whole leg or whole body, I would resist such amputation until it was absolutely necessary, for I 
would perceive that the foot plays an important role in several things I like to do. At the same 
time, the foot would also be perceived as the source of something that could kill me (or at least 
harm me), and that would make it a source of something towards which I have a negative non-
indifference, and would therefore make the foot something towards which I would have a 
negative non-indifference. The same applies to a beaver, for, if the description made so far is 
correct, when it cuts off its testicles it is also cutting off the possible E92;!& that it perceives 
intrinsically associated with them. Given that the beaver has a positive non-indifference 
towards these possible E92;!&, which are intrinsically associated with these parts, it must have 
that positive non-indifference towards these specific parts even when it is being pursued 
because of them. This would explain why it resists cutting off its testicles as long as it can. 
However, because a beaver perceives that its testicles are also the reason why it is being 
hunted, they are also perceived as the source of something towards which it has a negative non-
indifference, and this makes the beaver have a negative non-indifference towards them.85 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
85 Once again, there are several problems at stake here, and to discuss them all is beyond the scope of this study. One of 
them is the following: this would mean that, just as the beaver perceives the use of its testicles for future activities when 
it is being hunted, it must also perceive them as a possible cause for it being hunted in the future. In this case, it would 
mean that the beaver has some kind of negative non-indifference towards its testicles even when it is not being hunted 
because of them. Another example of this regards a current approach to cancer; for this explanation implies that, when I 
perceive some part of my body as being capable of having cancer, I should have a negative non-indifference towards it, 
even when it does not have cancer. That this can indeed happen is shown by recent cases of preventive organ removal 
(i.e. of organ removal without there being any cancer in the organs, only the possibility of there being one in the future). 
But what does this contribute to an explanation of perception? As we will see, this does help to explain perception: for it 
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According to this description, a beaver also has a negative non-indifference towards its testicles 
starting at least from the moment it began being hunted for their sake, which is coupled with a 
positive non-indifference towards them. The relationship between these two opposite forms of 
non-indifference could be described as a force field. At one point one force is stronger than the 
other, and this corresponds to the animal running and trying to escape intact, while at a certain 
point the negative non-indifference overpowers the positive non-indifference and makes the 
animal cut off its testicles in order to escape alive.  
My point is not to prove that this is a good account of animal behaviour. On the contrary, I 
am just trying to reconstruct the structure of perception that Hierocles had in mind when using 
this example. Whether or not this is a valid account of animal behaviour, if my take on 
Hierocles’ structure of perception is correct, this further complicates the problem of the "first 
distribution". In fact, we are now dealing with an increasingly complex "distribution" of one's 
fundamental positive non-indifference towards oneself throughout one's #D#,!#&'. An animal 
can, at the same time, have both a positive and a negative non-indifference towards all of its 
parts. This relationship between the positive and negative non-indifference within each part can 
be described as a force field. 
 But one still cannot grasp how positive and negative non-indifference between different 
parts is articulated and distributed.  
For this purpose, we can go back to the example of the bear. The fact that this animal — 
when being beaten with sticks — uses its paws to protect its head gives us some information on 
the problem we have in hand. Just as in the first section, at stake here are two hierarchies, 
which can now be explained with the decisive component of non-indifference.  
Both hierarchies are connected to a bear's positive non-indifference towards itself.  There is 
a relatively more fixed one that identifies which parts are more important to a bear's 
preservation and survival, whatever the external situation might be. But then there is a more 
circumstantial hierarchy that is connected to the specific E92*! it is dealing with at any given 
moment. In this example of the bear, combined with the previous examples, we can see a little 
bit of both these hierarchies.  
The first is shown by a bear's concern with its head. It is true that a bear only protects its 
head because it is being beaten with sticks, but this still evinces that that is the most important 
part to protect. And this is so because a bear perceives its head as a fundamental part, without !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
shows that perception is continuously "hiding" some possibilities and highlighting others, while both the hidden and the 
highlighted ones intrinsically define what is perceived. One's positive non-indifference towards oneself will also be 
"distributed" throughout one's different parts in accordance with what one perceives as important at each and every 
moment, and this is defined in connection with perception. 
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which it would not be able to (literally) perform any future task. This means that a bear 
perceives its head as being a constantly important part in whatever E92*! it might have to deal 
with. So this does not exclude the role of possibility in a bear’s perception of its head: on the 
contrary, it is only because a bear perceives its head as being a fundamental part in whatever 
future might occur that its head is at the top of its concerns. Accordingly, a bear perceives that, 
if its head were severely damaged, this would lead to its death, and, since it has a positive non-
indifference towards itself that repels death86 and its head is a fundamental part in it staying 
alive, this makes it have a positive non-indifference towards its head at all times.  
Now, although this passage does not mention any such hierarchy of positive non-
indifference, combining this example with that of the beaver enables us to see that what 
Hierocles has in mind is something along these lines. Indeed, the beaver example shows that 
some parts are more expendable than others, despite an animal's positive non-indifference 
towards them. If hunters were chasing the beaver for its head, the animal would not cut it off to 
end the chase, nor would it rip its own heart out if they were chasing it for the sake of its heart. 
Maybe it might cut off one of its paws if that were the reason for it being hunted... We do not 
know. A bear does not sacrifice its paws because it does not like them, but because its positive 
non-indifference towards them is weaker than the one towards its head. And this is something 
we can come to understand without much effort: some parts are easier to sacrifice than others. 
If my appendix were infected and needed to be removed, I would probably be less worried than 
if my bowl or pancreas were infected and needed to be removed (and I would not even consider 
removing my brain or heart if they were infected). 
Still, assuming that there is a kind of rank between different parts, identifying which parts 
are expendable and which need to be preserved in each situation is also a matter of identifying 
which are the ones necessary for present and future E92;!&. If one focuses on the present E92*! 
an animal is at each moment dealing with, this brings us to a second hierarchy. This is the one 
that varies according to the circumstance the animal finds itself in. When a bear is being beaten 
with sticks, it uses its paws to bear the burden for its head, not only because it perceives the 
former to be less important than the latter, but also because it perceives its paws to be the most 
suitable part for protecting its head (more than its feet, for example, since these are not close to 
its head). A beaver cuts off its testicles because it is being hunted for their sake, but also 
because it does not need them to survive and escape (perhaps it would not cut off its feet so 
readily...). A deer values its legs because they help it to escape, but, if it were trapped, it would !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
86This makes it have a negative non-indifference towards death. 
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take a bite to a leg rather than a bite to the neck, and a bite to the tail rather than a bite to a leg. 
Now this means that the positive non-indifference an animal has towards each of its parts 
changes according to the circumstance it is in: at one time its positive non-indifference towards 
itself leads it to be more interested in some parts than others; and at another time it leads it to be 
more interested in other parts. But this circumstantial hierarchy is always in connection with 
the more stable hierarchy, even if this second one is silent, so to speak. For example, if a deer is 
drinking water with no one around, it is not worried about the safety of its head, but this does 
not mean that its head becomes unimportant; it just means that the deer perceives that there is 
nothing around it currently that is able to harm its head.  Indeed, if a predator came along, the 
deer would dramatically change its focus, and its underlying concern for the safety of its head 
would quickly surface. 
But this circumstantial hierarchy also varies in another way: if a bear needs to catch a 
salmon, its paws are very important, and its positive non-indifference towards them increases. 
If a deer is trapped, its positive non-indifference towards its horns increases, to such a point that 
these horns become more important than its legs. If a beaver happens to be mating with a 
female, its positive non-indifference towards its testicles will be greater than when it is running 
away from poachers.  
So we are dealing with two different hierarchies of positive non-indifference towards one's 
#D#,!#&'. Both of them derive from one's positive non-indifference towards oneself.  
However, as the examples also show, one's positive non-indifference towards oneself can 
also give rise to negative non-indifference towards some parts of one's #D#,!#&'. To explain 
how there is also a ranking of negative non-indifference towards one's #D#,!#&', we can 
consider the example of wounds. After this I will try to link together these two hierarchies and 
explain their connection to external things, and accordingly to positive non-indifference, 
negative non-indifference and indifference towards external things. 
Now, just as in the beaver example, so too wounds show both a positive non-indifference 
and a negative non-indifference towards the same part of one's #D#,!#&'. In fact, when 
Hierocles describes wounds as stinking ("P(#/#µT,!,!") and being repulsive to the eyes 
("89=' ,O) p.&) +8%)B#,!,!"), he is describing a form of negative non-indifference towards 
something that is seen as part of one's #D#,!#&'. One’s wounds are one’s wounds — they are 
@!(,/A. However, one has a negative non-indifference towards them, because they are seen as 
something harmful. Nevertheless, they are bearable, for they are one's own, and one needs to 
look after them in order for one's health to be restored. One has positive non-indifference 
towards one's wounds, for otherwise they would be unbearable; however, one has negative non-
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indifference towards them, as otherwise one would not need to endure them. The point is that 
one endures them in anticipation of their healing, and, because one has a positive non-
indifference towards one's own health and wellbeing, one strives to recover. At the same time, 
precisely because one's positive non-indifference towards oneself entails a positive non-
indifference towards one's health, it also entails a negative non-indifference towards one's 
illness and accordingly towards one's wounds. Once again, both forms of non-indifference 
seem to co-exist and to battle each other. The tie-breaker between them seems to be the 
anticipation of the future: if the wound is going to heal and not lead to one's death, one's 
positive non-indifference seems to surpass one's negative non-indifference. However, if one 
perceives one’s wound as something that will infect and contaminate the whole body, the 
negative non-indifference overpowers the positive non-indifference and the wound (and 
everything contaminated by it) becomes something towards which there is more negative non-
indifference than positive non-indifference (and more drastic measures are required). 
But the relationship between positive and negative non-indifference is a gradual one, 
which can cover a wide range of both positive and negative non-indifference and of a complex 
array of relationships between the two. This range varies depending on how threatening a 
wound is to an animal's life, but also depending on how it affects the activity at stake at each 
moment.  
A wound in one's head is generally a bad thing, but it is worse if it is a deep cut or a 
concussion than if it is a scratch. And even if the wound amounts to a superficial cut, it is not 
equally bad if it is a cut to the forehead or a cut to the eye. Likewise, a deep cut to a hand is 
bad, but a deep cut to the neck is far worse. Conversely, a superficial scratch to the neck can be 
something one hardly notices, whereas a superficial cut to the tip of one's finger can be a very 
uncomfortable thing if one is writing a thesis on a computer keyboard.  Once again, we are 
dealing with two different kinds of hierarchies: one that has to do with the importance of the 
parts involved, and another one that is connected to the situation one is in. But now, instead of 
ranking a positive non-indifference towards such parts, one is ranking the negative non-
indifference towards wounds that affect each of those parts. It is not hard to guess that the ranks 
of positive and negative non-indifference are intrinsically connected: a wound in a part for 
which I strongly care will be a wound towards which I will have a strong negative non-
indifference, whereas a wound in a less vital part will not be the object of the same kind of 
strong negative non-indifference. However, if this less vital part plays an important role in the 
activity I am currently embarked on, a wound that incapacitates it will become a strong focus of 
negative non-indifference. For example: a broken foot is always a bad thing; but it is bad to 
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different degrees if I usually sit down all day or if I am a professional athlete or, for that matter, 
a soldier on a battlefield. So, just as /012*3#&' changes depending on the object it is directed 
towards, so too does +--/,9*3#&'.87 
Once again, the problem is one of functional "distance" from the @!(,6. This functional 
"distance" was explained above in connection with the different kinds of /012*3#&'. It was said 
that this positive non-indifference varies according to the functional distance from the @!(,6: 
things closer to @!(,6 are usually the object of a stronger positive non-indifference — and the 
further away things are, the weaker the positive non-indifference towards them. This happens 
both within the realm of what is @!(,/A and within the realm of what is not @!(,/A. And now 
we see that the same applies to one's negative non-indifference: the closer something negative 
is to one, the stronger one's negative non-indifference towards it; and the further away it is, the 
weaker the negative non-indifference. A cut to one's eye is a really bad thing; but a cut to one's 
finger is not so bad. A cut to a friend's eye is also a really bad thing; but one's negative non-
indifference towards it will be weaker than if it were a similar cut to one's own eye. And if a 
stranger gets cut in the eye, one's negative non-indifference towards it (if there is any, and not 
just indifference) would be weaker than if that cut happened to a friend.  
And the same applies to a circumstantial negative non-indifference: a cut to the index 
finger is bad in just about any situation; but it is worse if I am a carpenter and make a living 
working with my hands than if I am a football player; and it is worse if I am a soldier in a gun 
fight than if I am a carpenter. Fernando Alonso — the F1 driver — has a policy insuring his 
thumbs for 20 million euros, precisely because he would not be able to drive an F1 car without 
them. Losing a thumb for him is not quite the same as losing a thumb is for me. And the same 
thing happens as regards one's negative non-indifference towards external things: one's 
negative non-indifference towards a bull running in one's direction is stronger if it is 100 metres 
away than if it is 500 metres away.  However, if one is dealing with a domesticated cow, one 
can touch it without any negative non-indifference (or even with some positive non-
indifference). If one faces the "spitting asp" Hierocles talks about, one's negative non-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
87 At stake here there is a very important problem , for which Hierocles' text does not provide any answer, to wit, the 
depth of the anticipation involved in each circumstance. We could term it the depth of the "/y])21!" structure. For 
example, it is worse to have a broken foot on a battlefield because it means it is harder for one to move and therefore to 
survive. It is worse for an athlete because his job, his pay-check and probably his passion for what he does are impeded 
by its injury. If one were to look at the various links that make these forms of positive and negative non-indifference 
vary, one would find a structure much more complex than portrayed here. This is especially true in the case of human 
perception (of a perception shaped by -67/'), but it also holds good for animal perception. In fact, the complex 
articulation of an animal's positive and negative non-indifference towards each and every part @!(,/A and towards each 
and every external thing could be described as a form of a functional non-indifference "])21!@!(,/A". On the one hand, 
this is precisely what I am trying to portray. On the other hand, a complete analysis of this "])21!@!(,/A"-structure 
would require elements that are not present in Hierocles' text. Such a discussion would go beyond the scope of this 
study. 
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indifference towards it is at its peak when one perceives oneself within the reach of its spit; 
however, if one faces a normal asp, one's negative non-indifference towards it will increase 
once it comes within biting distance. As was said, it is a matter of distance, of functional 
distance. Indeed, what counts is to what extent something is likely or able to hurt oneself, and 
this is why it makes sense to speak of functional distance. On a battlefield, one's negative non-
indifference towards an enemy sniper — whom one knows to be hidden some 1000 metres 
away — can be far greater than one's negative non-indifference towards an enemy who lacks 
aim and is only 50 metres away.  
Once again, perception is shaped by a sort of non-indifferent anticipation. One's positive 
and negative non-indifference towards what is @!(,/A and towards what is not @!(,/A is 
defined by one's perception of such things as being more or less influential in one's life (both at 
the moment and in the future). And this already shows that, just as animal and human 
perception is intrinsically a non-indifferent perception — since it already perceives things as 
being located in what might be termed the "functional map" of non-indifference —, so too 
animal and human non-indifference is shaped by perception. Indeed, this positive non-
indifference an animal or human has towards itself is immediately and necessarily 
"deformalized" into non-indifference towards a) what the animal or human perceives as @!(,/A 
and b) towards what the animal or human perceives as not @!(,/A. 
Now, all these considerations serve to show two distinct things: a) At the end of the day, 
the "double standard" we talked about turns out to be more complex, for each of the above 
mentioned "two standards" stands in turn for a variety of perspectives; b) the "second 
distribution" —the "distribution" of one's positive non-indifference towards oneself throughout 
external things — is intrinsically connected to the first.  
Let us take a closer look into these questions. 
When I introduced the notion of "double standard", it was used precisely to describe how 
one can endure one's wounds better than another person's wounds — in the sense that one can 
stand their nauseating smell and disgusting appearance more easily. Consequently, the double 
standard had to do with one's positive non-indifference towards oneself and towards one's 
#D#,!#&', which made one's own wounds closer to oneself than another person's wounds — 
and this was the reason why one could stand their smell and their repellent appearance with less 
difficulty. However, it is easy to see that this description of the "double standard" was utterly 
incomplete and, ironically, one-sided. In fact, this example focuses on one's ease in standing the 
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smell and the appearance, but not on one's ease in standing the pain.88 But, as one can 
immediately grasp, one's negative non-indifference towards the pain a wound causes is greater 
if that wound is one's own than if it affects a friend; and one becomes even less affected, if the 
wound in question causes pain to a stranger. And, what is more, the stronger negative non-
indifference towards oneself can vary: it is connected and proportional to the degree of one's 
positive non-indifference towards the part of one's #D#,!#&' affected by the wound in question. 
And if one thinks of a mere pimple, one realises that a pimple on one's face is the object of 
a greater negative non-indifference than a pimple on somebody else's face. But the negative 
non-indifference towards a pimple on one's face varies depending on whether one is going on a 
date or planning to spend the night at home alone.89 A teenager at the Romeo stage will 
consider a big pimple on the tip of his nose something serious, and would trade it for a wound 
to his arm, provided it impressed the ladies. On the contrary, a man who is out in the wild 
hunting for food (instead of ladies) will not bother with a pimple, but he would be very 
concerned with a wound to his arm, since he would perceive it as uncomfortable, a hindrance to 
hunting and a likely source of infection.  
So there is indeed a different standard for what is @!(,/A and for what is not @!(,/A. 
Nonetheless, there is both a positive and a negative non-indifference towards what is @!(,/A 
and towards what is not @!(,/A, which both vary according to the functional "distance" from 
@!(,6. Furthermore, within one's positive non-indifference towards what is @!(,/A, there are 
many difference intensities, and proportionally there is a wide range of negative non-
indifference towards what is @!(,/A. And the same applies to both the positive and the negative 
non-indifference towards what is not @!(,/A. On top of this, all these complex hierarchies of 
positive and negative non-indifference towards what is @!(,/A and what is not @!(,/A vary 
according to the specific circumstance one finds oneself in. This means that, within both realms 
of what I termed a "double standard" there are various perspectives. Indeed, within the realm of 
@!(,/A, there are as many perspectives as there are degrees of /012*3#&', of +--/,9*3#&', and 
of connections between the two towards what is perceived as @!(,/A. Whithin the realm of 
what is not @!(,/A, there are as many perspectives as there are degrees of /012*3#&', of 
+--/,9*3#&', and of connections between the two towards what is perceived as not being !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
88 It is not hard to understand why Hierocles avoids this side of the argument, since it would lead him to a long debate 
with the Epicurean doctrine and to an extensive distinction between positive non-indifference and pleasure and between 
negative non-indifference and pain. As stated at the beginning of this section, this is a problem that I only marginally 
consider here. 
89This problem can turn out to be a bit more complicated, since a pimple might affect one's self-image, which in turn 
might affect one even if one is home alone. However, all I wanted to stress was the importance of the specific situation 
at stake in each and every moment; this was the purpose of the example. 
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@!(,/A. However, the various degrees of /012*3#&', of +--/,9*3#&', and of connections 
between the two towards what is perceived as not being @!(,/A vary in their functional 
relationship with the various degrees of /012*3#&', of +--/,9*3#&', and of connections between 
the two towards what is perceived as @!(,/A. And  the various degrees of /012*3#&', of 
+--/,9*3#&', and of connections between the two towards what is perceived as @!(,/A vary 
according to their distance from the central and formal @!(,6. 
And — contrary to what one might expect after reading Hierocles' examples — I would 
also like to emphasize once again that, even within the realm of what is @!(,/A, it is not 
necessary that a proximity to @!(,6 generates /012*3#&' (or diminishes +--/,9*3#&'). In fact, 
the opposite might happen: i.e. that, the closer something is to @!(,6, the more +--/,9*3#&' it 
generates. Ultimately, if one takes a close look at the example of the wound (for instance), it is 
hard to determine what generates /012*3#&' or +--/,9*3#&'. Be that as it may, my decisive 
point is that the cornerstone upon which all non-indifference is built is the fundamental 
/012*3#&' towards a "formal" @!(,6. All non-indifference derives from it and is at all times 
defined in connection to it.  
Now, all that has been said also helps us get a glimpse into how one's positive and negative 
non-indifference towards one's #D#,!#&' articulates with one's positive and negative non-
indifference towards external things. In other words, it helps to articulate the "first distribution" 
and the "second distribution" of one's fundamental positive non-indifference towards oneself. 
These examples show a complex connection between perception of oneself and perception 
of external things. Both perception of oneself and perception of external things are non-
indifferent to the functional "distance" of each perceptum from @!(,6. One's perception of a big 
pimple on the tip of one's nose is a bad thing if it is connected to the perception of a girl one 
wants to impress or to the perception of one's friend making fun of one (be it in the present or 
in the future). However, if one's perception of such a pimple is connected to the perception of a 
wood where there are only animals and trees, one will probably be indifferent to that same 
pimple on the tip of one's nose. One's perception of a cut to the tip of one’s finger will be 
different if one is about to go out for a stroll or going to spend long hours writing on a 
computer. And the same thing applies to the perception of external things: my negative non-
indifference towards a bull running in my direction will be weaker if I perceive myself 
protected behind a fence than if I perceive myself exposed to its attack. In the same fashion my 
negative non-indifference towards the bull's horns is stronger than towards its back, since I 
perceive the horns as capable of hurting me, whereas the back is perceived as harmless.  
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This explanation would be more detailed if one were here to take up again the complex 
analysis of the first section and all the examples used in it. In this case, one would be able to 
consider with more detail how perception of one's own parts is connected to the perception of a 
complex 829&BE/), just as was shown there — but now taking into account the pivotal role 
played by positive and negative non-indifference. However, such an analysis would bloat this 
study excessively. I will leave the reader to do that task on his own. If I have done everything 
as I should have, the task will not be hard.  
Nevertheless, I would like to stress that the "first distribution" depends on one's 
fundamental positive non-indifference towards oneself, and that the "second distribution" 
depends on the first distribution and on one's fundamental positive non-indifference towards 
oneself. My positive non-indifference towards myself is distributed throughout whatever is 
@!(,/A, and because what is perceived as @!(,/A is perceived in connection with what is not 
@!(,/A, I become non-indifferent towards what is not @!(,/A. For example, my positive non-
indifference towards myself is distributed throughout my constitution in such a way that a) I 
have a positive non-indifference towards the wellbeing of my body, and b) because of this, I 
have a negative non-indifference towards a man trying to cut me with a knife. I only have a 
negative non-indifference towards him because I have a positive non-indifference towards the 
wellbeing of my body, and I only have a positive non-indifference towards the wellbeing of my 
body because of my fundamental non-indifference towards myself (as a formal @!(,6). But if I 
were overweight and considered being fit to be important, this would make me have a negative 
non-indifference towards my over-sized belly, in which case a man trying to cut me with a 
knife to remove these extra pounds (namely a surgeon) could actually be seen with positive 
non-indifference, whereas he would be seen with negative non-indifference if he was trying to 
cut me in order to injure or to kill me.  
As a final note, I would still like to stress that this "second distribution" gives an all-
embracing dimension to one's non-indifference. Everything that is perceived, is perceived 
within a framework of non-indifference that is derived from one's fundamental positive non-
indifference towards oneself. Everything that is perceived is perceived as something towards 
which one has either positive non-indifference (be it mild or strong) and/or a negative non-
indifference (be it mild or strong) or some kind of functional indifference (in the above 
mentioned sense). This is the meaning of the observation that there are no non-indifference 
blind spots in the perceptive field.  
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2.c) The connection between 8=:-*4#&' and !"#$%#&'. 
 
The majority of the connection between /012*3#&' and !"#$%#&' has already been 
established in the previous chapter. Given the fact that they are intrinsically connected, it would 
be hard to explain the presence of /012*3#&' in Hierocles' text without also resorting to 
!"#$%#&'. In fact, every use of /012*3#&' in the text presupposes its connection to !"#$%#&', and 
vice-versa. However, a thorough look at the passages that deal with this problem will shed 
more light upon their connection. 
Let us then focus on the passages in which there is a clear link between /012*3#&' and 
!"#$%#&'.  
A) The first one is I 33-37. Hierocles says that "G9!EB! PV P/12; 72 829R ,I' !0#$M#23' 
2082;)", since this" 4B92& 7F9 20' 7):#&) ,/A 89T,/( /012*/( (...)". I would like to begin by 
saying that Hierocles never explains what the 89:,/) /012;/) stands for. This probably has to 
do with the nature and purpose of his text. Nevertheless, this does not help our cause. A careful 
study of the 89:,/) /012;/) would also be impossible within this context. However, in order to 
understand why and how !"#$%#&' is connected to it, one must have some clue as to what it is. I 
will try my best to portray the main aspects and place them within the terminology I have 
employed so far. 
I believe that Hierocles uses the expression 89:,/) /012;/) to denote the original 
constitution of a positive non-indifference towards oneself, towards what matters to oneself and 
towards what is favourable to oneself, and accordingly to what matters to oneself. I realize that 
this may seem a very strange description, but I intend to clarify it. To do so, I will briefly go 
back to the formal structure of the @!(,6.90 
As was said, all non-indifference revolves around the @!(,6 and stems from one's 
fundamental positive non-indifference towards it. Now, this @!(,6 is usually perceived as being 
whatever is @!(,/A (in the sense of the fundamental equation). At least in the case of animals 
and human infants, this @!(,6 is perceived as being their own (@!(,/A) #D#,!#&'. In other 
words, each of them perceives itself as being its own #D#,!#&'. In this case, an animal's 
fundamental non-indifference towards itself translates into a positive non-indifference towards 
its own #D#,!#&' and towards the preservation of its own #D#,!#&'. In this case, what matters 
to the @!(,6 — perceived here as being the same as its own #D#,!#&' — is the preservation of 
what it takes itself to be, i.e. the preservation of its own #D#,!#&'. Because of this, an animal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
90 As regards the 89:,/) /012;/), please see Attachment 1. All that is said there helps to clarify the following 
explanation and also deals with some problems that are not strictly concerned with Hierocles' text.  
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has a positive non-indifference towards the things that are favourable to the preservation of its 
#D#,!#&'. In this case, which is the case portrayed in Hierocles' text, the 89:,/) /012;/) 
involves all these elements. Just as was said regarding the "first distribution", the 89:,/) 
/012;/) is not 89:,/) in a time-related sense. It is the first in the sense in which Barry White 
sings "you're my first, my last, my everything": it is the first in the sense that it corresponds to 
an identification of that around which everything spins and also of what is important to it. 
When the singer sings "you're my first, my last, my everything ", he means that everything in 
the words spins around the girl he is singing to. Much the same applies to the 89:,/) /012;/): 
because the @!(,6 is perceived as being one's own #D#,!#&', one's positive non-indifference 
(/012*3#&') towards oneself is seen a positive non-indifference towards one's own #D#,!#&', 
and this at the same time generates a positive non-indifference towards what matters to that 
#D#,!#&' — i.e. its preservation — and towards what favours this preservation (such as water, 
food, safety, and so on). The 89:,/) /012;/) covers this "immediate" ground of non-
indifference — it is the "first" result of an animal's fundamental non-indifference towards itself. 
Once again, this is not used in a time-related sense, but is always happening at every moment in 
one's life (in such a way that, if the identification of the @!(,6 changes, the 89:,/) /012;/) will 
also change).  
As a final note, I would like to stress that the 89:,/) /012;/) involves both the first and the 
second "distribution". As is easy to see, it deals both with one's positive non-indifference 
towards whatever one takes oneself to be, and also towards the things that are not perceived as 
@!(,/A. An animal's includes its positive non-indifference towards itself, which is distributed 
throughout its own #D#,!#&' (because it perceives itself as being its #D#,!#&'), but also 
towards external things that help it to preserve its #D#,!#&', like water, food, shelter, and so on. 
Explaining why and how perception contributes to the understanding of this is now an 
easier task. In fact, when Hierocles says that the study of !"#$%#&' contributes ("4B92&") to the 
understanding of the 89:,/) /012;/), he does not mean that !"#$%#&' is a complementary 
element, which assists one to understand the 89:,/) /012;/) without playing a significant role 
in it. On the contrary, Hierocles' wording points exactly in the opposite direction: without 
understanding how !"#$%#&' works, one is doomed to miss out on the 89:,/) /012;/) and on 
/012*3#&' in general. Now, we certainly have not yet grasped what !"#$%#&' is all about — nor 
will we entirely—, but we have looked at most of what Hierocles has to say about it. And, as 
regards the 89:,/) /012;/), one can safely say that, if an animal did not perceive itself 
immediately as being its #D#,!#&' from the moment it is born (in the sense of the fundamental 
equation I referred to)— i.e. if an animal did not have !"#$%#&' @!(,/A from the moment it is 
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born — it would not have any positive non-indifference towards itself or its own (@!(,/A) 
#D#,!#&'. Given that one's positive non-indifference towards one's #D#,!#&' derives from it 
being one's own (@!(,/A) #D#,!#&' one's positive non-indifference towards oneself would not, 
if the #D#,!#&' were not perceived as @!(,/A,  make one non-indifferent towards it. And this is 
why the study of !"#$%#&' contributes ("4B92&") to the understanding of the 89:,/) /012;/). 
So this means that: 
1) At birth, an animal's (and human new-born's) perception of its own #D#,!#&' is shaped 
by a positive non-indifference towards it. This happens because an animal perceives itself as 
being its own -F-'0-#., in the sense of the above-mentioned fundamental equation: it perceives 
itself (@!(,6) as the same as its own -F-'0-#.. 
2) Although this identification does not seem to change throughout an animal's life91, it can 
start to develop negative non-indifference towards some parts of its own #D#,!#&'.  
3) An animal has a strictly positive non-indifference towards its own #D#,!#&' at birth, but 
this makes it have— from that very moment onwards — either positive non-indifference, or 
negative non-indifference (or for that matter functional indifference) towards external things.92 
And I insist: this happens right from birth— from the very moment in which it becomes an 
animal. In other words, this means that the 89:,/) /012;/) is from the very beginning in 
contact with something external and has non-indifference towards it. For this reason it involves 
both the "first distribution" and the "second distribution". This is clearly shown by the 
examples Hierocles uses to prove that an animal perceives something external from the 
moment it is born (which were examined at the end of the first section) 
4) à012*3#&' and !"#$%#&' are connected in such a fundamental way that whatever non-
indifference we have throughout our life is marked by perception at each and every moment of 
it: there is no /012*3#&' without !"#$%#&' (at least not in the kind of life humans and animals 
have). At the same time, since the 89:,/) /012;/) is connected to the very beginning of human 
and animal life (i.e. to the moment at which an animal or human becomes such) there is no 
!"#$%#&' without /012*3#&' (at least not the kind of life humans and animals have). Every 
moment of animal and human life is marked by an08-"9-#. that is non-indifferent, and by a 
non-indifference that is perceptive. If our positive non-indifference towards ourselves were not 
coupled with perception, it would be radically blind — and either it would not be an 
indifference at all, or we would have no idea of what it would be. But on the other hand, if our !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
91 As one can infer from the previous note, it can change in the case of humans. 
92 In fact, as we have seen, there can, at the same time, be both a positive and a negative non-indifference towards some 
external (or non-external) thing. 
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perception were indifferent, we would not perceive our hands as capable of harming and of 
being harmed, we would not perceive things as dangerous or safe, we would not perceive the 
ground as something we can walk and run upon, and so on — in sum, we would not perceive 
either the way we perceive or what we perceive.93 In the end, !"#$%#&' and /012*3#&' are 
mutually involved communicating vessels and neither of them could exist (in the way it does) 
without the other. In fact, if perception were not interested, it would be utterly different from 
everything I have described so far.  
So much for a brief sketch of the 89:,/) /012;/). 
B) There is another important link between /012*3#&' and !"#$%#&', which, though not 
explicit, is still very easy to grasp. It deals with the connections between !"#$%#&' and N9µM 
and between N9µM and /012*3#&'. 
In the passage I have quoted regarding the connection between !"#$%#&' and the 89:,/) 
/012;/), Hierocles actually starts by saying that "we do not need to discuss N9µM for now" ("d) 
$!,B9/( µV) /HPV) 89=' ,= 8!9=) P26µ2$! [2082;)]" I 33-34), but "G9!EB! PV P/12; 72 829R ,I' 
!0#$M#23' 2082;)˙ 4B92& 7F9 20' 7):#&) ,/A 89T,/( /012*/( (...)". Now there are two ways of 
interpreting this passage: either a) Hierocles is saying that N9µM has nothing to do with 
/012*3#&' and the 89:,/) /012;/), and does not therefore need to be considered, or b) he is 
saying that, despite the existence of a connection between !"#$%#&' and N9µM, and consequently 
between N9µM and /012*3#&' (and the 89:,/) /012;/)), he will focus only on an explanation of 
!"#$%#&'. 
It is important to note that Hierocles emphasizes a) that both !"#$%#&' and N9µM begin at 
birth and b) that they are what makes an animal differ from a non-animal. This means that 
animal life is intrinsically defined by being !0#$%,&1M and N9µ%,&1M.  
Now, the first possibility for interpreting the passage in question pushes N9µM away from 
/012*3#&', and therefore also from !"#$%#&'. Animal life is then intrinsically characterized by 
having (at least) three components: !"#$%#&', /012*3#&' and N9µM. The first two components are 
intrinsically related, but the third ia "parallel" to them, never touching or being touched by 
them. 
But this is clearly not what Hierocles has in mind. For anyone who has studied Stoic 
philosophy it is clear that impulse (N9µM) derives from /012*3#&'. Although I will not go into 
the Stoic concept of N9µM, I will try to shed some light upon it and to focus on the connection !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
93 This point will be clearer further ahead. Nevertheless, it is connected to the problem of the perceptum per se, which 
we have already considered. At stake is precisely the fact that we do not perceive pure percepta. Instead, our perception 
is intrinsically an evaluative and interpretative one — precisely because it is intrinsically non-indifferent. In other words, 
there is never a perceptum per se in this sense. 
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between it and /012*3#&'. Given that /012*3#&' and !"#$%#&' are intrinsically related, explaining 
the connection between N9µM and /012*3#&' will also help to explain how these three elements 
are connected to one another. This amounts to explaining why the second way of interpreting 
this passage is the right one. 
The connection between N9µM and /012*3#&' can be explained in the following terms: 
/012*3#&' has to do with an animal's positive non-indifference towards whatever it perceives, 
and N9µM is the term used to describe the corresponding drive/appetite that moves the animal 
towards it (or in favour of it). For example: an animal has a positive non-indifference towards 
its #D#,!#&' and its preservation, and this makes it have an impulse (N9µM) towards the 
preservation of such #D#,!#&'. If the animal perceives water or food or shelter as beneficial to 
itself — because it perceives these things to be beneficial to the #D#,!#&' (that it perceives as 
being itself) —, it will have an impulse (N9µM) towards water or food or shelter. And this shows 
that a non-indifferent perception — precisely because it is non-indifferent — is always 
accompanied by an impulse towards what it perceives with positive non-indifference (whether 
or not this impulse leads to actual action). 
However, this is not all.  Just as in the case of /012*3#&', Hierocles' use of N9µM can also be 
described as a synecdoche. For in fact, as the examples analysed so far evince, Hierocles' text 
deals both with a) an impulse that drives "in favour" of what is perceived as beneficial and b) 
an impulse that "repels", "rejects", "repudiates", "has aversion towards" or "has repulsion 
towards" what is perceived as harmful or prejudicial.  To refer to this phenomenon the Stoics 
usually use the term +4/9µM. Although Hierocles does not use this term, it is clearly entailed in 
all the examples we have considered so far.  
I will not go over all the examples in order to prove this. Still, it is fairly easy to grasp that 
a deer has some kind of repulsion or aversion for the oversized parts of its horns, and that is 
why it runs against an outcropping rock to shatter them. This same deer has a negative non-
indifference towards any predator it perceives, and this generates aversion towards this 
predator and urges the deer to flee. A beaver's perception of hunters is marked by a negative 
non-indifference towards them, and this negative non-indifference generates aversion towards 
the hunters and makes the beaver run away. So a beaver's impulse to run away from hunters — 
juts like a deer's impulse to run away from predators — is a consequence of their negative non-
indifference towards hunters and predators. If these animals did not have any form of negative 
non-indifference towards hunters or predators, they would not have any aversion towards them 
and would have no "reason" to avoid them. It is only because they perceive hunters and 
predators as something that might harm them that they have a negative non-indifference 
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towards them, and it is only because they have this negative non-indifference that they have an 
aversion towards them. This aversion consists in an impulse to avoid them, which tends to lead 
to the corresponding action (although this action might not actually take place).94 
Once again, both the positive impulse (N9µM) and the negative one (+4/9µM) ultimately 
derive from one's fundamental positive non-indifference towards oneself. Strictly speaking, the 
positive impulse derives from one's positive non-indifference, and teh negative impulse derives 
from negative non-indifference. However, since all positive and negative non-indifference 
derives from one's fundamental positive non-indifference towards oneself, in the end, all 
positive and negative impulses stem from one's fundamental positive non-indifference towards 
oneself. 
There is yet another important aspect to be considered concerning N9µM and +4/9µM. The 
term N9µM is used here with regard to the connection between an animal and something 
external. And this means that both these terms revolve around the articulation between what I 
have termed the first and second "distributions" of /012*3#&'. In fact, animal impulses are 
triggered by the connection between a non-indifferent +),*-%.&' @!(,/A and a non-indifferent 
+),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6'. If an animal did not perceive something as threatening, it could not have 
any impulse to run away from it. At the same time, if an animal were absolutely indifferent to 
itself, it would be absolutely indifferent to its #D#,!#&', and therefore it could not perceive 
anything as threatening. The same thing happens regarding a positive impulse: an animal's 
positive non-indifference towards its own #D#,!#&' is not, in itself, an impulse: it is rather a 
pre-condition to any impulse. For a positive impulse to take place an animal needs to perceive 
something (external) as being beneficial to it — i.e. it needs to have a positive non-indifference 
towards something external.95 
This explanation raises an obvious objection: animals have an impulse to look for water 
even if they do not see it, just as they have an impulse to look for food even if they do not 
perceive any food around. If animals only had an impulse to drink when they can see water, 
they would surely die from dehydration, just as they would starve to death if their impulse for 
food only began when they could see it. Likewise, an animal does not need to explicitly 
perceive some danger in order to be afraid and try to escape —children, for example, can have !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94 For example, if a beaver is caught in a trap, it has an aversion towards this trap and this negative impulse urges it to 
escape, even though it cannot move and actually escape from it. 
95 This paragraph needs to be treated with more care. In fact, one needs to consider if and how an impulse is rooted in 
one's anticipation of a "future state" of oneself. A part of such a consideration will be performed when dealing with the 
role of possibility. I would just like to emphasize that whether or not an impulse is rooted in one's anticipation of a 
"future state" of oneself, this entails perception of oneself, and also therefore perception of external things, and will 
ultimately always regard the connection between the two. 
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an aversion towards dark rooms or woods, even if they do not perceive anything concrete that 
can harm them. 
However, such an objection undoubtedly overlooks the description we have made so far, 
especially concerning the intrinsically anticipative character of perception. In fact, in order for 
there to be an impulse — be it positive or negative — there does not need to be a perception of 
something present towards which one has a positive or a negative non-indifference. The point 
is that, whether or not the object of the impulse is present, there must be an anticipation. In 
other words, one's perception of oneself must be connected to a perception of something 
external, but, as we have seen, this can happen in the form of an anticipation of that external 
thing, and not only of its actual presence. An animal's perception of being thirsty is connected 
to its perception of water, whether it perceives water in the present or not. In the same fashion, 
an animal's perception of its being afraid is connected to its perception of something that might 
harm it, and this happens regardless of whether the animal is actually being pursued or whether 
it is just anticipating some possible pursuit. So, in both these cases, an animal's perception of 
itself is connected with a perception of something external, be that object present or anticipated.  
And all this stresses once again the vital role of possibility. This time, one realizes that 
there could be no N9µM if perception did not include a perception of possibility. An animal's 
impulse to drink water is rooted precisely in the anticipation of drinking water it is not yet 
drinking, but only craving for. Likewise, an animal's impulse to escape danger comes into play 
precisely when it perceives it might not be safe — i.e. when it anticipates an attack —, and this 
makes it run away because it perceives that running away might lead it to safety — i.e. because 
it anticipates that safety might be obtained by running away. 
All this also means that the N9µ!* and +4/9µ!* relate to what I have termed the multiple 
active and passive E92;!&. In fact, N9µM appears in Hierocles' text — as a synecdoche —in the 
form of an animal's impulse towards external things. As I have tried to explain, an animal's 
perception of external things is characterized by the fact that it involves the perception of 
multiple active and passive E92;!& as a decisive element. It is the perception of these multiple 
active and passive E92;!& that paves the way for N9µ!* and +4/9µ!*. For example, an animal 
has a positive impulse towards water because a) it perceives water as something beneficial to it, 
which makes it have a positive non-indifference towards it, and b) it perceives itself as capable 
of drinking it, while at the same time perceiving the water as "drinkable". And the same stands 
for an animal's negative impulse towards a predator, for example: a bull has a negative impulse 
towards a lion a) because it perceives the lion as something that may harm itself, while at the 
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same time perceiving itself as likely to be harmed by the lion, and b) because it has a negative 
non-indifference towards being harmed and therefore towards the lion that might harm it.  
These two examples are very simple. Still, if one bears in mind the structure portrayed in 
the first section, it is not hard to understand how the complex network described there fits and 
complements this description of N9µM. 
Now, as I said, all this means that the N9µ!* and +4/9µ!* relate to the articulation between 
the "first distribution" and the "second distribution". This articulation was said to correspond to 
the "distribution" of one's non-indifference towards one's own -F-'0-#. throughout external 
things. And this is precisely where the N9µ!* and +4/9µ!* come into play. A deer feels an 
impulse to run towards an outcropping rock — to shatter the oversized parts of its horns — 
because it has a negative non-indifference towards those oversized parts. Now, the deer's 
negative non-indifference towards those oversized parts is linked to its perception of the 
outcropping rocks in question as being capable of shattering its horns. It is this connection that 
makes the deer have a positive non-indifference towards the outcropping rocks. The deer's 
positive non-indifference towards the outcropping rocks corresponds to what I have termed the 
"second distribution". This positive non-indifference is only possible because the deer 
perceives the rocks as being capable of shattering the oversized parts of its horns, and because 
it has a negative non-indifference towards those oversized parts. In this case, because the deer 
perceives the rocks as something that helps it get rid of those parts of the horns towards which 
it has a negative non-indifference, the deer's positive non-indifference towards itself makes it 
have a positive non-indifference towards those rocks. To sum it up: the deer's positive non-
indifference towards itself makes it have a negative non-indifference towards the oversized 
parts of its horns, and therefore a positive non-indifference towards the rocks that enable it to 
destroy those oversized parts towards which it has a negative non-indifference. Without this 
"second distribution"96 — the one that makes the deer have a positive non-indifference towards 
the rocks — there would be no impulse whatsoever. And exacty the same thing happens with a 
deer's impulse to escape a predator: it needs to perceive something external with a negative 
non-indifference in order to run away from it, and this entails the deer having a positive non-
indifference towards its safety and the safety of its #D#,!#&', while at the same time having a 
perception of its #D#,!#&' as being damageable by that predator and a perception of that 
predator as being capable of harming its #D#,!#&'. So in the final analysis, both N9µ!* and 
+4/9µ!* involve the complex relationship between the animal's positive and negative non-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96 Once again I would like to stress that this "second" is not used in a time-related sense.  
! "%$!
indifference towards its own #D#,!#&' — i.e. the "first distribution" —, and the animal's 
positive and negative non-indifference towards external things — i.e. the "second distribution". 
All this shows that, despite the intrinsic connection between !"#$%#&' and /012*3#&' and 
N9µM, there is a certain primacy of !"#$%#&' and /012*3#&' over N9µM. In fact, logically, there 
could be !"#$%#&' and /012*3#&' without N9µM, but there could be no N9µM without !"#$%#&' 
and /012*3#&'. However, this is not very significant, since — at least in life as we know it — 
!"#$%#&' and /012*3#&' do entail G2µH. 97  Furthermore, the entire analysis conducted by 
Hierocles is based on his study of the N9µ!* he observes in animals: he witnesses animals 
pursuing some things and avoiding others, and it is from these N9µ!* that he tries to infer the 
whole structure we have been discussing. 
Having said this, we can move on to the third link between !"#$%#&' and /012*3#&' in 
Hierocles' text. 
C) This third link has to do with the passage where Hierocles says: " 89T,/(' E96)/(' +8= 
72)B#23' W8V9 ,/A P&!#T>2&) 1!R #(),%92;) @!(,= 89/GI)!& ..... ,O) 209%µB)%) /012*3#&), 
2H$Z' ..... N9µM, 1!R ,/A 89=' ,= #3,M9&/) @!(,/A #()!*#$%#*' C#,&) c -2-27µB)% /012*3#&'" 
(VII 44-49).  
It is now easy to see that this passage touches all the vital points in both the first and the 
second sections. In fact, this is where Hierocles connects all the dots, as this passage seals the 
link between "c -2-27µB)% /012*3#&'", "#()!*#$%#&'", "#(),%92;)" and "N9µM". In doing so, it 
connects the complexity of the "-2-27µB)% /012*3#&'" with the complexity of the bipartite 
realm of !"#$%#&' — via the use of "#()!*#$%#&'" —; moreover, it emphasizes the role of 
possibility by referring once more to "#(),%92;)" — and therefore of the multiple active and 
passive E92;!& —; last by not least, by putting "N9µM" in the middle of all this, this passage also 
shows that N9µM is connected to the other elements referred. 
My claim is that this passage summarises and corroborates everything I said so far. For this 
reason, I will not explain everything all over again. I will rather focus on the links between the 
different elements. Hopefully, this will lead to a finer and final articulation of all the 
phenomena described so far. 
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97 This happens to such an extent that we cannot picture what !"#$%#&' and /012*3#&' would be like if they were not 
accompanied by N9µM. In our lives the three of them are connected in an intrinsic way, and when we deal with one of 
them, we deal with the other two. So, despite being able to recognize that !"#$%#&' and /012*3#&' have a certain logical 
primacy, we have no clue as to what these two terms would correspond to if separated from N9µM. Thus, the meaning of 
each of them in Hierocles' text is defined by the other, as we will see in a few pages. 
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I will go straight to the fundamental part of the sentence, where Hierocles states that 
"N9µM, 1!R ,/A 89=' ,= #3,M9&/) @!(,/A #()!*#$%#*' 5-'#4 c -2-27µB)% /012*3#&'" (my 
emphasis). 
First of all, one needs to consider that Hierocles is describing an "equality". His use of  
“C#,&)” clearly suggests this. However, "-2-27µB)% /012*3#&'" seems a simple term, whereas 
the other part of the equality includes both "N9µM" and ",/A 89=' ,= #3,M9&/) @!(,/A 
#()!*#$%#&'". It is true that, by now, we know that neither of these parts is simple. 
Nevertheless, we can start by considering what comes before the "C#,&)" 
What is it that Hierocles describes as equal to the "-2-27µB)% /012*3#&'"? Is it  ",/A 89=' 
,= #3,M9&/) @!(,/A #()!*#$%#*'", or is it " N9µM, 1!R ,/A 89=' ,= #3,M9&/) @!(,/A 
#()!*#$%#*'"? And what is the difference between these two options? 
An answer to this question ultimately requires a specific interpretation of the "1!*". 
Unfortunately, the fact that the text is lacunose does not help in this task. In the end, this "1!*" 
plays a decisive role, for it is the element that either includes or excludes N9µM from the link 
between #()!*#$%#*' and /012*3#&'. And this is precisely where we left the point B) a few lines 
above. Now, we can put the problem like this: is /012*3#&' equal to ",/A 89=' ,= #3,M9&/) 
@!(,/A #()!*#$%#*'" and N9µM, or is /012*3#&' equal to ",/A 89=' ,= #3,M9&/) @!(,/A 
#()!*#$%#*'" and then there is something termed N9µM — that one might add without changing 
the content of what is embraced by the  “C#,&)”? 
From what we have seen so far, the answer can only be the first one. Hierocles' use of 
/012*3#&' has to do both with the complex form of perception denoted by #()!*#$%#&', and 
with the impulse that is attached to this perception and to the non-indifference that shapes it. 
According to all the examples, one's positive non-indifference is not only connected to a 
complex co-perception of multiple elements — organized into two distinct realms and entailing 
an anticipation of multiple passive and active E92;!& —, but also with the concomitant impulse 
that makes an animal act in accordance with such a non-indifferent perception. One can never 
stress enough that a) Hierocles' analysis is entirely supported by examples of animal behaviour, 
and that b) the object of these examples is precisely each animal's actions, which stem from its 
impulse to avoid its own destruction and procure its own safety and preservation (which in turn 
stems from the animal's positive non-indifference towards itself and from the perception of 
what is "in favour" or "against" itself). In this sense, Hierocles' analysis of /012*3#&' and 
#()!*#$%#&'/!"#$%#&' is inevitably an analysis of N9µM. For this reason, I think that the "1!*" at 
the beginning of the sentence includes "N9µM" as one of the terms "equalized" by "C#,&)". 
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But this brings us back to the meaning of "C#,&)" in the passage quoted above. I said it 
established an "equality" between "c -2-27µB)% /012*3#&'" and both ",/A 89=' ,= #3,M9&/) 
@!(,/A #()!*#$%#&'" and "N9µM". So this "C#,&)" gives us something like "c -2-27µB)% 
/012*3#&'" = ",/A 89=' ,= #3,M9&/) @!(,/A #()!*#$%#&'" + "N9µM". The difference is that 
here, unlike in mathematics, if we pass "+ N9µM" to the other side of the "=", it does not become 
"- N9µM". And this means that the "C#,&)" does not mean "equality" in a strictly mathematical 
sense. Then what does it mean? 
The sentence " N9µM, 1!R ,/A 89=' ,= #3,M9&/) @!(,/A #()!*#$%#&' C#,&) c -2-27µB)% 
/012*3#&'" means that the /012*3#&' we have been talking about is the co-perception of  "what 
is favourable to an animal's own #3,M9&/)" and is also the N9µM that leads the animal to seek 
these things. My point here is that this sentence's meaning implies that the ",/A 89=' ,= 
#3,M9&/) @!(,/A #()!*#$%#&'" is also the "-2-27µB)% /012*3#&'" and is the "N9µM", just as 
"N9µM" is the "-2-27µB)% /012*3#&'" and is the ",/A 89=' ,= #3,M9&/) @!(,/A #()!*#$%#&'".  
The reason why N9µM is the "-2-27µB)% /012*3#&'" and is the ",/A 89=' ,= #3,M9&/) 
@!(,/A #()!*#$%#&'" has been explained for the most part in the last few pages. As we have 
said, and as Hierocle's examples show, there is only N9µM where there is /012*3#&' and 
#()!*#$%#&'. But, as we have also said, and as Hierocles' examples also show, this does not 
mean that there is /012*3#&' and #()!*#$%#&' and then there is N9µM. On the contrary, N9µM is 
always both /012*3#&' and #()!*#$%#&'. A deer's impulse to run against a rock to shatter its 
horns is its /012*3#&' and is its correlative non-indifferent #()!*#$%#&' of all the things we have 
said. The point is that Hierocles' examples show an essential unity between all these three 
elements, in such a way that each of them is intrinsically defined by the other two. In a way, 
each of them is the other two. Y9µM is /012*3#&' and is #()!*#$%#&' in the sense that every 
impulse is non-indifferent and is "perceptive". Without being non-indifferent, N9µM would not 
be N9µM, just as N9µM would not be N9µM if it did not include #()!*#$%#&' as its decisive 
moment. 
Let us then focus on the link between ",/A 89=' ,= #3,M9&/) @!(,/A #()!*#$%#*'" and "c 
-2-27µB)% /012*3#&'". This will also help to understand the kind of link we are dealing with, 
i.e. it will help to understand what kind of "C#,&)" we are dealing with. 
We saw in the first section that #()!*#$%#&' has a very complex meaning, just as the word 
itself suggests. At the beginning of our analysis, we associated the meaning of the prefix #()- 
with the bipartite field of !"#$%#&'. It was said that +),*-%.&' @!(,/A always entails +),*-%.&' 
,:) C1,6' (and vice-versa), and that there could not be one without the other. In this case, 
!"#$%#&' is always a -<4!*#$%#&' of at least two fields. But, as we also saw, things are more 
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complicated than this, since both fields of !"#$%#&' include multiple elements. Thus, it was also 
said that there are many possible connections between a) each of the multiple elements within 
each field and b) between each of the multiple elements of one and the multiple elements of the 
other field. All these possible connections were described through the multiple passive and 
active E92;!& an animal has at each and every moment. In the end, we saw that perception of 
each and every object entails a complex perception of the whole present and possible 
perceptive field, in such a way that each thing we perceive is indeed perceived in connection 
with the total sphere of perception. The term #()!*#$%#&' came to precisely signify the 
incredibly complex picture I am attempting to reconstruct in a very brief way. 
If we now link this #()!*#$%#&' with its object — ",/A 89=' ,= #3,M9&/)@!(,/A" —, we 
find once again the role of possibility brought to the table by ",=#3,M9&/)". But "89=' ,= 
#3,M9&/)" also makes reference to the positive non-indifference towards two things: towards 
one's preservation and towards the things that are favourable to one's preservation. It is 
important to note that one's positive non-indifference towards one's own preservation involves 
a co-perception — a -<4!*#$%#&' — of oneself and of the things that contribute to one's 
preservation. But, obviously, one's positive non-indifference towards one's own preservation 
involves a co-perception — a -<4!*#$%#&' — of many more things! It involves a -<4!*#$%#&' 
of a possible future in which one is healthy, of a possible future in which one is not healthy 
(and indeed a co-perception of all the possible states between being as healthy as it gets and not 
surviving), a -<4!*#$%#&' of the things that are more and less helpful to one's preservation in 
each specific circumstance, and also a -<4!*#$%#&' of the things that are not "89=' ,= #3,M9&/) 
@!(,/A", amongst which some are indifferent and others are co-perceived as against ",= 
#3,M9&/) @!(,/A" on many different levels (which also vary according to the circumstance). 
As pointed out above, one's positive non-indifference towards oneself — and therefore towards 
one's own preservation — ultimately entails a non-indifferent co-perception of the entire 
perceptive field (which is articulated in positive non-indifference and negative non-indifference 
and functional indifference, in the various intensities that vary according to each thing's  
"functional distance" from @!(,6). 
However, the point I now want to stress is not that one's positive non-indifference towards 
one's own preservation entails or involves #()!*#$%#&', but that it is (5-'#4) this non-indifferent 
total -<40+-"9-#.. 
If one goes back to the meaning of " ,= #3,M9&/)", one realises that all the examples given 
by Hierocles are, in one way or another, related to it. Directly or indirectly, all animal action 
portrayed by Hierocles is also connected to ",= #3,M9&/)". And this happens because Hierocles 
! "%(!
is describing animal perception as a non-indifferent perception. Now, as we have seen, the 
fundamental positive non-indifference from which all non-indifference stems is a non-
indifference towards ",= #3,M9&/) @!(,/A". 98  As we have also seen, one's continuous 
#()!*#$%#&' is at all times shaped by this fundamental positive non-indifference. And this 
means that, in a way, all -<40+-"9-#. is a "'(@ I2J. 'J -,'H2#(4 ;0<'(@ -<40+-"9-#." — and, 
given that all !"#$%#&' is always #()!*#$%#&', so is all !"#$%#&'. This is why ,/A 89=' ,= 
#3,M9&/) @!(,/A #()!*#$%#*' 5-'#4 c -2-27µB)% /012*3#&'" (my emphasis)". In fact, this 
description of an intrinsically non-indifferent #()!*#$%#&' is the description of /012*3#&' made 
so far (and vice versa). 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
98 Please see Attachment 1 and notes 41 and 42 above. 
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3) Third Section — The structure of !"$%#&' arising from  Hierocle's text. 
 
At this point we have now gathered the most important elements in the !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#. 
regarding the structure of perception. So it is finally time to collect the fruits of this long and 
toilsome labour.  
In the first section, the analysis expanded from a strict consideration of !"#$%#&' @!(,/A to 
a consideration of !"#$%#&' as an all-embracing phenomenon. Along the road, the sub-field of 
!"#$%#&' @!(,/A turned out to be more and more complex, and then the same happened with 
the sub-field of +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6'. Multiple connections within each of these sub-fields came 
to the surface, and so too did the very important multiple connections between the two sub-
fields. The role of possibility was highlighted and the result was an inter-relational structure in 
which perception of each element was defined by its connection to several other elements, both 
present and future. This web of connections is essentially related to the multiple passive and 
active E92;!&. In the end, we came to realize that perception of anything involved a concomitant 
perception of the whole perceptive field, both present and future. 
In the second section the focus shifted towards /012*3#&', but it was rapidly clear that this 
was not a real change of focus. It was rather a zoom in on an aspect that was always taken for 
granted in the first section, even though it never emerged explicitly. The meaning and structure 
of /012*3#&' was then explained: it all starts with a fundamental positive non-indifference 
towards oneself, and this fundamental positive non-indifference towards oneself generates 
positive and negative non-indifference towards one's #D#,!#&' ("first distribution") and towards 
external things ("second distribution"). Via Hierocles' use of #(),%92;) and ,%92;), the role 
played by possibility99 in both these distributions was highlighted.. Gradually, we came to find 
an increasingly tighter connection between !"#$%#&'/#()!*#$%#&' and /012*3#&'. This 
connection came to reveal an intrinsically non-indifferent perception, just as it revealed a non-
indifference that is essentially perceptive. Both these elements pervade each other and are 
defined by each other from start to finish. Furthermore, impulse also came into play, and indeed 
as a key player in both !"#$%#&'/#()!*#$%#&' and /012*3#&'. 
This is a very brief sketch of the road we have travelled. Now it is finally time to cross the 
finishing line and draw our conclusions about Hierocles' text. So, after all, what is !"#$%#&' all 
about? 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
99Which was already a key player in the first section. 
! "%*!
First and foremost, !"#$%#&' is always a non-indifferent -<40+-"9-#.. There is no such 
thing as a simple perception; neither is there a perception that is not pervaded by non-
indifference. All elements of every perception are encrusted with non-indifference and defined 
by it.  
Now, this non-indifferent -<40+-"9-#. has a complex structure. This structure — which is 
the structure of !"#$%#&' — entails two distinct sub-fields: the sub-field of +),*-%.&' @!(,/A 
and the sub-field of+),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6'. Perception of what is @!(,/A and of what is C1,6' is 
defined by one's fundamental positive non-indifference towards oneself. This fundamental 
positive non-indifference towards oneself distributes itself throughout one's own (@!(,/A) 
#D#,!#&' (this is the "first distribution" and is directly related to +),*-%.&' @!(,/A, i.e. to what 
bears the @!(,/A stamp) and throughout external things (this is the "second distribution" and is 
directly related to +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6', i.e. to what does not bear the @!(,/A stamp).  
It is important to stress that one's perception of each of these sub-fields is intrinsically 
connected to the perception of the other, as obviously is one's non-indifference towards the 
elements that belong to one and to the other. According to Hierocles' description, perception is 
always a co-perception of both these sub-fields. At the same time, since this co-perception is 
always non-indifferent, there is always non-indifference towards the elements of both of them. 
As we saw at the end of the last chapter, the articulation between one's perception of what is 
@!(,/A and of what is C1,6' and the articulation between the first and the second "distributions" 
are one and the same. In other words, the explanation of the structure of our complex 
#()!*#$%#&' is the explanation of our complex structure of /012*3#&', precisely because "N9µM, 
1!R ,/A 89=' ,= #3,M9&/) @!(,/A #()!*#$%#*' C#,&) c -2-27µB)% /012*3#&'" (VII 44-49). 
This explanation is a very intricate one. Perception of oneself is defined by one's non-
indifference towards oneself as such, which is always seen as already being what one takes 
oneself to be, and therefore by one's non-indifference towards what one takes oneself to be. At 
the same time (literally), one's non-indifferent perception of oneself is also defined by a non-
indifferent perception of what is not oneself but interferes with oneself. The complexity of all 
these connections is amplified by the fundamental role of possibility. One's fundamental non-
indifference towards oneself as a formal @!(,6 is "distributed" throughout what one perceives 
as being oneself (what is "deformalized" as oneself) at any given time, but this "distribution" 
entails as a fundamental element the anticipation that, in a while, one will continue to be what 
one is right now, and the corresponding anticipation that, in a while, one will continue to be 
non-indifferent towards what one now takes oneself to be. Additionally, given that this "first 
distribution" is intrinsically connected to the second one and defined by it, just as the "second 
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distribution" is connected to the first and defined by it, there is also a corresponding 
anticipation that, in a while, the things that are not @!(,/A but interfere with what is will still be 
perceived with the same positive non-indifference or negative non indifference or functional 
indifference that they have now. 
But possibility plays a much larger role than this. For it is also a decisive element in a) the 
connection between all the elements that are perceived as @!(,/A, in b) the connection between 
all the elements that are not @!(,/A, and in c) the connection between all the elements that are 
@!(,/A and the ones that are not. 
 To fully understand this, we need to re-consider the role of the multiple active and passive 
E92;!&. Indeed, as Hierocles' examples show, these E92;!& are always involved in every 
perception, and they bring to the table a form of anticipation — a form of anticipation that puts 
one's own parts in connection with each other and with a complex +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6'. For 
example, a bull's perception of its horns is connected to its perception of their possible (and 
perhaps also present) use for defence, and the latter is connected a) to perception of its other 
parts as weaker and capable of being defended by the horns, and b) to the bull's perception of 
an external threat, say another animal that might harm the bull, and that might harm the bull 
with certain parts (but not with others) and c) to the bull's perception that this other animal 
might be harmed by the bull's horns (namely in some parts more easily than in others). This 
example and corresponding explanation are very incomplete. However, a thorough 
consideration of this problem has already been made. The point I now want to stress is that all 
of this also means that these E92;!& are expressions of non-indifference, or, to be more precise, 
they are expressions of one's fundamental non-indifference towards oneself and of what I have 
termed the first and second "distributions" of one's fundamental non-indifference towards 
oneself. The essential connection between these intrinsically /012&3#&'-related E92;!& and one's 
intrinsically non-indifferent #()!*#$%#&' helps to grasp the inherently anticipative and 
prospective character of all perception. 
In fact, one has to understand that, if there were no fundamental positive non-indifference 
towards oneself, there would be no E92;!& (or at least there would not be E92;!& in the sense we 
are aquainted with). Our concept of E92*! (and of Q97/)) presupposes non-indifference —it 
presupposes /012*3#&'. One only needs to defend oneself if one has any non-indifference 
towards oneself, just as one only looks for water if one is interested in finding it, and this only 
happens if one is interested, say, in drinking it, and this could not happen if one were radically 
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indifferent to oneself100. One only seeks water if one perceives it as being beneficial to oneself, 
and this presupposes a) a non-indifference towards oneself that identifies what is important for 
oneself (in a positive and negative way), and b) a non-indifference towards oneself that makes 
one b.1) strive and look for the things that one identifies as favourable to oneself (the things 
towards which there is as a positive non-indifference) and b.2) reject or have an aversion 
towards the things that are perceived as prejudicial to oneself (the things towards which there is 
as a negative non-indifference).101 
 It is this intricately articulated non-indifference towards oneself (i.e. towards what one 
takes oneself to be — which is actually the object of the examples102 — and towards external 
things that makes one anticipate in a non-indifferent manner what might happen to oneself. It is 
only because I am non-indifferent towards myself that I am concerned with what happens to 
me. In other words, it is only because I am non-indifferent towards myself (towards what I take 
myself to be) that I look after myself and care for myself. And all the multiple active and 
passive E92;!& have this form of a non-indifferent anticipation of what might happen to me and 
what I might do in that case. Because of this, these non-indifference-related active and passive 
E92;!& entail a looking after myself and also a looking out for what might interfere with my life 
and affect me — i.e. they entail a non-indifferent looking out for ,F C1,6'. 
Now, these concomitant looking after myself and looking out for what might interfere with 
myself bring us back to the inherently anticipative and prospective character of all !"#$%#&' 
viz.#()!*#$%#&'. The above establishes a fundamental link between possibility and non-
indifference, for it depicts possibility as being always a non-indifferent anticipation of what can 
happen to oneself and of what one mighht do in this and that scenario.103 And because this non-
indifferent anticipation involves a concomitant non-indifferent looking after myself and looking 
out for what is not @!(,/A but might interfere with what is, this description is in fact a 
description of my inherently anticipative andp rospective non-indifferent #()!*#$%#&'. To put 
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100 To be sure, an Epicurean could contend, i.e. it could be said, that one only looks for water because of an inherent and 
inalienable connection to pleasure. As I said previously, I will not embrak on a full scale debate of the Epicureans’ 
opposition to the Hierocles' claims. However, I would like to stress the obvious Stoic counter-argument: one can only 
seek water for pleasure if one is non-indifferent to pleasure. Furthermore — and this is where I need to be more careful 
— this non-indifference to pleasure presupposes what I termed the fundamental positive non-indifference towards 
oneself. 
101As is easy to see, b) is where the N9µM comes into play. 
102 This happens because of what I have termed the "fundamental equation". 
103 This means that we are never mere bystanders: even when we see a fight in the street between people we do not 
know, we perceive it with a negative non-indifference or a functional indifference, but we are not radically indifferent to 
it just because we are not involved in it. Everything is perceived within the context of one's fundamental non-
indifference towards oneself; and this means that everything is defined by it. In fact, looking after myself and looking 
out for what might happen to me also involve a non-indifference towards what plays a role in my life as something that 
does not affect me, that cannot harm  me, and so on and so forth. 
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it in a nutshell, we can say that this inherently anticipative and prospective non-indifferent 
#()!*#$%#&' of ,F @!(,/A and ,F C1,6' has the form of a continuous '92*K4 or -<4'92*K4. To be 
even more specific, it has the form of a continuous '92*K4 or -<4'92*K4 ;0<'?. 
Hierocles is describing !"#$%#&' as a cura sui. That is what it means when we say that 
!"#$%#&' is always an intrinsically prospective and /012*3#&'-related #()!*#$%#&' of both its 
sub-fields and of the multiple present and possible connections between them. In other words, 
#()!*#$%#&' corresponds to the relational identification of everything that is significant to 
oneself in a positive, a negative and a functionally indifferent way, both in the present and in 
the future. Thus, !"#$%#&' viz. #()!*#$%#&' corresponds to what might be termed an essential 
"non-indifferent appraisal of one's situation". This "non-indifference-related appraisal of one's 
situation" involves all elements perceived as significant to oneself at each and every moment 
(both present and possible). 
I will try to clarify this crucial notion of "non-indifference-related appraisal of one's 
situation". Hierocles' examples describe !"#$%#&' viz. #()!*#$%#&' as being a continuous 
appraisal or assessment of the situation one is in — as a continuous and non-indifference-
related appraisal or assessment of what one is dealing with, of where one stands. They depict 
perception as a process that is continuously asking questions while at the same time solving 
them and already providing the answers. On this basis, we do not realize we have questions 
because what we perceive is always the result of the answers to them. The examples we have 
considered throughout the text present what we perceive in the form of "this is what I am 
dealing with" or "this is where I stand" (which is exactly as we see them). 
In fact, Hierocles' examples and arguments portray a perception that from the very outset 
has to do with questions and is non-indifferent towards the answering of these questions. In 
other words, they portray a perception that is always non-indifferent towards the identification 
of what one is dealing with, (and that therefore entails the identification of the role each thing 
plays in one's life). In this sense, perception takes the form of a set of questions that are always 
being answered. It is as if perception took the form of non-indifferent questions regarding 
oneself and what interferes with oneself. And, because one is interested in oneself, one is also 
interested in finding out "what one is dealing with" — in finding out "where one stands" or in 
finding out "how things stand" — and this generates a constant pressure of non-indifference to 
get the answers to these questions. Perception is the constant process that simultaneously asks 
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and answers these questions, i.e it is the constant solution of a non-indifference-related set of 
questions, of which we see only the final result.104 
We can also say that perception has the form of a process that is continuously making and 
solving non-indifferent questions regarding the identification of one's vital situation: what is the 
situation I am in? Which things are significant for me in this context? Which ones are 
significant in a positive way? Which ones are significant in a negative way? Which are not 
significant (in the sense of a functional indifference)?105 
The idea of a checklist helps us to understand this "non-indifference-related appraisal of 
one's situation". It is as if perception was constantly making an inventory of what one is dealing 
with, and doing it in the form of a checklist. It makes a set of questions and then ticks the boxes 
that correspond to what one is dealing with, and leaves the other boxes clear. For example: 
everything I perceive is shaped by this silent question: safe or dangerous? It is as if perception 
had a list with "safe" and a box in front, and then "dangerous" and a box in front, and then it is 
constantly appraising and assessing what it is dealing with by crossing either one box or the 
other. As is easy to see, the list is a much longer and more complex one: besides asking if what 
I am dealing with is "dangerous" or "safe" it also asks if it is "uncertainly safe", "uncertainly 
safe but still closer to safe than to dangerous", and, in the case of dealing with something 
"dangerous" if it "moves" or "does not move", if it "can cut me" or if it can "only hit me", and 
so on. 
It is, of course, true that we do not realize that these questions "in-form" our perception; 
but this only happens because we are always dealing with the answers given by perception 
itself. However, if we did not have these questions and non-indifference towards their answers, 
we would not perceive what we.  
To sum up, perception is all about a non-indifferent situational diagnosis. This diagnosis is 
intrinsically life-related: it is a vital and non-indifferent diagnosis.  
Let us take walking as an example: when I am walking I am identifying which members I 
need to use to walk, but also identifying what I am walking upon. But this is far more complex, 
for identifying which members I use to walk entails identifying which members I do not use to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
104 It would also be interesting to explore how this is connected to the notion of equation I used in the first section. In 
fact, this connection was anticipated in the stating of the problem that drives this thesis. However, a thorough 
consideration of this problem would lead us away from Hierocles' text and would require more time and space than we  
have here. 
105 There are more questions than these, and more profound ones, such as "what/who am I?", "what matters to me?" that 
are presupposed in Hierocles' analysis. Nevertheless, I will not consider them, for they would pose several problems and 
objections I cannot deal with. These other questions have to do with the core of /01203#&'. They deal with the 
fundamental question of identity, and with the fact that there is always an already given answer to this fundamental 
question. 
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walk, just as identifying what I am walking upon presupposes a distinction between that and 
what does not play any significant role in my walking. And the point is that all these 
identifications are in fact answers to questions I am forced to make because I am non-
indifferent towards myself and towards what happens to me. These questions are questions 
such as: which members do I use to walk? What I am walking upon? Can I walk on this 
surface? Are there any holes I could stumble upon? But obviously, these questions are a very 
small example of a much larger set of non-indifferent questions entailed by my continuous 
'92*K4 or -<4'92*K4 of myself. Actually, the fact that I am constantly and uninterruptedly 
looking after myself and also looking out for what might interfere with my life poses a much 
larger set of inter-related questions, as for example: am I safe or threatened? If the latter is the 
case, what kind of dangers am I facing? How could I be harmed? How can I defend myself? 
What are my weapons for defence? Where can I harm him whom I am defending myself 
against? Is it better to run away and escape? If it is better to escape, where can I run away to? 
Can I run on this ground? Is there a precipice I could fall down? Are there holes where I could 
trip and fall? If I cannot run, how can I defend myself? Is it by using my hands? By using my 
feet?106 
Now, it is true that we do not realize that we have these questions, but the reason for this is 
the one stated before: we are already dealing with the answer; for perception gives the answer. 
What I see is a bull running towards me with horns that can make a big hole in any part of my 
body and a wall I can hide behind to protect myself. But this perception of the bull and of the 
wall entails a myriad of other silent elements: the bull's horns are more dangerous than the 
space between them and than the hooves; and the hooves are more dangerous than its back or 
its tail; and getting pierced in my leg by its horns is worse that getting kicked in my leg by its 
hooves, while getting pierced in the belly by its horns is worse than in the leg but better than in 
the chest or the neck or the head (and maybe getting kicked by the bull in the belly would be 
better than being pierced in the leg by its horn). At the same time, the perception of the wall I 
can hide behind is completely different if there is a bull running towards me or not; for if there 
is a bull running towards me the wall is immediately perceived as a place to hide and to be safe. 
Obviously, this whole assessment of my situation is steeped in non-indifference: it is only 
because I care about myself that I want to avoid being hit by the bull; it is only because I care !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
106 It is important to note that all these questions can take the form of the above-mentioned checklist: for example, 
assessing how I can defend myself can be articulated into the assessment of which parts of my body are able to defend 
me; in which case perception would tick the boxes of the ones that are usable for defence, and not the ones of the parts 
that are not usable for defence— and one has to realize that identifying which parts are not usable for defence is just as 
important (entails the same level of non-indifference) as knowing which parts are usable for defence. 
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about myself that I have a greater negative non-indifference towards its horns than towards its 
legs or back; it is only because I care about myself that I perceive the wall as a place to hide 
behind which I can find safety, and so on and so forth.  
It is very important to stress that perception as “the appraisal of one's situation" — say, a 
situation in which a bull is running towards one or a situation in which one is completely safe 
— corresponds to a differential diagnosis in the medical sense of the word: a process of 
questioning that aims at reducing a broad spectrum of potential diseases to a specific 
identification of what one is dealing with. Using the example of the bull, it is easy to grasp that, 
when I see a bull getting closer to me (whether it has already been running from afar or not), I 
never perceive just a bull: I perceive a bull that is either getting closer to me and coming in my 
direction or getting closer to me but not paying much attention to me; I perceive either a small 
bull or a normal-sized bull or a big bull; I perceive a bull that is either an adult with fully 
developed horns or a baby bull or a "teenage" bull; I perceive a bull that has its horns either 
intact or cut off at the tip or cut off from the base of the head. In sum, my perception takes the 
form of a continuous differential diagnosis solving a complex set of alternatives. These 
alternatives correspond to different possibilities, and perception corresponds to the elimination 
of some of them and the confirmation of others (as suggested by the idea of a checklist). 
Of course, my perception of the bull is already a perception of a big adult bull with long 
un-clipped horns, but this corresponds to the elimination of all the other possibilities. And we 
can easily understand this through a very basic "Gedanken experiment": if I could not see 
properly (if for example the bull was far away or if I was short-sighted and had forgotten my 
glasses) these questions would surface and I would knit my brow in an attempt to focus on the 
bull and to understand what am I dealing with. The same happens if I am walking alone at night 
and see a group of sketchy-looking guys coming closer: are they coming in my direction to 
mug me or are they just passing by? How many of them are there? How big are they? Do they 
have guns? Can I defend myself? Can I run away? Where to? What do I have with me that they 
can take? How important is it? All of these questions, and especially the answers to them define 
what I in fact perceive: for these people will be perceived in a completely different way — they 
will be perceived as completely different things — if the answers vary. If the answer to the 
implicit question "are they going to mug me?" is "yes", my perception of them includes as 
decisive elements (indeed as the defining element) the ideas of "muggers" and of "danger"; 
whereas if the answer is "no" my perception of these same people (of the same size and with 
the same colours and smells) includes as a defining element the idea of "not dangerous". And 
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this shapes what I see in such a way that I perceive radically different things if I perceive them 
as muggers or as "people passing by". 
 Both these examples serve to show that a situation of uncertainty brings to the surface the 
questions that are always present in our perception and shaping it, but that we tend not so see 
because they are answered by perception itself. 
If we return to the medical sense of this differential diagnosis, we also understand that this 
differential diagnosis is intrinsically defined by non-indifference towards being healthy 
(#3,%9*!) and towards the degree of health or sickness, but also by the course of treatment, i.e. 
by one's reaction to it. As happens with doctors, the diagnosis is inseparable from the course of 
treatment (even if the diagnosis corresponds to being fine and hence to not needing to change 
anything, or to being so sick that there is no cure). As is easy to see, this is the role of N9µM in 
this metaphor. But even this is decided via a reduction from a broad range of possibilities to a 
specific course of action: in this "situation", what is the best course of treatment? Is it A? Or is 
it B or C? Which are the strengths and weaknesses of each? How do these strengths and 
weaknesses adapt or relate to the strengths and weaknesses of the disease? The answer to all of 
these questions defines what I am dealing with, where I stand.107 
To sum up: perception takes the form of a continuous diagnosis of one's non-indifference-
related situation. This happens because one is interested in oneself and therefore in 
understanding "what one is dealing with" ("where things stand", that is, in the final analysis, 
"where one stands")"108. In this sense, perception is a continuous answer to a set of self-
referential questions, and indeed in such a way that the answers are picked from a range of 
possible answers. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
107One cannot say it often enough: every situation I am in is a "non-indifference-related situation". In fact, it could be 
objected that I am indeed in a "(non-indifference-related) situation" when I perceive myself chased by a bull, but not so 
much when I am drinking a beer on my couch. However, given that my non-indifference towards myself is continuous 
and uninterrupted, even in the latter case I am in a " non-indifference-related situation". In fact, this is also very easy to 
understand. First of all, drinking a beer (or water) is never a radically indifferent matter. For this reason, even in such 
circumstance there are basic questions: what part of my body can I drink with? How can I get to the beer (for example: is 
it in a bottle or in a glass)? Which parts of my body do I use to hold the bottle and bring it closer to my mouth? We are 
not usually aware of these questions; but the reason for this is once again the same: as Hierocles says, perception of my 
body parts essentially entails a co-perception of the Q97! for which I have those parts. Furthermore, perception of each 
part is connected to the other parts and to external things. When I am drinking a beer, there is a co-perception of my 
hands (which have fingers and are capable of grabbing) that are holding the bottle and of my feet that are not holding the 
bottle and of my arms that help in raising my hands (and of all my other body parts) and of a bottle that is solid (and will 
not shatter if I grab it) and completely closed except for a small hole at the top which fits the size of my mouth, and so 
on. But, most important of all, the reasons why I am calmly drinking my beer are because I perceive that there is no 
danger (no one poisoned it, it is not its use-by-date, etc..) and there is nothing more urgent to do, so that I can take a 
break. This is a very incomplete example, and it is also explained in a very incomplete fashion. However, my point is 
that there is a non-indifferent diagnosis of the "drinking a beer" siutaion and of all other situations I might find myself 
in. 
108 If this were a study focused on Stoicism in general, we could make a bolder step here and say that "This happens 
because am interested in myself and therefore in knowing what I am dealing with". This "need to know" is obviously 
present in what I am saying, but to consider it thoroughly would amount to an entirely new study. 
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But there is still another side to the meaning of "situation". This side has to do with the role 
of the 829&BE/), and it is obviously linked to the previous one. In fact, "situation" is also used to 
indicate the idea of a surrounding environment (829&BE/)) or a surrounding context. The point 
is that perception of anything alreday involves an identification of the situation one is in. Now, 
because one is interested in oneself, one is interested in the situation one is in and in everything 
perceived within that situation. And this meaning of "situation" as 829&BE/) or context forces us 
to focus on how big the scope of +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6' involved here is. Put differently, it forces 
us to ask: how far does one's non-indifference towards ,F C1,6' stretch? How big is this 
"situation"? How large is this context? 
The answer to this question has already been given en passant: this "non-indifferent 
situation" involves all elements perceived as significant to oneself at each and every moment 
(both present and potential). This means that one's "non-indifference-related situation" is 
always a delimitation of the total sphere of non-indifference. As we have seen, there is no such 
thing as a (radically) indifferent perception, which means that one's situation corresponds to the 
whole perceptive field (which entails both present and potential elements). At stake in every 
moment of perception is a total sphere of non-indifference. As we saw at the end of the first 
section, perception of any moment of +),*-%.&' @!(,/A involves every other moment of 
+),*-%.&' @!(,/A and of +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6', just as perception of any moment of +),*-%.&' 
,:) C1,6' involves every other moment of +),*-%.&' ,:) C1,6' and of +),*-%.&' @!(,/A. 
Given that these two sub-fields complete the whole realm of !"#$%#&', this means that 
perception of every single moment is a co-perception of the whole perceptive field. And now 
we understand that this happens precisely because perception is always an interested 
perception, which is intrinsically defined by one's fundamental non-indifference towards 
oneself and (therefore) towards external things, a perception that is constantly non-indifferent 
to the diagnosis of "what one is dealing with". 
If we combined this "total" aspect of one's "non-indifferent situation" with the 
"interrogative" one, we might say that our non-indifferent #()#!*#$%#&' is always scanning 
and diagnosing all present and possible elements of a "vital situation" towards which one is 
non-indifferent. 
The fact that the perception of anything is always defined in connection with the whole 
perceptive field and by its connection to it is also very important because it serves to show that 
perception is never a perception of what I have termed a perceptum per se.  We never perceive 
a simple "sensitive"(sensory?) content, so to speak. To use an example: I do not perceive two 
white, long and curved cylinders with a conical end at the tip of each of them, attached to a 
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black mass with a strange kind of parallelepiped block attached to a longer and differently 
shaped parallelepiped part (longer than the first one), which is in turn attached to a black and 
somehow cylindrical figure with four perpendicular and slimmer cylindrical pieces. Neither do 
I perceive a black smudge with a specific smell and making a specific noise.109 Instead, I 
immediately perceive a bull — and, what is more, the bull is an essential component of the 
situation I find myself in. And this perception of a bull is intrinsically and immediately defined 
by everything we have just seen: not only by its being able to pierce me with its horns and to 
kick me with its hooves, by its having a weak point in its back (and so on), but also by the fact 
that it is running towards me, and so on. The point is that perception of the same bull is 
different if it is running towards me or not; just as, if it is running towards me, perception of it 
will vary if there is a fence between us or not. At the same time, if the bull's horns are clipped, 
this does not just change my perception of the horns themselves, but it also changes my 
perception of the whole bull: for even though it is still perceived as capable of hitting me, it is 
not perceived as capable of piercing me. In this case, even the bull's legs are perceived in a 
different way, for they are the legs of a bull that can hit me but not pierce me — they are 
perceived as being the legs of a bull that can hit me but not pierce me (and they are thus also 
defined by the bull's incapacity to pierce me).  
Once again, it is important to note that perception of a bull with horns is always defined by 
the anticipation of the horns' ability to pierce me (and by the bull's ability to move both its legs 
and its head, etc.), whether the bull is actually trying to use this ability or not. This is connected 
to the description Hierocles makes of perception of one's parts as a co-perception of their 
function. This co-perception is intrinsic to perception of something external, just as perception 
of other animals is always a perception of their parts and their functions in connection to 
oneself. This happens because perception of everything is a non-indifferent perception that is 
constantly diagnosing what one is dealing with: a perception that is considering a vast array of 
possibilities and identifying which of them are actually at stake. For example, perception of a 
horn that a) is able to pierce me, but b) is attached to a bull that is not trying to attack me is 
defined by a functional indifference towards that horn; whereas perception of that very same 
horn attached to a bull that is trying to get me is perceived with a very strong negative non-
indifference. In the former case, the horn is still perceived as able to impale me (this possibility 
is considered and included in my perception of the horn); but because the bull is not trying to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
109 And even if I did perceive something like this, it would not correspond to a mere perceptum per se, i.e. to a pure 
presence of some purely esthetical content (whatever that might be), for even this corresponds to the identification of 
colours and shapes. 
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get me, this possibility is functionally indifferent in my assessment of the situation I find 
myself in. If the bull suddenly started to attack me, the ability of its horns to pierce me would 
gain a leading role in my "non-indifference-related situation" (or "vital situation"); and both the 
bull and its horns would be perceived in a completely different way — they would be perceived 
as something that can harm me and potentially kill me. Because I have a positive non-
indifference towards my well-being, I would perceive the bull and its horns with a great 
negative non-indifference (which would be distributed differently throughout the different parts 
of the bull), and this would generate a concomitant impulse to escape the bull (and especially 
its horns). 
Thus, instead of corresponding to the pure presence of a perceptum per se, our perception 
corresponds to a continuous process of diagnosis that is essentially interpretative and 
evaluative. This "hermeneutical" characteristic of perception is obviously linked to the fact that 
perception takes the form of non-indifferent questions regarding oneself and what interferes 
with oneself. This means that perception is not a neutral apprehension of a pure sensory content 
(of a perceptum per se), it rather essentially interprets and evaluats this "perceptive content" 
from the very outset. This happens is such a way that there is no contact with a "perceptive 
content" without one already interpreting and evaluating it — our contact with a "perceptive 
content" is immediately a contact with an answer to the non-indifference-related perceptive 
questions. We perceive everything through the lens of the non-indifference-related questions: 
our perception functions as a form or structure that organizes perceptive content in accordance 
with our non-indifference towards the understanding of "what we are dealing with". For this 
reason, whatever we perceive is always perceived within this structure of non-indifference, 
defined by it and made possible by it.110 
In fact, my perception of a bull's horns is defined by their ability to harm me, and this 
possibility is defined by my non-indifference towards myself, and indeed in such a way that I 
would not perceive the horns in the way I do if I did not perceive them as (potentially) 
dangerous. Put briefly, the complex structure of an interested co-perception that enables me to 
perceive the bull's horns as dangerous is the structure that enables me to perceive horns the way 
I do. But this "danger" is not something a perceptum per se can give me: it is rather something 
that is made possible by the complex structure of my non-indifferent perception. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
110 What we see is a synthesis of this form and its content, and we are not able to identify what  the identification of 
either the form or the content apart from each other would correspond to. There is the problem of an original duality, for 
indeed there must be some kind of perceptive content that constitutes the "material" or "sensory side of my perception. 
However, I cannot consider this problem here. 
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According to this description, the complex structure of our interested perception that we 
have been trying to describe amounts to a constant condition sine qua non of perception as we 
know it. Indeed, when we try to analyse Hierocles' examples as we have been doing, what we 
come up with is the skeleton that enables perception to work the way it does: the structure that 
enables us to see what we see, to hear what we hear, etc.. 
But there is still another characteristic that plays a decisive role in this structure: we have 
termed it the functional non-indifferent distance from the @!(,6. To get a new glimpse at this 
problem, I will start by considering the well-known fragment from Stoabeus,111 which contains 
a passage from Hierocles' "How to deal with one's relatives". 
The fragment starts like this: "\-3' 7F9 ]1!#,/' cµ:) /i/) 1D1-/&' 8/--/;' 
829&7B79!8,!&, ,/;' µV) #µ&196,29/&', ,/;' PV µ2*>/&, 1!R ,/R' µV) 829*E/(#&, ,/R' PV 
829&2E/µB)/&', 1!,F ,F' P&!469/(' 1!R +)*#/(' 89=' +--M-/(' #EB#2&'." This is, so to speak, 
the formal structure of what he is about to describe. After this, Hierocles goes on to give some 
content to this structure by identifying what is contained in each circle. In doing so, he helps to 
clarify what the criterion, according to which some things are closer to the centre than others, is 
(i.e. he helps to clarify what he means by "1!,F ,F' P&!469/(' 1!R +)*#/(' 89=' +--M-/(' 
#EB#2&'"). He says that the centre (1B),9/)) itself is the P&<)/&!. Then he says that the first 
circle encloses the #:µ! and the things taken for the sake of the body ("C) â 1D1-_ ,= ,2 #:µ! 
829&BE2,!& 1!R ,F ,/A #Tµ!,/' ])21! 8!92&-5µµB)!"). This circle is the smallest one, and it 
almost touches the centre itself ("#EBP/) 7F9 N G9!ED,!,/' 1!R µ&19/A P2;) !H,/A 
89/#!8,6µ2)/' ,/A 1B),9/( 1D1-/' /y,/'"). The second circle is further away from the centre 
("8-B/) µV) +42#,w' ,/A 12),9/A") but it encompasses the first ("829&BE3) PV ,=) 89:,/)"), 
and it contains parents, siblings, wife and children. And then the circles go on, increasingly 
further away from the centre, populated by people that are increasingly distant from us — 
people with whom we have increasingly weaker bonds of affection. The point is that these 
circles encompass literally everyone, i. e., that there is no person left outside this structure – no 
person that is not placed in some such circle, as distant as it may be. In other words, the point is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
111 Stobaeus  4.671,7—673,II. We follow Long & Sedley's translation — Cf. Long, Anthony A & Sedley, David N., The 
Hellenistic Philosophers, Volume I and II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987. One could here object that 
there is not direct connection between the {$&1O u,/&E2*3#&' and the fragment from Stobaeus. For one of these texts 
focuses specifically on the relationship of /012*3#&' amongst humans, whereas the other — or at least its surviving part 
— focuses on animal behaviour, which is defined precisely as being different from human. However, this objection fails 
to comprehend the key point that underlines the whole text and the whole thesis so far elaborated: Hierocles is trying to 
describe animal standpoint as one that is continuous with the adult human standpoint. Even though such assumption is 
problematic (as we see in Attachment 2), still it is clearly stated by Hierocles that the {$&1O u,/&E2*3#&' describes 
animal behaviour and perception as a mean to explain human perception and ethics. For this reason, and despite the 
absence of a single word from Hierocles to connect the two texts, it makes all the sense to analyse both of them together. 
Furthermore, the formal structure portrayed by the fragment from Stobaeus reflects the general structure of perception 
and /012*3#&' as found in the {$&1O u,/&E2*3#&'. My goal in the next pages is to show exactly this. 
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that the whole realm of our fellow human beings is structured like this – so that it is like a set of 
concentric circles expressing both the closeness or distance of the relation to/from oneself (the 
increasing distance from the self) and the varying degree of /012*3#&' (its decreasing intensity). 
As is easy to anticipate, my brief discussion of this concentrates on the structure of the 
concentric circles and on the criterion used to establish these circles' distance from the centre. 
This is why I have especially focused on the beginning of the fragment — where this structure 
is depicted — and have not paid the same attention to the other details. Bearing this in mind, 
there are several aspects one has to consider when trying to connect this fragment with the 
{$&1O u,/&E2*3#&' (and in particular with the role played by !"#$%#&'viz. /012*3#&' in human 
and animal life, and with the question concerning what perception is all about). 
1) The first thing to note is that Hierocles is describing a formal structure. He is not saying 
that everyone necessarily puts his or her siblings and wife or husband in the second circle, and 
the aunts and uncles in the third, distant relatives in the fourth, and so on. In fact, one can come 
to have a closer relationship with one's aunt or grandmother than with one’s mother, just as one 
can have a closer relationship with a distant cousin than with an uncle or a grandfather or even 
a brother. Other peoples' distance from the centre may vary from person to person. And, what is 
more, one can even put someone in different circles at different times: one can put one's 
siblings in the first circle until there is something to inherit, and then those same siblings can 
move out to the furthest circles of /012*3#&' (or even to a leading position in the field of 
+--/,9*3#&').112 
So this means that Hierocles is first and foremost designing a formal structure of proximity 
to the centre. This proximity is an (E$*+,-#.-related proximity. It depicts the variation of the 
intensity of one's positive non-indifference towards other people: the greater one's positive non-
indifference towards someone is, the closer that person is to the centre (to oneself); the weaker 
one's positive non-indifference towards someone is, the further away that person is from the 
centre. 
2) The second thing to note is that this formal structure is also the structure of +--/,9*3#&'. 
To be sure, in the Stobaeus fragment there is no mention of +--/,9*3#&' or of any such thing as 
concentric circles of +--/,9*3#&'. But, as was seen at the beginning of this second section, 
(E$*+,-#. and +--/,9*3#&' are two sides of the same coin. And they share this very same 
structure, since they both have to do with non-indifference – or rather with self-related non-
indifference – and the fact is that in both cases there are degrees of non-indifference: the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
112 Or, for example, it also easy to see for a close friend from adolescence or childhood to be seen as a very distant 
person after a few decades. 
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intensity of +--/,9*3#&' concerning another human being varies according to how close and 
how grave the menace represented by the person in question has become to the central person 
around whom everything else and everybody else revolve. Just as one's positive non-
indifference identifies different intensities of positive non-indifference according to the 
functional distance from the centre, so too one's negative non-indifference identifies different 
intensities of negative non-indifference according to the functional distance from the centre. In 
the case of the latter, the closer something towards which I have a negative non-indifference is 
to the centre, the greater my negative non-indifference towards it; and the further way from the 
centre, the weaker my negative non-indifference towards it. 
3) Thirdly, this formal structure must not be seen merely as the structure of one's 
relationship with other people. It is rather the structure that depicts one's non-indifferent 
relationship with everything. In other words, on closer inspection it turns out that the formal 
structure of the concentric circles depicted in the Stobaeus fragment is the formal structure of 
all perception – or, to be more precise, the formal structure of all perceptum. Other people are 
just a part of this broader picture – i. e., just a case of what happens with all perception and all 
perceptum. To be sure, perception may vary from case to case – and in some cases it may be 
relatively less complex. But the point is that no matter how relatively simple perception may 
be,113 the perceptum essentially has the structure of Hierocles’ concentric circles. And it all has 
to do with the above-mentioned essential connection between 08-"9-#. and non-indifference 
viz. between 08-"9-#. and (E$*+,-#.. In the final analysis, Hierocles’ circles describe 
perception as a perception that locates everything114 according to its non-indifference-related 
proximity or distance to/from the centre, i.e. according to its non-indifference-related functional 
proximity or distance to/from oneself. 
4) By describing a series of concentric circles, where the larger ones encompass the 
smaller ones, this structure emphasizes the fundamentally centred character of !"#$%#&' viz. 
/012*3#&'. Now, this centred character of !"#$%#&' viz. /012*3#&' is not centred in the sense of 
being physically centred in a body that serves as a support for perception. It is rather centred in 
the sense that everything revolves around oneself and one's fundamental positive non-
indifference towards oneself. In other words, it is centred in the sense that it corresponds to the 
identification of what might be described as a functional – non-indifference-related – 
"surroundingness" with regard to the centre (which is the source and cornerstone of all non-
indifference), namely to oneself. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
113 And, as pointed out above, in Hierocles’ view it is essentially complex.  
114Please remember that there was no one outside the circles. 
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In this sense, this structure identifies different levels of functional proximity or distance 
to/from oneself, which vary according to one's fundamental positive non-indifference towards 
oneself and subsequent positive and negative non-indifference towards what is not oneself but 
relates to oneself.  
This is where the first and second "distributions" come into play. For this structure 
describes these "distributions" as "centred distributions". Accordingly, these circles also bring 
us back to the fundamental distinction between +),&-M.&'@!(,/A and+),&-M.&' ,:) C1,6'. Let 
us take a closer look at this. 
Upon closer inspection of the circles, it is easy to see that the first circle corresponds to the 
89:,/)/012*/). As we said, this 89:,/)/012;/) involves one's fundamental non-indifference 
towards oneself, one's positive non-indifference towards one's #D#,!#&' (the "first 
distribution") and one's positive non-indifference towards the things that immediately promote 
one's #D#,!#&' (the latter already belongs to the "second distribution").115 Within this first 
circle, there is already a distinction between what is @!(,/A and what is not @!(,/A. The 
percepta that are not @!(,/A are perceived with positive non-indifference for the sake of 
(])21!) the percepta that are @!(,/A, and this shows that even within the first circle some 
percepta are closer to the centre than others.  The percepta that are perceived as @!(,/A are the 
closest to the centre, and then, within the field of what is not perceived as @!(,/A, different 
percepta are at different distances from the centre. We can see that there is a fundamental non-
indifference-related opposition between +),&-M.&'@!(,/A and+),&-M.&' ,:) C1,6', which is the 
fundamental opposition between a centre and its I*2#5)(4. But then this 829&CE/) unfolds in a 
series of concentric circles: it has an onion-like structure with several concentric circles around 
the centre, and these circles are located increasingly further away from that centre. The "second 
distribution" — which stems from one's fundamental positive non-indifference towards oneself 
and from the "first distribution" — consists in the distribution of different intensities of positive 
and negative non-indifference towards external things according to their functional distance 
from oneself (according to the way they interfere in a greater or lesser degree with one's 
fundamental positive non-indifference towards oneself).This is the point I would like to stress 
here: the onion-like structure of all perception viz. of all perceptum. Perceptum is essentially a 
manifold; and this manifold always has a centre, around which everything else revolves. In 
other words, the manifold is composed of a centre and – around it – a I*2#5)(4, i. e. an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
115 As explained in Attachment 1, the first distribution is directed towards one's own #D#,!#&' because the #D#,!#&'  is 
what one takes oneself to be. 
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environment. On the other hand, the I*2#5)(4 itself has the structure of an onion-like manifold 
(the structure of Hierocles’ concentric circles). I. e., it is not only a question of a centre and a 
I*2#5)(4 – it is rather a question of a centre and a multilayered, onion-like I*2#5)(4. We could 
also say that perception is essentially perception of oneself and one's environment: it is always 
about a centre (a centre of positive non-indifference) and what might be termed  
"surroundingness" or "aroundness" (different degrees of "surroundingness" or "aroundness”).  
5) And all this means that, in re, there is a strong connection between the two texts (the 
{$&1Ou,/&E2*3#&' and the Stobaeus fragment), for they are indeed describing the same formal 
structure of /012*3#&' viz. of all !"#$%#&'. 
With the help of this, we can finally understand that perception — as described by 
Hierocles — is all about a non-indifference-related differential diagnosis of a situation in which 
things (all percepta) are defined by their functional non-indifference to oneself.  
This differential diagnosis takes the form of non-indifferent questions that identify what 
one is dealing with. It involves the identification of where each of these things (each 
perceptum) stands in a self-centred and non-indifference-related map (the map of oneself, i. e. 
of the situation one finds oneself in). 
 In the end, what we perceive is the result of this complex perceptive process: a result that 
comes in the form of a self-centred and non-indifference-related map. What is perceived is 
essentially defined by its functional proximity or distance to/from the centre of this map, which 
is “oneself”, and by its relative position to all the other things that have a functional distance 
from the centre (and which are both @!(,/A and C1,6'). Furthermore, the functional distance 
everything has from the centre changes according to the identification of the concrete situation 
one finds oneself in. If I am going to the bakery to buy bread, my feet are perceived as very 
important, because I cannot walk without them; but when I get home my feet are relegated to 
the background, and my hands are perceived as being functionally closer to me, because I need 
them to eat the bread. Once again, this means that the same "feet" can be perceived as 
significantly different things according to their functional connection to the centre. In other 
words, this self-centred map is a dynamic map, not in the sense that the form of the map 
changes, but in the sense that the position everything occupies in the map is constantly 
changing — everything except the centre. 
To sum up: perception is all about a form of vital navigation. It is the constant non-
indifferent and self-centred mapping of where one stands and how one can deal with that 
context. Perception is all about a cura sui. 
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Attachment 2 — The scala naturae and its problems 
 
Hierocles' strategy of !"#$% and &'µ()*+$+,) raises the question: is he extracting the 
arguments from "the facts themselves" and from "things that actually happen" or is he using the 
latter to prove arguments he wanted to defend beforehand? On the one hand, it can be said that 
the examples are prone to be interpreted in such a way that they lead to Hierocles' underlying 
thesis. In such case one could argue that Hierocles had a pre-established thesis and uses the 
examples to substantiate his view. On the other hand, it can also be said that the examples are 
used to prove the thesis that originally arose from them. In that case we are dealing with a thesis 
that emerged from empirical observation, and Hierocles exposes the thesis in question by 
calling the reader's attention to the data from which it originally emerged.  As we will see, there 
is most likely some circularity between these two options. 
It is common to say that Hierocles is an orthodox Stoic, and that it is therefore safe to 
assume that he uses the examples given in the -.%/0 &,$%12*3&%4 to prove the traditional Stoic 
doctrine. But then one can wonder about how Hierocles' "forerunners" created this doctrine in 
the first place. On top of that, it would be hard to determine whether the value of the arguments 
depends or not upon the empirical observation of animal behaviour. To better understand all 
these problems one would have to consider the most famous Stoic accounts of child and animal 
behaviour (Cicero De Finibus III 76ff and Seneca ep. 121), and one would also have to focus on 
the importance of empirical observation in Stoic theory. But to dwell on these two problems 
would go far beyond the scope of this study.  
Nevertheless, these questions can help us to highlight an important issue. It can be 
articulated in the following way: regardless of whether Hierocles is extracting his arguments 
from the empirical observation of animal behaviour or using those examples to support his 
arguments, in both cases he is interpreting empirical data to prove a point.  
I would like to focus on Hierocles' use of animal and child-related examples. The latter 
provide the basis for his attempt to get some insight into other living beings1 and to grasp what 
might be called the first person behaviour (their first person perception, their first person 
impulses) from a third person perspective, viz. from empirical observation. In both cases — i.e. 
whether Hierocles extracts his arguments from the empirical facts or is just using the latter to 
confirm his views —, the fact remains that his empirical examples are all about trying to grasp 
first person behaviour from a "third person" point of view. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Notably those that are not exactly like us. 
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In the first case he sees animals viz. children doing this or that and then interprets what he 
sees as a sign of something. To explain this, I will use an example that is not directly connected 
to the text: I can say that every time I pick up my dog's eating bowl and the metal clasps, the 
dog runs to me. After seeing that a few times — and associating that experience with other 
times my dog seemed happy — I might be tempted to conclude that the dog's behaviour proves 
that it likes to eat. This example is obviously a caricature, and philosophers have mocked 
examples like this for ages. There are indeed various gaps between my thesis and the example I 
give. Yet, the point I am trying to make is very simple: not being the dog, I cannot tell if it likes 
to eat, nor if it does not like this food but is starving and will take it even though it hates it, nor 
if the dog is somehow pre-determined to run to me every time it hears that sound because of 
some complex biological or bio-psychological structure, or for any other reason there might be. 
But whatever reason I give for my dog's behaviour, not being the dog, it will always be an 
interpretative one. The same applies to a new-born or a small child: not being in their position, I 
am forced to interpret their first person behaviour from a third person perspective. 
In the second case — the one in which I use the examples to support my argument — the 
problem remains. For if I say that my dog likes to eat, and then use the example of the bowl to 
prove it, this still implies an interpretation of the reason why my dog runs to me when it hears 
the bowl. The analysis of animal and child behaviour in Hierocles' text poses the same problem: 
the thesis and the examples are entangled in such a way that the strength of one depends on the 
other. And this means that there is indeed an interpretation of animal behaviour: this behaviour 
is seen as a sign that seems to confirm the thesis Hierocles is defending (whether or not such 
thesis arose from empirical observation). 
So the alleged "facts themselves" or "things that actually happen" turn out to be just an 
interpretation of animal and child behaviour: not the first person perspective (the perception and 
impulses in question), but rather a third person view about them. Once one realizes that the core 
of the arguments themselves needs to be extracted from these empirical examples, one soon 
understands that the arguments Hierocles uses are open to a series of objections. Given the fact 
that Hierocles' analysis of the structure of perception is based on animal or child-related 
examples — or sleep-related examples, which raise the same problem —, one is forced to admit 
that his account of perception is but a possible interpretation of the facts is refers to. 
Now, this problem can be traced back to the above-mentioned scala naturae (esse, vivere, 
percipere, intelligere). At stake here — i.e. both in the scale and in the examples used by 
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Hierocles — is the presupposition that an adult human is able to correctly grasp the standpoint 
(N.B: the first person perspective) of an animal or child.2 
As we saw before, both animals and human infants fit the level described as percipere, 
whereas adult humans fit the category described as intelligere. To put it in Stoic terminology, 
the latter differs from the former because it is already transformed by !"#$4.  
As we will now see, the main problem here is the fact that the whole scale is built from the 
point of view of intelligere, i.e. from a standpoint already transformed by !"#$4. This poses a 
problem for, on the one hand, both esse and vivere — or for that matter percipere  — are 
essentially related to the absense of intelligere viz. of all !"#$4, while on the other hand the 
whole scala naturae presupposes that the intelligere is able to grasp its own absence.3 In other 
words, the perspective we are talking about —let us call it the scala naturae perspective — 
presupposes that what is less (less complex, etc) can be grasped from the standpoint of what is 
more (more complex, etc.). This kind of perspective forgets that there is a world of difference 
between what is less from the standpoint of what is less (what is less from its own point of 
view) and what is less from the standpoint of what is more. 
Indeed, the building of a scale that categorizes different forms of being into the four layers 
we have described assumes one can understand — from the point of view of the intelligere — !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#!As Professor António Martins has kindly noted, one could object to my use of terms such as "first person perspective" 
and "third person perspective". Indeed, my use of these expressions might suggest that, 1) as a matter of principle, a "first 
person experience" ensures an adequate insight into whatever happens and that 2), in the end, this is the only perspective 
that can have an adequate insight into any phenomenon. This being true, if one is not in the position to experience 
something in the "first person", one is unable to adequately understand what is at stake. 
This objection revolves around two key points: 
First,it is perfectly possible that one has "first person experience" of something and still has absolutely no insight into the 
nature of whatever it is one has a "first person experience" of. For example, we all have "first person experience" of 
perception, but this does not mean that we know the intrinsic nature of Perception, how it is constituted and what it is all 
about. 
The second consists in the fact that, in principle, nothing prevents a "third person experience" from being able a) to grasp 
what it is like to have a "first person" experience of whatever is in question, and, what is more, b) to grasp the inner 
nature of the thing in question (the very inner nature the "first person experience" might have no idea of). 
Now, I understand that by using such broad expressions as "first person perspective" and "third person perspective" I put 
myself in a complicated position. However, I use them for the sake of conciseness to refer to a set of complex 
phenomena.  And the fundamental aspect I want to make clear is that when I use the expression "third person 
perspective", I use it precisely to refer to a complex phenomenon, namely the fact that we are neither able to reconstitute 
what I term a "first person perspective" of infant/animal perception and $5/2*3&%4, nor are we able to adequately 
understand what the inner nature of perception and $5/2*3&%4 is — so that, at the end of the day, all our claims to 
grasping both a) and b) turn out to be nothing more than an illusion. 
So, on the one hand, my use of  "first person perspective" does not presuppose that a "first person perspective" must 
perforce have an adequate insight into its own nature. On the other hand, it should be born in mind that my use of "third 
person perspective" refers to a specific kind of standpoint — a specific kind of "third person standpoint" — that proves 
itself unable to achieve both a) and b).  I am not saying that every kind of "third person perspective" is unable to 
accomplish such a task. On the contrary, my use of the expression "third person perspective" serves only to denote a kind 
of perspective that fails to comprehend a) and b) and that tricks itself into believing it knows what it is talking about 
when speaking of animal and infant behaviour. In doing so, it fails to realize that it does nothing but project its own 
experience onto something it has no absolutely no idea of. 
3  I.e. that the !"#$4 is able to grasp what is defined by the absence of !"#$4. 
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what it is like to be a mere esse or a mere vivere or a mere percipere. But the problem is that 
one can only interpret such states from within one's own standpoint, (namely one that is already 
transformed by !"#$4). In other words, one can only recover those standpoints from an outside 
perspective, since one's own basic structures of esse, vivere and percipere are already 
completely transformed by the presence of intelligere and are therefore heterogeneous to what a 
mere esse, a mere vivere and a mere percipere stand for. Believing one is able to grasp what we 
termed the first person perspective corresponding to the other levels of the scale is indeed what 
makes the scale possible in the first place.  
Let us take a closer look at this. 
First and foremost, as pointed out above, the scala naturae is anchored in one of its parts, 
to wit the last: intelligere. The scale is built from and by the intelligere: instead of building up 
— as one assumes — from the most basic structures,  the scale is actually built by an intelligere 
perspective that subtracts key characteristics from top to the bottom. This then creates a double 
perspective of the scale: 
On the one hand, one believes that the scale starts from esse, i.e. the most basic layer, to 
which complexity is added. This is the intuitive understanding of the scale, the structure it has 
according to its face value: one pictures the most basic structure and then proceeds to the upper 
levels by adding characteristics (viz. complexity) to the previous levels. Such understanding of 
the scale is based on an outside perspective, one that looks into the scale as if it had the ability 
to sit outside of the scale and contemplate it. 
On the other hand, if one looks behind the curtain, it turns out that the scale can only be 
built by someone who is already at the top of the scale and who subtracts complexity from the 
point he is at, in order to comprehend what the previous levels are all about. So first we have 
intelligere, and from that perspective, on attempts to subtract intelligere and picture mere 
percipere and so on and so forth. Put differently:  
percipere = intelligere - something;  
vivere =  intelligere - something - something;  
esse  = intelligere - something - something - something.  
This is the process by which we get the real value of the scale (and of all its components), 
not its face value. The percipere we deal with corresponds to the result of the subtraction I just 
described, and the same applies to vivere and esse. Instead of dealing with an esse that 
corresponds to a mere form of existence (which is its face value), we deal with esse as a result 
of several subtractions made by a standpoint which is already in the state of intelligere (and the 
same thing holds for vivere and percipere). 
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In the final analysis the scale is built on the assumption that the intelligere can grasp a first 
person perspective of all the other levels from its own third person perspective about them4. If 
the intelligere reveals itself unable to properly recreate the other levels of the scale (in a first 
person perspective), then the whole structure crumbles. To put it briefly, if this is so, then it 
turns out that the esse of the scale is but the esse of the intelligere and not what it claims to be: 
the esse from it own perspective (from its first person perspective)5. The same applies to the 
vivere and the percipere, for in these cases too it turns out that the vivere and percipere of the 
scale are the vivere and percipere as seen from the point of view of intelligere and not what 
they claim to be: the vivere from the point of view —or lack thereof— of the vivere itself (the 
vivere as mere vivere) and the percipere from its own point of view (as mere percipere). 
The fundamental (and foundational) belief in the intelligere's ability to retrieve the other 
levels of the scale is in turn based on the assumption that the intelligere's survey into the other 
categories is characterized by transparency. In other words, there is an assumption according to 
which the intelligere can adequately grasp all other levels of the scale — the very ones that are 
defined by lacking what makes intelligere what it is.  
One of the most important things to know about the intelligere's conviction of its ability to 
adequately grasp the other levels of the scale is that this belief has a universal scope. This 
universal scope is constituted by a global assumption of transparency — an assumption that is 
made uno tenore once and for all. In other words, the intelligere believes itself able to have — 
always and beforehand — a transparent access to whatever sits within the scale, so as to be able 
to understand every other moment in an adequate manner (i.e. it believes it can see esse as esse 
itself is, vivere as vivere itself is, percipere as percipere itself is). Deep down, the intelligere 
understands itself as a mere receiver of data6 (the bystander and the Lego paradigms we talked 
about above) and takes that data (per se) to be a direct and trustful account of what is perceived. 
This global or assumption of transparency then enables the intelligere to believe it is able to see 
the esse, vivere and percipere as they are, and not as mediated and shaped by intelligere itself. 
We can also express this by saying that the intelligere understands itself in terms of what 
might be termed the witness point of view. This witness point of view corresponds to a complex 
structure, one that founds the possibility the scale we are dealing with: it corresponds to 
imagining that the intelligere can "get out of the scale" and observe the scale from a panoramic 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 N.B. The intelligere has a third person perspective regarding esse, vivere and percipere. 
5 Which of course means nothing else than the complete absence of any perspective.  
6 A receiver with no density and form of its own. 
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view, in which case it sees its own position and also the positions that are defined by lacking 
what makes intelligere what it is.  
This panoramic view recreates the scale in such a way that one is not only seeing the scale 
from the outside, but also seeing oneself at the same time inside the scale seeing the other levels 
correctly. In other words, we tend to put ourselves both inside and outside the scale: from the 
outside we picture a scale that has several levels (building it from the esse up), and then we 
picture ourselves inside the scale as seeing the other levels just like we do from the outside. 
This double vision makes us believe that we are able to reconstruct the other levels of the scale 
in an adequate and transparent way. Such adequacy is based on the illusion that we can actually 
see five things from an outside perspective (i.e. from a third person or witness perspective) as if 
we were seeing each of them from an inside perspective (i.e. from a first person perspective): a) 
we can see ourselves at the top of the scale, b) we can see the other elements of the scale and 
their position, c) we can see each element of the scale from its own position, d) we can see 
ourselves at the top of the scale seeing the other elements of the scale and their position, e) we 
can see ourselves at the top of the scale seeing adequately the other elements of the scale as we 
see them from an external perspective (i.e. we picture ourselves inside the scale recovering 
every other step as if we could get its first person perspective — the one we think we can grasp 
from the panoramic view).  
As we will now see, the intelligere's belief in its ability to reconstruct the rest of the scale 
reveals itself a problematic one. In fact, if we take a closer look at it, we find the very opposite 
of transparency: what we find is a complex form of cheating.   
To break it down into little pieces, one might begin by noticing that the assumption of a 
universally transparent access is not taken to be an assumption, but sheer self-evidence: 
something that does not need further inspection. This evidence is what prevents an inspection in 
the first place: if I feel that my car is working fine, I don't feel the need to take it to the 
mechanic.  
However, upon closer inspection of the scale, what one finds is far from self-evident. 
Putting it in the terms we used previously, the presumed adequacy of the scale is based on the 
assumption that one can grasp what is less from the standpoint of what is more.  As the 
explanation of the witness point of view already gave away, this is a very hard assumption to 
prove.  
If it is a question of grasping what is less from the point of view of what is more, one easily 
sees that a subtraction must be done and that it needs to be done correctly — one needs to know 
the subtrahend, i.e. what is it that makes what is more different from what is less. Put briefly, 
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one needs to know exactly what to subtract in order to make the subtraction. It is impossible to 
accurately subtract something one cannot identify. Imagine we have something like  
C = A - B. 
Now, if we know A, and the learn that B = 14, we get  
C = A - 14 
But if we do not know what B corresponds to, we cannot get an accurate result, i.e. we 
cannot determine what C stands for. In other words, if there is some imprecision regarding what 
must be subtracted, there will also be imprecision regarding the result of the subtraction. 
As far as the scale is concerned, this means that even if the intelligere is able to correctly 
understand what itself is7, it also needs to be able to correctly determine to what extent 
percipere falls behind intelligere itself. If the intelligere is unable to correctly identify what 
needs to be subtracted, it will not be able to subtract it, and it will not be able to get the result 
(i.e. percipere, or vivere or esse as such).8 
Now, the most important thing to take into account is that, if this result of the subtraction is 
imprecise but taken as if it were the very opposite, no real subtraction takes place after all— 
although one thinks it to actually happen. In such case, the subtraction takes place actu signato 
but not actu exercito. When one pretends to subtract all the characteristics that differentiate 
intelligere from esse, one assumes one knows what those characteristics are all about, and that 
is why one thinks one is subtracting them effectively. But in reality what happens is very far 
from that. In the final analysis, one does not even know what should be subtracted in order to 
fins out what mere percipere (without intelligere) is like — let alone the exact "value" of the 
subtrahend when it comes to finding out what mere vivere and mere esse stand for. We can also 
express this by asking the following questions: can one really depict what it is like to live as a 
mere percipere (i.e. to have a form of perceptive life that has no !"#$4 whatsoever)? And can 
one really know (from a first person perspective) what it is like to live without any form of 
perception at all, or what it is like to have no life at all? Or is one projecting — from the 
standpoint of intelligere — the absence of intelligere, percipere and vivere, while one is still 
using intelligere (or, for that matter percipere and vivere) to depict their own absence? 
This is what one might call a fake subtraction, for it consists in saying that we subtracted 
something — !"#$4 for example — that in reality is still present in the result of the subtraction 
(and indeed as a key player). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Please confront note 8 below. 
8 It is also relevant to notice that, in the case of vivere and esse, we are unable to identify not only the subtrahend but also 
the minuend. 
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 In the end, instead of subtracting, we pretend to subtract something we really cannot 
define, and we end up never leaving the starting point, i.e. intelligere. In other words, we end 
up dealing with a cover up, a projection — an obscure projection — that tries to replicate 
something it cannot grasp: we end up with an esse that is not a mere esse, but a mask of esse 
(the esse of intelligere); we end with a mask of vivere, a mask of percipere and, in the final 
analysis also a mask of intelligere.9  
Put another way, the witness point of view is a form of cheating that, in the case of this 
scale, presupposes one can understand what it is to be a dog, or a plant, or a rock. One tends to 
think that dogs act according to perception and impulse, but without reason (or with a 
primordial form of reason) — and thus defines them by lacking some extra thing one has. But if 
one really wonders about how such a perspective is constituted — i.e. how is it that dogs see 
and hear and smell, how they perceive food, for example —, one easily understands that one is 
incapable of grasping what their perspective and impulsive structure (what their first person 
perspective) really is like. 
To sum up, the main problem with this witness point of view consists in it being 
intrinsically shaped by !"#$4. It uses !"#$4 to consider what it is like to have a perspective 
without !"#$4. The idea of the subtraction of !"#$4 is clearly present in the recovery of the 
other levels, but there is no real subtraction because !"#$4 is being used to rebuild those 
perspectives — and that is the reason why there is no actual first person perspective of the other 
levels of the scale, but only a third person perspective. 
The Stoic way around these problems — regarding animal and human infants — falls back 
on the notion of confusion (&'#/21'µ6+$+), a notion that is also present in Hierocles' text 
("&'#/21'µ6+$4" VII 60, "&7#1'&%+" VIII 3, "8$9%&,:;<4" VIII 6) precisely in the sense we are 
about to see) and that has to do with what we just termed the fake subtraction.  
To put it very briefly, the Stoics describe children as having a pre-logical point of view (viz. 
perception), a point of view and perception that have potentially the same capability of human 
representation, but that are still undeveloped and "confuse". This strategy raises serious doubts, 
for it attempts to describe a different perspective by saying it is both similar to and different 
from ours, without precisely identifying the similarities and differences in question. The same 
thing holds for the description of animal perception, where this confusion leads to an 
anthropomorphist picture of animal perception and impulse: it is as if animals had both !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 If the intelligere sees itself as able to reproduce the other levels of the scale and turns out to be unable to do so, that 
means that the intelligere does not grasp itself in a adequate way, but projects an image of itself that does not correspond 
to what it actually is. In this scenario, the whole scale is proven to be completely wrong and accordingly crumbles. 
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something similar to us and something different from us, but then that "something similar" is 
described from our standpoint without taking into account the difference in question. Once 
again, the problem is to find and fundament both the similarities and differences between the 
two perspectives while avoiding mistaking a third person reconstruction for a first person 
perspective.10 
Accordingly, the term "confusion" is often used to mask the inability to grasp what 
constitutes animal and infant perspective without using our own standpoint (viz. our non animal 
categories) to describe it. In the end, the strategy is the one described above: we describe animal 
and infant perspective as if we could subtract our adult human standpoint (in this case clarity, 
the opposite of confusion) from the equation; while actually we are using that very standpoint 
(namely the one marked by clarity) to depict what its absence (i.e. confusion: the absence of its 
clarity) would be like. 
Besides all that was said, the problems we have been discussing raise yet another relevant 
question, which concerns the above-mentioned assumption that animals and children somehow 
have a common and fundamentally similar structure of perception, one that is continuous with 
the structure of adult human perception. This idea is also derived from the scala naturae and 
from that same witness point of view, and so is all the explanation of the #6+2&%4 ,=+ >µ?713+. 
All the work that can be done upon these assumptions is stained by the form of cheating present 
in the witness standpoint, and therefore amounts to a third person interpretation of a first person 
perspective. In the final analysis, I know as much about the infant's perspective as I know about 
the dog's, and defining it from the lack of what I have as an adult raises the same problems I just 
mentioned (at least within the Stoic perspective we explained above). For that reason, it is hard 
to prove the continuity between animal or infant perception and adult human perception. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 If we look closer, we realize that the anthropomorphism that characterizes our description of animal 
perception is also present when one claims that human perception is a more or less modified version of 
animal behaviour (as is the case with the Stoics, for example). We tend to think a) that this 
anthropomorphism only takes place when we see our human perception as paramount (as one that is 
more advanced than animal perception, and includes the animal perspective in itself and somehow 
surpasses it) b) that anthropomorphism disappears if one believes that it is the other way around: that 
animal perception is paramount — and that human perception is only a variety of it. But this is an 
illusion. For in fact, even if it is true that human perception is only a particular case of animal 
perception, it can happen — and it ends up happening — that the view we humans have of animal 
perception as such is still shaped by our human perception. In other words, even if human perception is 
only a particular instance of animal perception, our human understanding of purely animal perception 
(and, for that matter, of purely animal $5/2*3&%4) is still completely blind to what a first person 
experience of purely animal perception viz. $5/2*3&%4 is like (and therefore one reconstructs such 
experience from one's own “all-too-human” point of view). Thus, unless there is absolutely no difference 
between animal and human perception, anthropomorphism remains a problem.  
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Obviously, this generates some doubts regarding a) Hierocles' ability to describe animal/infant 
perception (viz. the alleged origin of human perception), and also about b) Hierocles' animal-
related examples' ability to prove that human perception does happen the way he describes it. 
Now, on the one hand, this means I have no way to prove the fundamental unity between 
infant/animal and adult perception — the unit that would ultimately enable me to say that 
Hierocles' description does give "proving" elements regarding the origin of my current adult 
perceptive structure (and human perception is general, assuming everyone else has the same).  
But, on the other hand — and this is very important to bear in mind —, this does not mean 
that Hierocles' description of my current adult perceptive structure (and even of animal and 
human infant perception) is an incorrect one. Nor does it mean that Hierocles' account of animal 
and infant behaviour (animal and infant )5&.@+2&.)% and $5/2*3&%4) is completely unfounded. 
Everything said so far only means that:  1) Hierocles' description of human perception is a 
possible and well-supported one; 2) Hierocles' description of animal and human infant 
perception is a possible and well-supported one. The flaws we have been exposing in this annex 
do not prove Hierocles' descriptions of animal/infant and adult human perception wrong 
(neither does the text prove it correct); they just show that it is a merely possible explanation of 
perception, that this account leaves some important problems unsolved, but that it nevertheless 
proves to be a strong and insightful account of perception. 
It is equally important to bear in mind that the problems we have been trying to focus do 
not specifically concern Hierocles' views, nor are they especially relative to the model of 
perception this thesis is all about. They have to do with our limited access to points of view 
other than our own — and they are common to all models of explaining perception. Whatever 
the model of perception one is trying to defend, if one supports it on a perspective that is not 
one's own (be it animal or human infant or whatever other perspective), the problems we have 
been exposing are still present. Indeed, whatever the model might be, if it claims to know 
animal and infant behaviour — or other kinds of perspective that are not one's own — it will be 
always have a blind-spot regarding the very perspective it supports itself upon. In other words, a 
model of perception that tries to support itself in this way will always have feet of clay (even if 
the building itself is constructed with the utmost rigor). 
All this means that, in the end, the model of explaining perception we dug out of Hierocles' 
text can be the right one, but in such a way that a) what corresponds to Hierocles' claims both in 
infant and in animal behaviour, and indeed b) what corresponds to )A&.<&%4 and $5/2*3&%4 (to 
)A&.<&%4 and $5/2*3&%4 überhaupt) in infant and animal behaviour (N.B.: in infant and animal 
first person experience) is something completely out of reach and unknown to us. To make this 
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clearer, one can say that perception is indeed explainable in the way Hierocles attempts to 
explain it, while the fundamental structures that enable perception to be as the -.%/0 
B,$%12*3&%4 describes it may turn out to be different from the ones present in Hierocles' text.11 
In fact, it can happen that animals do perceive in the way Hierocles describes, and that adult 
humans do have the complex structure we tried to describe throughout this thesis, but that, if 
one tries to support this claim in the analysis of what happens with other living being (viz. with 
forms of experience other than our own)— which can only be reconstructed from a third person 
perspective — then one is doomed to being unable to prove the very foundations of one's model 
(one is doomed to being blind regarding the very foundations of one's model — even though 
one thinks one sees them clearly).  
So this annex serves to show that Hierocles' text still has blind-spots and fails to consider 
the complexity we have been trying to highlight. 12 
This increased level of complexity raises new (and unanswered) questions. One of them is 
connected to the fact that, ultimately, both perception and $5/2*3&%4 may turn out to vary 
significantly from animal species to animal species, from animals to infants, and from infant 
human beings to adult human beings. This is a very important aspect, for it means that both 
perception and $5/2*3&%4 (and, for that matter, all the essential components of perception and 
$5/2*3&%4 we have dealt with) may turn out to be what Aristotle termed C$!!)1=4 !2#"µ2+) 
(and that the same holds true for the articulation between the two, )A&.<&%4 and $5/2*3&%4).13 
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11 Or they may turn out to be the exact ones described there: the problem consists precisely in one's inability to 
retriever animal and infant perception (or any other kind of perception that is not one's own) — which means that 
one can neither prove the description of such perspectives right nor wrong. 
12 It can not be emphasized often enough that this is not a specific problem of Hierocles' text, nor of the kind of 
account of perception and $5/2*3&%4 Hierocles' descriptions stand for, but rather applies to all other models of 
explaining perception that are based on the same strategy. 
13 Now, the main problem to keep in mind regarding these heterogeneous forms of perception and $5/2*3&%4 
consists in them being not only heterogeneous, but also — and more importantly — blind to one another. Like I 
have bee trying to explain in this annex, the main problem consists in the inability of each form of perception and 
$5/2*3&%4 (or rather of each particular combination of the two) to see what it is like to have other forms of 
perception and $5/2*3&%4 (viz. other forms of combination of what these two words stand for). So this means we are 
dealing with a special kind of C$!!)1=4 !2#"µ2+). Usually, when one thinks about what Aristotle termed 
C$!!)1=4 !2#"µ2+), one presupposes a synoptic view of the different senses or meanings in question. But this is 
not what we are dealing with here. What is at stake here is the possibility of being enclosed within one of those 
instances, in such a way that the one enclosed within one form of perceiving and $5/2*3&%4 is completely unable to 
grasp what it is like to perceive or to be "under the spell of $5/2*3&%4" the way the other instances do. In this case, 
we are also unable to see the differences between different perceptive structures. In other words, the C$!!)1=4 
!2#"µ2+) we are speaking about here are not different objects within our reach, but rather something constituted in 
such a way that we (namely our whole way of $5/2%$D&,)% and )5&.@+2&.)%) are one of its components, and we can 
speak of the others only by means of what Kant once termed "negative Erweiterung". Regarding this problem, and 
also other unanswered questions in Hierocles' text, please confront Carvalho, Mário Jorge, Wahrnehmung und 
Selbstreferenz - Der Selbstreferentielle Charakter der Wahrnehmung nach Hierokles, in Edmundo Balsemão Pires, 
Burkhard Nonnenmacher and Stefan Büttner-von Stülpnagel (ed.), Relations of the Self, Coimbra University Press, 
Coimbra, 2010,pag. 137. 
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To conclude, I would like to stress that the flaws we have just discuss do not compromise 
what I tried to point out in this thesis, i.e. they do not compromise the particular way of 
understanding perception (viz. $5/2*3&%4) to which Hierocles' -.%/0 B,$%12*3&%4 paves the 
way. Even if the examples used by Hierocles cannot be considered proved descripions of animal 
behaviour, they still allow the reader to probe the kind of model that takes shape in Hierocles' 
analysis. The fact that such explanation is proved to be only a possible explanation does not 
hinder its value as an explanation of perception, but rather helps it in a critical perspective, since 
it helps to answer the driving questions of this dissertation. In other words: even if a third 
person interpretation of animal behaviour is just an interpretation, and even if the unity between 
animal or infant perspective and adult perspective cannot be secured, yet that does not mean 
that the elements found in Hierocles' text do not provide the basis for a sound interpretation of 
perception, one that helps me understand what my perception is all about.  
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Attachment 3 — Perceptum per se 
 
The problem of perceptum per se is one of the most complicated ones to solve within the 
framework of this thesis. And it is easy to explain why: Hierocles never really considers the 
problem in these terms. To be honest, he never deals with it explicitly.1 However, the discussion 
around what we have termed perceptum per se is present in this thesis from the very moment in 
which the Lego and Bystander paradigms were introduced.2 Given the fact that the whole thesis 
consists in explaining how Hierocles' account challenges these paradigms — creating thus an 
alternative model to explain perception —, it seems to me important to clarify what perceptum 
per se is and why it is not suitable for describing how our perception works (unless as 
something opposed to what really defines our perception). 
So what is the problem of perceptum per se? 
To answer this question I will start by identifying what I understand by the expression 
perceptum per se; secondly I will explain why what this expression stands for collides with 
Hierocles' description of perception — and why it lies at the heart of a possible objection to 
Hierocles' main claims —; and finally I will try to overcome this objection.  
By perceptum per se I understand pure perceptive data, in the sense of mere perceptive 
content. The two main characteristics of this pure perceptive data consist in a) its 
elemental/minimal nature and b its) simplicity (qualitative simplicity – pure presence of a 
material quality as opposed to forms of representation (i.e. whatever is not reducible to this)). 
Behind both these characteristics lies the belief that it is possible to break down perception into 
the minimum units of perceptive data, and that such minimum units would be simple and 
intrinsically unrelated to one another. 
Let us take a closer look into this. 
a) When I speak of an elemental/minimal nature of perceptum per se I mean the alleged 
possibility of breaking any perceptive content down into the simplest elements that it contains. 
For example, it would be possible to dismantle perception of my hand into different and simple 
moments, such as different colours, textures, odours, and so on. In this case, perception as such 
amounts to the recollection of these different and simple colours, textures, odours, and so on.3 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 To go even further, I would say that Hierocles never even considers this problem, although an analysis of his text forces 
one to do so (even if as an unanswered question — or silently, implicitly and unconsciously answered). 
2Right at the introduction, pages 6-7. 
3 The recollection of X moment of brown + Y moment of brown + Z moment of light brown + A moment of texture + B 
moment of texture + J moment of smell, etc..  
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b) When I speak of the simple and intrinsically unrelated nature of perceptum per se, what I 
have in mind is the claim that, in the final analysis, perception amounts to the mere 
apprehension of the different and isolated moments referred to in a) (which are percepta per se), 
in such a way that perception qua perception does not include anything else but a mere presence 
of pure sensory qualities. 
The existence of a perceptum per se — as described here —is founded upon the conviction 
that one perceives as if one were a mere "data receiver": one receives "pieces" of perceptive 
data (one receives percepta per se)4 in such a way that one grasps them like an unsuspected and 
neutral receiver of them5. After this "recollection phase" the percipient assembles the percepta 
per se (just as in a Lego) and transforms them into actual information (such as blue, salty, cold, 
big, moving, and all the way until one gets to an ocean, for example).  
So what is the objection we still have to answer regarding the possible existence of what we 
have termed perceptum per se?  
In reality, the objection is twofold: 
1) Could it be that everything described by Hierocles is not perception as such, but 
something that is added to perception? In other words: could it be that perception as such is just 
apprehension, and then the interpretation of the perceptive data is something added to 
perception qua perception? 
2) Could it be that, even though perception does include (qua perception) an interpretative 
moment and does have the self-centred and non-indifferent structure described by Hierocles, it 
still has as its starting moment pure perceptive data that perception itself then transforms and 
organizes into the structure in question? In other words: could it be that perception (qua 
perception) has two distinct moments – one that consists in the pure immediate presence of a 
"material" content and (so to speak) a "judicative" one— and that the first is simple and purely 
perceptive, and only after this does the second come into play (and with it the complexity 
described throughout the text)? Or, to put it in the briefest way: could perception have a simple 
and non-judicative moment? 
At the core of these objections lies a very important question: there seem to be elements in 
Hierocles' explanation of perception that "exceed" perception as such — are they or are they not 
part of perception as such? Is the structure portrayed in this thesis an intrinsic structure of 
perception? Is it a structure of perception but not an intrinsic one? Or is it a "logical" or meta-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4This has to do with the Lego paradigm 
5 And this has to do with the Bystander paradigm, especially in the sense of not being a non-indifferent percipient, for the 
interest would introduce the characteristics I have tried to illustrate during the thesis!
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perceptive structure that is applied to perception? Or, to sum up the three questions: is 
perception always and at its core more than apprehension of perceptive data?6 
As far as I can see, the objection touches on two fundamental aspects of the paradigm  
arising from our previous analysis: a) the intrinsically complex nature of perception (qua 
perception) and b) the "logical" (or "judicative") structure of perception (qua perception). Let 
us then join battle on these two fronts. 
To fully answer this manifold question one would have to write a whole new thesis. 
However, I will try to concisely (and accurately) describe and pick apart the objection 
perceptum per se poses to the model of perception extracted from Hierocles' text. 
Now, instead of defending the model I tried to depict throughout the whole thesis, I will try 
to cut this discussion to its minimum size by raising a counter-objection. And this counter-
objection is the following: when we speak of a purely "material" or immediate presence of 
perceptive contents, we tend to assume that we know what that purely "material" or immediate 
presence of perceptive content is. My objection is that we have no clue as to what such a thing 
might be. To show this, I will consider Aristotle's distinction between !"#$%#&' and µ()µ%. 
1) I would like to start by stressing that, when we try do picture pure !"#$%#&' (pure 
apprehension of the present perceptive data), we do it while using a standpoint that goes beyond 
pure !"#$%#&' (i.e. that is not limited to the pure apprehension of present perceptive data). In 
other words, when we try to take away everything that exceeds the pure apprehension of the 
present perceptive data, we do it actu signato, but not actu exercito.7 
2) Why is this so? Because, in order for us to accurately grasp what it would be like to have 
a pure presence of perceptive data, we would have to be able to understand a point of view in 
which there is no past and no future. For that is what pure !"#$%#&' is all about. But a point of 
view in which there is no past and no future is altogether different from anything we know. It is 
always trapped within an absolute present — which is an oxymoron in itself. Furthermore, an 
"absolute present" is something constantly "bleeding away" (so to speak). Whatever appears in 
an "absolute present", appears in such a way that it is already disappearing. The result being that 
it has nothing whatsoever in common with what pure !"#$%#&' seems to stand for — i.e. with 
pure !"#$%#&' in the usual (and seemingly obvious) sense of the word. 
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6 This has to do with what the Stoics call *+,-.. The question is whether or not perception always has a logical form. If 
one puts this question with regard to the animal case, some problems connected with annex 2 will re-surface. To better 
understand them, it is important to study how Stoic texts describe these *+,-. and the role they play (both explicitly and 
implicitly) in their description of animal behaviour. However, this task is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
7As we have seen this happened with our attempt to reconstruct animal behaviour in the previous annex.!
! %!
3) Thus, in order for the present moment to be a "present moment" in the sense we give it, 
the present must be connected to the past and the future, i.e both memory and expectation. 
Without them, there is no present in the sense we are used to. 
4) For economy's sake, let us focus only on memory viz. on the retention of past perception. 
As Aristotle points out, µ()µ% (the µ()µ% without which there can be nothing but an "absolute 
presence") differs from mere µ/(0 -/1 !2#$)µ!-/', (i.e. from mere "persistance" or 
"permanence" of the perceived). As a matter of fact, mere µ/(0 -/1 !2#$)µ!-/' only means that 
the "absolute present" includes many more perceptive contents than without this kind of µ/(0 
(all perceived contents like an "absolute chord" — and absolutely no melody). As Aristotle 
rightly puts it, there is no µ()µ% without some kind of representation of time itself (that is, both 
of the difference between present and past and between different moments of the past). But this 
in turn means that there is no µ()µ% — and therefore no present in our usual sense of the term 
— without much more than the pure immediate presence of perceptive content (i.e. without a 
kind of "meta-perceptive representation which our opponents try to exclude from perception). 
5) This means that, when we talk about the mere presence of purely sensitive data we are 
using this structure and sequence of µ()µ% without realizing it. Now, since this structure and 
sequence of µ()µ% is clearly more than the pure presence of sensitive data, this means that there 
is a mistake in our understanding of what it takes to make !2#$.(+#$!&. In fact, when we picture 
"simple !"#$%#&'" as the pure presence of sensitive data, we do it while silently using elements 
that transcend the pure sensitive presence !"#$%#&' is allegedly all about. 
Besides this first counter-objection, there is a second one, which is concerned with the 
ever-so-stressed connection between life and perception. It goes as follows: when all is said and 
done, the pure presence of immediate perceptive contents is completely irrelevant from a "vital" 
point of view. In other words, such perception is irrelevant to life. It seems completely unable to 
play the role life requires from perception. In short, as far as life is concerned, the minimum is 
far more than the pure presence of perceptive contents — the minimum is the very kind of 
3(-&*)4+&' Hierocles’ analysis of perception is all about.  
This rough sketch must suffice to give an idea of the kind of discussion we would like to 
engage in, if it were not for the lack of space. 
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Attachment 4 — The role of experience in the !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#.. 
 
One of the problems I could not consider in the course of my explanation is the 
role of experience in Hierocles' text. This problem can be formulated as a question 
and as an objection to everything I have said so far. As a question it can be expounded 
like this: what is the role of experience in the structure of perception described in the 
!"#$% &'(#)*+,-#.? As an objection, it can be formulated like this: is it or is it not 
true that animals come to have the structure of perception described in the !"#$% 
&'(#)*+,-#. via experience? 
The main reason for me not to have focused on this problem is very simple: 
Hierocles' text does not deal with it, at least not explicitly. There is a passage where it 
is clearly implied that animals have non-experience-learned behaviours.1 On the basis 
of everything we have seen so far, this means that their perception is shaped by 
something they have not learnt from experience. However, the role of experience in 
animal behaviour is not considered. Since Hierocles' analysis of animal perception is 
made through the study of animal behaviour, the role of experience in the evolution of 
the structure of perception is also left outside of the author's account. 
To overcome this gap, one would have to reconstitute Hierocles’ position on this 
matter. To do this, one could use both the surviving part of the !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#. and 
Seneca's 121st letter to Lucilius. The latter is a fundamental piece in the Stoic account 
of experience and of the role it plays in animals' lives and perspectives. In fact, taking 
this letter into account would help with various other matters in our study, for it ends 
up describing the same complex structure we have tried to evince so far. 
Unfortunately, such a task cannot be undertaken. Still, the elements we have gathered 
from Hierocles' text allow us to give at least a partial answer to the question/objection 
enunciated above (and therefore to at least partially reconstitute his view on the 
matter).  
 Even though Hierocles does not consider the role of experience, he does not say 
that it plays no role in animal life viz. perception. He rather leaves this problem 
untouched and focuses on the fact that animal perception has fundamental and 
constitutional elements that are not derived from experience, but are considered part 
and parcel of an animal's innate structure. It seems clear that the !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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presents danger (for example) as a category that precedes experience, and not as 
something that is learned through experience. 
To better analyse this, we can consider III 40 onwards, where it is said that a 
domestic chick is afraid both of weasels and of falcons, but does not fear bulls. Here 
there are (at least) two levels of non-experience-related elements: firstly, the 
experience of bulls as non-dangerous animals and of weasels and falcons as 
dangerous animals is something that can only happen within a context of a non-
indifference towards oneself that makes one afraid of what is perceived as a threat to 
oneself; secondly, there is an allegedly non-experience-related anticipation of what 
constitutes a threat to oneself and what does not (since this passage can be read as 
meaning that a domestic chick is still young and could not have learnt these things by 
experience, but rather knows them from the moment it is born).  
Now, the biggest contribution that Hierocles' text has to offer to the study of 
experience is related to the first aspect. For, as we have said countless times, it tries to 
depict how a non-experience-related non-indifference towards oneself shapes 
perception, that same perception that enables experience to happen as it does. And 
this serves to answer the question and objection formulated above, since it shows that, 
even if experience does influence and shape an animal's (viz. human's) structure of 
perception, there are non-experience-related fundamental and constitutional elements2 
that have an even deeper role in it and that constitute it in such a way that experience 
as we know it could not happen if it were not for them. For example, a domestic chick 
could not be afraid of something — it could not experience fear — if it did not have a 
positive non-indifference towards itself, or what is more, it could not be afraid of 
something if it did not have the formal and complex structure of non-indifference and 
perception I have tried to illustrate throughout the text. This structure is thus 
presented as a "welcome-home-pack" — a "welcome-to-the-world-pack" — that 
anticipates all experience and enables it. This means that there is an anticipation of the 
form of experience, and that experience as such is but an instantiation or specification 
of such form. 
Still, when it comes to the second level and the role of experience in it — i.e. 
when it comes to understanding both a) how it is that animals anticipate what is 
dangerous and safe even before they have any experience and b) if and how !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2And here it is important to notice that some of these elements — such as danger and safety — are precisely 
those one would assume to be learned via experience. 
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experience come to change an animal's (viz. human's) structure of perception — 
Hierocles' text is completely silent. To answer this second part of the question one 
would have to step outside the !"#$% &'(#)*+,-#. (and indeed outside of Hierocles' 
work) and study all the related problems that I cannot consider here. 
 
